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ABSTRACT
The first essay, the Financial Consequences of Customer Satisfaction: Evidence from Yelp
Ratings and SBA Loans, demonstrates the financial and real consequences of customer satis-
faction using a novel and comprehensive Yelp dataset. I show that Yelp ratings are significant
indicators of business outcomes in a regression discontinuity design setting. A one-half star
increase in Yelp ratings leads to a higher probability of receiving SBA loans, better loan
terms, and better loan performance. The results are more pronounced when banks have less
information about the borrowers. Yelp ratings become less effective when using repeated
loan transactions. Lastly, higher Yelp ratings lead to increases in consumer demand and the
likelihood of subsequent business opening.
In the second essay, Are Open Market Share Repurchase Programs Really Flexible, I
show that open market share repurchase programs are not as flexible as expected, utilizing
the financial crisis and predetermined variation in program ending dates. Firms with share
repurchase programs ending after December 2007 cut real activities more than otherwise
similar firms with programs ending before December 2007. The effects are more pronounced
in firms that do not depend on banks, without long-term analyst coverage, without credit
ratings, and with no new debt or equity issuance. The freed-up capital indeed goes toward
share repurchase programs: firms buyback on average 84% of the predetermined amount of
the shares.
The third essay, “Trading” Political Favors:Evidence from the Impact of the STOCK Act,
demonstrates the tacit benefits that accrue to both politicians and the firms to which they are
connected through stock ownership. Specifically, we show strong evidence that politicians
use private information and political favors for financial gains from stock investments in
their personal portfolios, and that these favors have a real impact on the value and economic
outcomes of the firms in which they invest. To do so, we assemble the stock ownership and
trading data for all members of the U. S. Congress from 2010 to 2013 and use the passage of
the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act in 2012 as an experiment to
examine changes in politicians’ trading performance as well as in firm value and outcomes.
We find that prior to the STOCK Act, members of the Congress earn significant abnormal
ii
returns on their stock trades, and an increase in their holdings of a firm’s stock positively
predicts the firm’s likelihood of being acquired as well as its revenue and earnings surprises.
After the passage of the Act, politicians exhibit no such informational advantage in trading
or outperformance. On the firms’ side, we show that companies with politician ownership on
average lose 1.4% in value during the three-day window around the Act’s passage, while firms
not owned by politicians experience no abnormal returns. Correspondingly, after the Act’s
passage, these politician-owned firms lose a significant amount of procurement contracts and
government grants and become less likely to be selected by the government into high-profile
trade missions compared to during the pre-Act period. We find that these mutual benefits
are particularly pronounced for politicians who are powerful and firms that are politically
active.
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CHAPTER 1
THE FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF
CUSTOMER SATISFACTION: EVIDENCE FROM
YELP RATINGS AND SBA LOANS
1.1. Introduction
Businesses, large or small, have devoted numerous resources to maintaining their customer
satisfaction. Customer satisfaction has been widely recognized as a valuable intangible asset
to businesses in fiercely competitive markets. The question arises, then, whether customer
satisfaction brings those businesses any direct financial consequences. In this paper, I focus
on Yelp ratings and use Small Business Administration (SBA) loans as the outcome. I show
that customer satisfaction aspects of crowd-sourced ratings have a real impact on the small
businesses.
Small businesses are the backbone of the U.S. economy. They represent more than 95%
of all firms and employ more than 50% of the private sector workforce. Additionally, small
businesses create roughly 65% of new employment opportunities. Due to limited access to
public equity and debt markets, small businesses mainly rely on bank credit, especially term
loans, to finance their growth. One major obstacle in small business lending is that banks
have scarce reliable information about borrowers because small businesses are not subject to
strict regulatory filing requirements. The usual toolbox lenders possess might offer little to no
benefit. That being said, lenders have access to alternative and less traditional methods for
measuring customer satisfaction and public perception about potential borrowers thanks to
the proliferation of review websites like Yelp.com. Yelp ratings are generated by individuals
and aggregated by the Yelp web platform. To some extent, these ratings represent businesses’
customer satisfaction, reputations, popularity, and prospects. The Yelp platform enables
such soft information to quickly reach consumers as well as lenders. More importantly, Yelp
ratings affect the outcome of the small businesses in two ways.
Social learning helps reduce uncertainties regarding the quality of goods and services.
For example, consumers choose to buy books with higher customer ratings (Chevalier and
Mayzlin, 2006), update their beliefs about a movie’s quality based on peer feedback (Moretti,
2011), and order a restaurant’s most popular dishes once they become aware of them (Cai
et al., 2009). Because customers learn from peer reviews posted on social media platforms
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and make consumption choices accordingly, businesses with higher ratings are more likely
to attract larger numbers of consumers. That is, businesses with five-star Yelp ratings will
attract more customers than those with one-star ratings.
In turn, the noticeable differences in consumer receptions between businesses with differ-
ent ratings could translate to higher revenue and cash flow streams. Those characteristics
shown by businesses with higher ratings make them attractive candidates in the eyes of ratio-
nal lenders. In other words, rational lenders, exploiting the good prospects of highly-rated
businesses that are generated by consumer demand, make sensible lending decisions that
coincide with Yelp ratings. Since mechanisms to resolve information asymmetry problems
are imperfect, banks ration borrowers (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Lenders believe borrowers
with a track record are more likely to repay their loans and have better outcomes (Diamond,
1991). In the modern era of bank lending, customer satisfaction reported from social media
platforms could indicate businesses’ prospects and in turn serve as salient signals to com-
plement lenders’ existing evidence. Indeed, successful and high-quality businesses usually
command higher premiums to compensate for business owners’ investments, which trans-
lates into enhanced revenue and profitability (Allen, 1984). Borrowers with higher ratings,
as indicated by information aggregated on social media platforms, would therefore have more
financial slack with which to fulfill their loan commitments.1
Anecdotally, the SBA and Yelp have formed a partnership to help small businesses succeed
with online reviews.2 Similarly, many other major financial institutions, such as J.P. Morgan
Chase, offer advice on their websites to educate small business owners about social media.3
Last but not least, mainstream news outlets, like Forbes and the BBC, have published articles
about social media and the ability to qualify for bank loans.4 Overall, Yelp’s business ratings
could provide lenders with reliable information regarding borrowers’ business prospects.
In this paper, I examine the impact of Yelp ratings on SBA loan outcomes, specifically
the probability of receiving loans, loan terms, and loan performance. To do so, I collect a
novel and comprehensive Yelp review dataset that begins at Yelp’s inception in 2004. The
final sample has over 80 million distinct reviews covering more than 1 million businesses
across the United States. I obtain the SBA loan data from the SBA through a Freedom
1One might argue that each review written on Yelp by itself is considered noisy at best and may not
provide insightful information. However, the true information is revealed when aggregating each individual
piece (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1981; Verrecchia, 1982; Ellison and Fudenberg, 1995).
2For more information regarding the partnership, see https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/sba-initiati
ves/sba-and-yelp-present-success-online-reviews (last retrieved: July 15, 2017).
3For more details, see https://www.chase.com/news/111416-social-media (last retrieved: July 15,
2017).
4For more details, see http://www.bbc.com/news/business-37224847 and https://www.forbes.com/s
ites/chynes/2017/04/25/how-data-will-help-drive-universal-financial-access/#1466f1eb57e6
(last retrieved: July 15, 2017).
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of Information Act (FOIA) request. In the baseline results, I find that aggregated Yelp
ratings have a positive and significant relationship with the probability of receiving SBA
loans. I further show that the loans have better terms, such as lower interest rates and
lower collateral requirements, and perform better, with lower default probability and a lower
amount of write-offs upon default. However, many confounding factors might coexist with
the Yelp ratings and hence may cause an endogeneity problem. More specifically, some
unobservable or observable elements may be correlated with Yelp ratings, which could affect
my findings.
To address this identification issue, I exploit a unique feature of the Yelp platform. Though
each individual review has its own unique rating assigned by the user who writes it, Yelp
aggregates those ratings and presents an overall rating of the business. The overall rating is
only shown as a number of stars. Because of the institutional design, Yelp ratings range on
a scale of 1 to 5 stars in one-half star increments, which means each overall rating is rounded
to the nearest one-half star by using predetermined rounding thresholds. For example, a
business with an overall rating of 3.75 is rounded up to 4 stars, while a business with an
overall rating of 3.74 is rounded down to 3.5 stars. I implement a regression discontinuity
design (RDD) around the rounding thresholds. I assume that the closer a rating is to the
rounding thresholds, the more similar predetermined business characteristics that affect loan
outcomes become. My key identifying assumption is that, in the absence of a discontinuous
jump in overall ratings near the rounding thresholds, there are no other discontinuous changes
in business characteristics that directly affect loan outcomes.
Using the RDD tool, I document a causal relationship between Yelp ratings and loan
outcomes. I first examine the probability of receiving SBA loans. I find that a one-half star
increase in Yelp rating leads to a significant increase in the probability of receiving loans.
This effect is also economically significant, representing a 40% increase in the probability of
receiving SBA loans. This is direct evidence that businesses’ customer satisfaction ratings
have significant effects in small business lending. To provide further support to the argument,
I next explore loan terms, more specifically loan spreads and collateral. Again, utilizing the
RDD design, I document that a one-half star increase in Yelp rating leads to significantly
lower financing costs. The average business ‘just above’ the rounding thresholds enjoys a 36
basis points lower loan spread and 4% less collateral requirements than the average business
‘just below’ the threshold. The effect is also economically substantial, corresponding to
12% cheaper loan pricing and lower required collateral, which is a tremendous benefit for
small businesses. Lastly, I examine loan performance in terms of default probability and
the amount of write-off upon default given that businesses with higher ratings are attracting
more customers, which means higher revenue and a better position to repay loans. I find
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that a one-half star increase in Yelp rating leads to two-times better loan performance, that
is both statistically and economically significant. I interpret the loan outcome results as
consistent with the notion that aggregated Yelp ratings represent the borrowers’ prospects.
I then use cross-sectional comparisons and show that the role of Yelp ratings is more pro-
nounced when retrieving information about the borrower is more costly to provide support
that lenders refer to such ratings as salient signals. Specifically, I focus on the local business
environment and bank monitoring effectiveness. My findings show that a one-half star in-
crease in Yelp rating has a stronger impact on businesses in sectors with fewer competitors
and on those located far away from the lending banks. For businesses with fewer competitors,
the available information is quite opaque. Yelp ratings serve as good indicators of future
revenue potential for those types of businesses. Similarly, banks need to devote extra effort
to obtaining the creditworthiness of and monitoring borrowers, especially those that reside
far from them. Social media therefore helps to alleviate this problem, since Yelp ratings are
readily available to lenders.
Next, I focus on situations in which other sources of information could potentially dilute
the effects of the Yelp ratings. I focus on small businesses that take out subsequent loans from
the SBA. In those cases, the lenders have already had prior experience with the borrowers.
I find evidence that the lenders rely less on Yelp ratings in subsequent lending decisions
compared to the first decisions. In addition, I identify whether the first and second loans
are originated by the same lender. I document that, when a second loan is taken out with
the same bank, businesses’ Yelp ratings become less revealing, because the banks have had
direct interactions with the borrowers. However, the overall effects of Yelp ratings are not
completely canceled out, indicating that Yelp remains a good predictor of loan outcomes
even for subsequent loans.
Lastly, I turn to two alternative outcomes, one from a consumer and one from a business
perspective, to test whether Yelp ratings could be effective determinants. I first study the
changes in consumer demand due to increases in Yelp ratings. I proxy consumer demand
using new reviews received by businesses and find that higher Yelp ratings lead to higher
probability of receiving more reviews. Then I measure subsequent location openings for
companies already on Yelp to develop an understanding of small businesses’ investment
decisions. I find that a one-half star increase in Yelp rating leads to a 23% increase in the
likelihood of opening a new location.
Considered together, my results shed light on the effects of social media on small businesses’
financial consequences. My work makes a critical contribution into several strands of inquiry.
First, I contribute to a large body of literature on the financial and real consequences of credit
ratings. Unlike credit ratings, which take effects through regulatory certification (Bongaerts
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et al., 2012), I show that Yelp ratings have a direct effect on bank lending. I also show that
other types of ratings, i.e., crowd-sourced Yelp ratings, play important roles in economic
outcomes, similar to the unexpected effects of sovereign ratings (Almeida et al., 2017). In
terms of ratings’ discreteness, I find evidence consistent with the fact that creditors favor
firms with ratings above a pre-determined cutoff (Chernenko and Sunderam, 2011).
This research also enriches the results of studies that have examined the role of social media
and reputation capital. My work identifies important and effective information contents from
consumer opinion, which is an integral part of business reputation. Existing studies, e.g.,
Da et al. (2011) and Huang (2017), show that Internet popularity influences asset prices in a
way that cannot be explained by existing risk factors. I study small businesses where there is
extremely scarce public knowledge about their financial health. The amount of information
provided by the crowd appears to be even more significant in these cases.5 To the best of
my knowledge, this paper marks the first attempt to utilize a comprehensive Yelp dataset
that provides valuable information coverage on more than 1 million businesses.6
My paper is also related to the literature on bank lending. Earlier studies, both empirical
and theoretical, have focused on relationship lending through repeated transactions between
the borrowers and lenders (e.g., Diamond, 1991; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell,
1995). More recent studies have explored the relationship between additional dimensions
between lenders and borrowers and loan outcomes, such as the loan syndicate structure (Sufi,
2007), asymmetric information in loan syndicates (Ivashina, 2009), and corporate ownership
structure (Lin et al., 2012). I study loan decisions in the realm of social media, i.e., reviews by
separate individuals averaged by a web platform. With over 80 million reviews to support
my analysis, I show that customer satisfaction is critical in determining loan outcomes.
Furthermore, it is difficult to establish a causal relationship between banking relationships
and bank lending. As such, I utilize an RDD identification strategy that exploits Yelp rating
rounding thresholds to address this endogeneity concern.
This study also adds to the literature about small business financing and entrepreneurship
in general. First, my paper introduces a new data source to the literature that provides
excellent coverage on entrepreneurial firms. Second, existing studies mainly document the
impact of small business loans on, for example, employment growth (Brown and Earle, 2017),
business growth (Hackney, 2016), and local economic performance (Craig et al., 2005). My
5The paper is also related to valuating intangibles in light of Edmans (2011) where customer satisfaction
ratings can be regarded as firms’ intangible capital.
6Scholars in other fields have used Yelp data to answer different research questions (e.g., Anderson and
Magruder, 2012; Luca, 2016; Elder et al., 2017). However, they tend to focus on one single city or industry,
which could potentially introduce city- or industry-specific biases that make it nearly impossible to generalize
the results.
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paper focuses on the determinants of those loans and provides additional ways to understand
the lending process, especially in the small business setting.
1.2. Empirical Design and Data
1.2.1. Empirical strategy
First, it’s important to establish the relationship between Yelp ratings and loan outcomes.
I carry out a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) approach as shown in Equation (1.1). In
the regression equation, outcomeit takes on different measures of loan outcomes, actual ratingit
is the unrounded actual Yelp rating, Xit is a vector of business and loan level controls, κi is
firm fixed effects, τt represents year fixed effects, ηi is Yelp industry fixed effects, and θi is
county fixed effects. This relationship should be understood as a correlation.
Outcomeit = β0 + β1 · actual ratingit + β6 ·Xit + κi + τt + ηi + θi + εit (1.1)
Identifying the effects of Yelp ratings on loan outcomes in general is challenging because
lenders possess additional information about the borrowers. Those elements, together with
unobservable factors, might be correlated with Yelp ratings. The regression in Equation (1.1)
is subject to potential endogeneity problems. Furthermore, whether the small businesses
receive SBA loans and what the loan terms would be are inherent selection issues arising
from the loan granting institutions.
To overcome this identification problem, I exploit a design feature of the Yelp platform.
When one looks up businesses on Yelp.com, the website prominently displays the overall
ratings of businesses on the top left corner under the business names. Figure 1.1 shows
two examples of Yelp ratings. The overall ratings are presented in the form of stars. The
stars range from one to five, and they increase in one-half star increments, which yields nine
possible rating categories. More specifically, businesses on Yelp receive overall ratings of 1
star, 1.5 stars, 2 stars, 2.5 stars, 3 stars, 3.5 stars, 4 stars, 4.5 stars, and 5 stars. In the
example shown in Figure 1.1, the business at the top of the figure has a Yelp rating of 4
stars, whereas the business at the bottom has a Yelp rating of 4.5 stars. However, those
star ratings are not the exact ratings of those businesses. They are, instead, average ratings
calculated from all the individual reviews left by users. When Yelp aggregates those reviews,
the platform uses a predetermined rule to round the average ratings to display them in one
of the aforementioned nine possible overall star ratings. Due to Yelp’s institutional design,
the rounding thresholds are set exactly at the mid-point of two neighboring star ratings.
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For example, in determining whether a business belongs to the 4-star group or the 4.5-star
group, Yelp compares the business’s average star rating calculated from all user reviews to
the mid-point of 4 and 4.5, which is 4.25. If the business has an average review below 4.25,
then the overall rating is rounded down to 4 stars and shown as such on Yelp. Otherwise
the business’s overall star rating is rounded up to 4.5 stars and displayed accordingly.7
I implement an RDD strategy around the rounding thresholds to study their effects on
loan outcomes. Since Yelp provides nine possible star ratings, there are eight rounding
thresholds. I recenter the average ratings to their cutoff points and assign the businesses
with average ratings ‘just above’ the rounding thresholds to the treatment group and the
businesses with average ratings just below the rounding thresholds to the control group.
The idea is that assignment to the treatment is determined by whether the Yelp ratings are
rounded up or down given the fixed rounding thresholds. Businesses with average ratings
‘just above’ the rounding thresholds are similar in many relevant respects to businesses with
average ratings ‘just below’. The average ratings may themselves be associated with loan
outcomes, but this association is assumed to be smooth. As a result, I can interpret any
discontinuity of the conditional distribution of loan outcomes as a function of Yelp ratings at
the rounding thresholds as causal. My key identifying assumption is that, in the absence of
a discontinuous jump in overall ratings around the rounding thresholds, there are no other
discontinuous changes in business characteristics that directly affect the loan outcomes.8
To empirically carry out my identification strategy, I adopt the parametric approach as
suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2010) and utilize the full sample with higher order polyno-
mials. I estimate a regression of the following form:
Outcomeit = β0 + β1 · Iround upit + β2 · recentered actual ratingit + β3 · recentered
actual rating2it + β4 · Iround upit × recentered actual ratingit+
β5 · Iround upit × recentered actual rating
2
it + β6 ·Xit+
φi + κi + τt + ηi + θi + εit
(1.2)
where outcomeit takes on different measures of loan outcomes, Iround upit is an indicator
variable that equals one if the Yelp rating is rounded up and equals zero if rounded down,
recentered actual ratingit is the unrounded average rating recentered around each cutoff,
Xit is a vector of business and loan level controls, φi is cutoff fixed effects, κi is firm fixed
7In Appendix A.1, I show the Yelp ratings as shown in Google search results of the sample businesses.
Google extracts the Yelp ratings and displays them directly in the search results. First, the lenders do not
need to find the specific Yelp pages to get businesses’ Yelp ratings. Second, Google preserves the format of
Yelp ratings so my identification strategy is still valid even if loan decisions are based on the Google search
results.
8I show this graphically in Appendix A.2
7
effects, τt represents year fixed effects, ηi is Yelp industry fixed effects, and θi is county fixed
effects.9
One potential concern arises with using the Yelp data. The rounding thresholds are also
known to the business owners. They have an incentive to manipulate their ratings so they
appear to be one-half star higher in ratings. The reasons behind the manipulation could be
to attract more customers and to window-dress their ratings before applying for financing.
Anecdotally, Yelp has always maintained that they employ a team of engineers to combat
fake reviews with complex and advanced computer algorithms.10 Additionally, federal judges
have dismissed lawsuits against allegations of Yelp review manipulation.11
1.2.2. Yelp data
Founded in 2004, Yelp is a crowd-sourced website where people post their reviews of busi-
nesses. Yelp attracts 26 million unique visitors on average through the mobile application
and 73 million unique visitors on average through the web each month. It contains over 127
million reviews as of the first quarter 2017.12 Everyone can sign up for a Yelp.com account
free of charge to rate businesses and write reviews. The reviews consist of reviewer names,
review dates, one- to five- star ratings, and comments from the reviewers. Everyone can
access Yelp through mobile devices and computers by directly searching the business names
in search engines or on Yelp.com. Users also have the ability to look up businesses by a
specific star rating, a particular location, a Yelp industry, or a price range, among many
other criteria.
I search and download relevant business information and reviews from Yelp. Figure 1.2
provides a sample business listed on Yelp and the data extraction procedure. For each
business, I collect the business name (i.e., Bacaro), Yelp business category (i.e., American,
9In robustness tests shown in the appendices, I also adopt the nonparametric approach by estimating
the effects of Yelp ratings on loan outcomes with data right around the cutoffs in the spirit of Hahn et al.
(2001). The purpose is to carry out a local linear randomization experiment. I test three bandwidths around
the cutoffs: 0.05, 0.1, and 0.15 points. I estimate OLS regressions of the following form: Outcomeit =
β0 +β1 ·Iround upit +β2 ·recentered actual ratingit +β4 ·Iround upit×recentered actual ratingit +β6 ·Xit +
φi + τt + ηi + θi + εit.
10For example, see a WSJ interview with Yelp founder Jeremy Stoppelman: https://www.wsj.com/arti
cles/yelp-looks-beyond-reviews-1494986641 (last retrieved: July 15, 2017).
11For details, see class action lawsuit against potential Yelp review manipulation https://www.wsj.co
m/articles/SB10001424052970204505304577002170423750412 and its appeal after the initial dismissal
http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2014/09/04/court-sides-with-san-francisco-based-yelp
-in-lawsuit-from-small-business-owners-9th-circuit-court-of-appeals-online-reviews (last
retrieved: July 15, 2017). Both counts afford me some confidence in ruling out manipulation by business
owners. Formally, I carry out a McCrary (2008) density test to rule out the manipulation concern, and
present the findings in Appendix A.3.
12For details, see http://www.yelp.com.
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Italian, Lounges), address (i.e., 113 N Walnut St., Champaign, IL 61820), price range (i.e.,
$$$ and $31-60), each reviewer rating and review date (i.e., 5 stars, 1/2/2017), along with
other identifying information embedded in the source HTML code. I collect data on busi-
nesses located in the United States only. The data includes Yelp reviews starting in October
2004 (Yelp inception date) through the end of 2016. I require businesses to have more than
five reviews in order to be included in the sample for the empirical analysis.13
Figure 1.3 plots the Yelp data coverage at the county level on a map. For each business, I
assign a census-defined county code based on the address. I count the number of businesses
in each county. The counties with higher numbers of businesses represented on Yelp are
presented in darker colors and counties with lower numbers of businesses on Yelp are in
lighter colors. The map shows that my data provides comprehensive coverage of most parts
of the United States. Table 1.1, Panel A breaks down the Yelp data by year. Over the
years, Yelp has increasingly gained popularity and continues to add an increasing number
of businesses and reviews. The average number of reviews per business has increased from
less than two in 2004 to almost 13 in 2016. Table 1.1, Panel B divides the Yelp data into
22 Yelp-defined categories. This panel shows the average Yelp rating, average number of
reviews, and category weight. Of the 22 categories, restaurants account for around 20% and
shopping accounts for about 10%. The average rating ranges from 3.49 to 4.49, and the
average number of reviews ranges from 5 to over 120.
1.2.3. SBA loan data
Traditional data sources that provide details about loans, such as Thomson Reuters DealScan
and S&P Cap IQ, mostly focus on syndicated loans that are taken out by multinational cor-
porations. Regarding small business loans, only certain banks are required to report their
activity according to the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977; in fact, the federal govern-
ment increased reporting thresholds to $1 billion in 2005. Those businesses are mostly rated
by rating agencies, have to follow strict regulatory requirements, are thoroughly researched
by the lenders, and are closely covered by the media compared to true small businesses.
The SBA 7(a) loan program caters to small businesses with a maximum loan amount
of $5 million.14 These loans provide the ideal environment in which to study the role of
13Comparing the Yelp ratings imputed from my data as of the end of 2016 with actual Yelp ratings posted
on Yelp.com, my data could match over 99% of the actual Yelp ratings posted.
14The SBA 7(a) loans are made to small businesses who are not able to able to obtain credit on reasonable
terms. The SBA also requires the borrowers to have good prospects to repay those loans and be small,
among other things. The normal procedure is that the borrowers apply to the lenders directly then the local
SBA office makes a final deicision. The SBA has rolled our Certified Lender Program, Preferred Lender
Program, and Express Loan Program to expedite the process. SBA 7(a) loans are no more pricer than
conventional non-guaranteed small business loans. For more details about the SBA 7(a) loan program,
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social media and customer satisfaction because the covered businesses tend to have a single
location and be family owned and operated. They are not subject to strict government filing
requirements and do not have much publicly available information. I obtain the SBA loan
data from the SBA through a FOIA request. The data provides detailed information on
each SBA loan, including business name, business address, bank name, bank address, loan
granting date, loan amount, interest rate, collateral, default status, write-off amount, etc.
Figure 1.4 plots SBA loan coverage at the county level on a map. For each business that
participates in the SBA loan program, I assign a census-defined county code based on the
address. I count the number of businesses in each county. Similar to the Yelp coverage map,
the counties with higher numbers of businesses in the SBA loan program are presented in
darker colors, and counties with lower numbers of businesses in the SBA loan program are
in lighter colors. The map shows that businesses in most of the United States take part in
the SBA lending program.
1.2.4. Summary statistics
I make an extensive effort to match businesses in the Yelp data to the SBA loan data by
name and address. I then construct my variables of interest. The key outcome variables
are loan probability, loan spread, collateral, default probability, and write-off amount. Loan
probability is a dummy variable that equals one if the business receives an SBA loan and
equals zero otherwise. Loan spread is the interest rate charged on the loan that is determined
by the lending institution, minus the prime rate at the beginning of that month. Collateral is
the amount required as collateral divided by total loan amount. Default is a dummy variable
that equals one if the business defaults on the loan and equals zero otherwise. Write-off
amount is the amount written off by the lender divided by total loan amount. I also define
a host of control variables to control for business and loan characteristics. Average rating is
the average unrounded monthly Yelp rating. Number of reviews is the cumulative number of
reviews at the end of each month. Price ranges are dummy variables that are based on the
four Yelp price range categories displayed in the business profiles. For example, price range
($) is a dummy variable that equals one if the business is in the one dollar-sign price range
category on Yelp and equals zero otherwise. I also include loan amount and loan maturity
as control variables. For the regressions regarding the probability of receiving SBA loans, I
construct a business-month level panel and match the loan probability dummy to the most
recent month.
I present the summary statistics in Table 1.2. Businesses on Yelp have an average actual
please see: https://www.sba.gov/partners/lenders/7a-loan-program (last retrieved: July 15, 2017)
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rating of 3.66 stars. Thirty-eight percent of the businesses are in the one dollar-sign price
range and 55% are in the two dollar-sign price range. The average loan granted by the SBA
is about $371,000 with a maturity of 10 years. The loans on average require 34% of the loan
amount in assets as collateral, command a 289-basis-point spread over the prime rate, and
experience a 1.3% default rate.
1.3. Loan-level Analysis
In this section, I examine the relationships between Yelp ratings and loan outcomes. I
demonstrate that increases in Yelp ratings lead to a higher probability in getting SBA loans.
The loans for businesses with higher ratings enjoy more favorable terms compared to those
with lower ratings. I also show that positive Yelp ratings lead to better loan performance.
1.3.1. Loan probability
Yelp ratings complement existing information lenders already possess because consumers
choose to frequent businesses with higher ratings, i.e., higher customer satisfaction. Diamond
(1991) shows that lenders are more willing to grant loans to borrowers with a track record
and a sound business practice because they are more likely to repay the loans. To assess
whether lenders refer to Yelp ratings in their lending decisions, the most appropriate way is
to examine the probability of receiving approval for loans.
Yelp ratings are posted by users at any given time and Yelp updates the overall ratings
after receiving each new rating. To strike a balance between keeping valuable information and
maintaining a reasonable data analysis process, I calculate an average rating for each business
at the end of every month. More specifically, I average the ratings that the businesses have
received since their appearance on Yelp at each month end. This way, I obtain a snapshot
of every business’s average rating for each month, effectively constructing a business-month
level panel. Since I have SBA loan data showing the exact approval date, I assign the loan
probability indicator to the nearest past month end.
I begin by reporting the reduced-form result between having higher Yelp ratings and
receiving SBA loans in Table 1.3 Column (1). I regress the loan probability indicator on
average actual Yelp ratings and control for a host of business and loan level characteristics
and fixed effects. Overall, this evidence suggests a positive relationship between Yelp ratings
and getting loans. I then focus on the RDD framework. First, I graphically show the results
in Figure 1.5. For each one of the eight pre-determined rounding cutoffs, I plot the average
loan probabilities relative to the rounding thresholds on each side of the cutoffs. The graphs
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show clear discontinuities in loan probabilities between the businesses that fall ‘just above’
the cutoffs and the businesses that fall ‘just below’ the cutoffs.15 Businesses with Yelp ratings
above the rounding thresholds are more likely to receive SBA loans compared to businesses
with ratings below the rounding thresholds. Taking a closer look at the graphs at each cutoff
point, I observe that the effects of Yelp ratings increase from the lower cutoffs to the higher
cutoffs, with the 3.75 and 4.25 cutoffs being the most prominent.
To formally test this relationship, I run an OLS regression following Equation (1.2).16 In
Table 1.3, Column (2), I implement the parametric approach to utilize all the available data
(Hahn et al., 1999). I include second-order polynomials in the regression and interact them
with the Yelp rating indicator variable.17 Doing so, I address potential nonlinearity in the
relationship between loan probability and Yelp ratings. I also include cutoff fixed effects to
rule out the possibility that I am comparing businesses at different cutoffs. The coefficient of
interest is highly statistically significant and positive, meaning that a one-half star increase
in Yelp rating leads to a significant increase in the probability of receiving loans. This effect
is also economically significant, representing a 40% increase in the probability of getting SBA
loans.18
Columns (3) and (4) focuses on the businesses that fall just around the 3.75 and 4.25
cutoffs, respectively. Those two cutoffs are the ones that matter the most in determining
loan probabilities as shown in the figures. For businesses belonging to the 3.75 cutoff, the
ones rounded up to 4 stars are much more likely to receive SBA loans compared to the
ones rounded down to 3.5 stars. The regression coefficient represents a 60% increase in the
likelihood of receiving loans. For the 4.25 cutoff, the effects are smaller, i.e., 40% increase in
the likelihood of obtaining loans for the businesses rounded up to 4.5 stars compared to the
ones rounded down to 4 stars, but it is still significant, both statistically and economically
Taken together, I have shown that Yelp ratings play a significant role in the loan deci-
sion process. This is direct evidence that customer satisfaction presented on social media
platforms affects loan decisions in the small business lending setting.
15I follow the guidance of Lee and Lemieux (2010) to formally test bin width choice. The same applies to
graphs presented throughout this paper.
16The results are robust to a logit specification. The same applies to loan probability analysis in later
sections.
17Again, I follow Lee and Lemieux (2010) to find the optimal functional form to estimate in terms of
higher order polynomials. The same applies to the tables presented throughout this paper.
18In Appendix A.4, I implement a non-parametric approach by using data right around the cutoffs and
vary the bin width around the rounding thresholds. I show that the results using loan probability as the
dependent variables are not sensitive to the choice of the estimation window and method.
12
1.3.2. Loan terms
After establishing the fact that Yelp ratings have causal effects on the probability of receiving
small business loans, I next study whether such ratings also affect loan terms. Ratings on
social media platforms represent borrowers’ customer satisfaction rating, which in turn could
provide complementary information regarding borrowers’ ability to repay loans due to the
effect on potential future revenue streams. Such business conditions are reflected in the loan
terms.
I follow a similar approach as before. However, I restrict the sample to businesses that
have received SBA loans only because businesses without SBA loans, by definition, do not
have loan terms for me to analyze. Similar to other scholars in the field, I consider two
measures for loan terms. First, I calculate the loan spread as the difference between the
reported interest and the beginning of month prime rate. I use collateral as the second
measure for loan terms. I define collateral as the collateral required for each loan divided by
their respective total loan amount. Second, I run OLS regressions in the form of Equations
(1.1) and (1.2). I report the results in Table 1.4 where Panel A focuses on loan spread as
the dependent variable and Panel B focuses on collateral as the dependent variable.
I first report the simple OLS regression estimates in Column (1) and show that Yelp ratings
are negatively and significantly correlated with loan terms, i.e., loan spread and collateral.
This evidence suggests that higher Yelp ratings mean lower financing costs and less assets
are required as collateral. Again, these results demonstrate a correlation. I next turn to
the RDD setting. I plot the average loan spreads and collateral requirements by rounding
cutoffs in Figures 1.6 and 1.7, respectively. The graphs show discontinuous jumps in loan
terms near the rounding thresholds. Taking the 3.75 cutoffs as an example (i.e., Panel F),
for the average firm in the first bin to the left of the cutoff (just below), it requires about
310 basis points in loan spread. However, the average firm in the first bin to the right of
the cutoff (just above) pays around 270 basis points in loan spread. Similarly, in terms of
collateral, the average firm in the bin ‘just above’ the cutoff pledges about 5% less in assets
compared to the average firm in the bin ‘just below’ the cutoff.
To test the observations empirically, I carry out the full sample regression approach by
adding second-order polynomials and interaction terms, and I report the results in Column
(2). When using loan spread as the dependent variable, the Yelp rating indicator has a
statistically significant regression coefficient of about -0.36. This means that a one-half
star increase in Yelp rating translates to a 36-basis-point reduction in loan spread. Given
that loan spread averages about 2.90% (290 basis points), the finding is also economically
significant, representing close to 12% cost savings in business borrowing. Using collateral as
the dependent variable, I also document a negative and statistically significant result. More
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specifically, the businesses falling ‘just above’ the rounding thresholds pledge 12% fewer
assets as collateral compared to businesses falling ‘just below’ the rounding thresholds.19 In
Columns (3) and (4), I again restrict the sample to businesses belong to the 3.75 and 4.25
cutoffs, respectively. I find similar results in both loan spread and collateral. Taking these
results as a whole, aggregated Yelp ratings clearly influence lenders in their decision-making
process.
1.3.3. Loan performance
Allen (1984) shows that business owners are compensated with higher premiums when they
have higher quality products and services. Such additional premiums translate to extra cash
flow streams and financial slacks that can be used towards fulfilling the loan commitments,
i.e., paying back debts on time and in full. In this subsection, I examine loan performance.
I follow a similar approach as that in the previous subsection. I use two measures for loan
performance. First, I look at the default probability. Default probability is an indicator
variable that equals one if the borrower defaults on the loan and equals zero otherwise.
Second, I use the outstanding loan amount that is written off by the lending institutions as
the other measure for loan performance. I calculate the write-off amount as the percent of
the loan amount that is written off divided by the respective total loan amount. The results
are reported in Table 1.5. I use default probability as the dependent variable in Panel A and
the write-off amount as the dependent variable in Panel B.
I again start with regressing loan performance on overall actual Yelp ratings to gauge the
relationship between them and report the results in Column (1). I find significant correlations
between loan performance and Yelp ratings. Specifically, higher Yelp ratings correspond to
lower default probability and write-off amounts. This evidence suggests that Yelp ratings
help to address costly information acquisition problems when available information on the
borrowers is scarce. Subsequently, I focus on the RDD strategy. In Figures 1.8 and 1.9, I
plot the average SBA loan default probabilities and write-off amounts on each side of the
eight pre-determined Yelp cutoffs separately. Businesses that are rounded up to the next
Yelp rating categories exhibit lower default probabilities and write-off amounts compared to
the businesses that are rounded down.
I next formally test this observation. In Column (2), I implement the specification in Equa-
tion (1.2) to conduct the full sample parametric approach. I find the regression coefficients on
Yelp ratings, i.e., Iround up, are negative and statistically significant when using both default
19In Appendix A.5, I implement a non-parametric approach by using data right around the cutoffs and
vary the bin width around the rounding thresholds. I show that the results using loan spread and collateral
as the dependent variables are not sensitive to the choice of the estimation window and method.
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probability and write-off amount as the dependent variables, indicating that Yelp ratings
have a causal relationship with loan performance, i.e., higher Yelp ratings imply a greater
likelihood of borrowers repaying the loans. These results are also economically large, com-
pared to businesses that fall below the rounding thresholds, and businesses that are above
the rounding thresholds are two times less likely to default on SBA loans. When studying
write-off amount as the outcome variable, I find results with similar economic magnitude.20
In Column (3), I focus on a sample where the businesses are in the 3.75 cutoff window.
I find not only a statistically significant relationship between loan performance and Yelp
ratings, but also a bigger economic meaning compared to the full sample. Businesses that
are rounded up to 4 stars are three times less likely to default and the write-off amounts are
three times lower compared to businesses that are rounded down to 3.5 stars. In Column (4),
I study businesses that belong to the 4.25 cutoff window. I find the effects in this instance to
be even larger. Overall, I show that a one-half star higher Yelp rating leads to better SBA
loan performance. One reason is that businesses with higher ratings have better prospects,
and the other reason is that with the help of SBA loans, businesses have more resources to
grow and be profitable.
Taking the loan-level analysis together, I interpret the loan outcome results as consistent
with the notion that aggregated Yelp ratings provide reliable information about the borrow-
ers’ future earnings potentials and, as a result, such ratings are significant factors in the SBA
lending process.21
1.4. Additional Findings
So far, I have shown how customer satisfaction through Yelp ratings informs loan outcomes in
terms of loan probability, loan terms, and loan performance. In this section, I first illustrate
how the effectiveness of Yelp ratings is greatly enhanced in situations where banks have less
information about the businesses. More specifically, I study cases when businesses have fewer
20In Appendix A.6, I implement a non-parametric approach by using data right around the cutoffs and
vary the bin width around the rounding thresholds. I show that the results using loan default probability
and write-off amount as the dependent variables are not sensitive to the choice of the estimation window
and method.
21In Appendix A.7, I show my robustness tests by adding employment and credit score as control variables
using data from Reference USA. It is prohibitively costly to collect Reference USA data on all businesses.
Therefore, I choose to focus on businesses with SBA loans and examine loan terms and performance as the
outcome variables. Further, I am only able to match about half of the sample businesses to Reference USA.
In the same results, I also include the portion of SBA guarantee in the control variables because the amount
of SBA guarantee might affect the loan terms and performance. When studying loan outcome, I include the
loan terms, i.e., loan spread and collateral, in the control variables as well. This helps me to control for the
effects of better financing terms on loan outcomes.
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competitors in their local environments and when banks’ monitoring abilities are weak. I
then examine situations where other sources of information could potentially complicate the
Yelp ratings to see whether they remain effective in loan decisions. Specifically, I study small
businesses that take out a subsequent loan from the SBA.
1.4.1. Cross-sectional Analysis
To better understand the role of customer satisfaction on bank lending decisions, I investigate
characteristics of businesses and banks that could amplify my results. Specifically, I focus on
scenarios when banks have less information about the borrowers. I look into the local business
environments to identify businesses that have more competitors versus fewer competitors.
I also analyze the distances between businesses and banks to find the differences between
effective and ineffective bank monitoring efforts.
For businesses that operate in sectors with fewer competitors, it would be harder for
lenders to make informed lending decisions (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). In turn, lend-
ing institutions have to exert additional effort to acquire creditworthiness and operation
information about those businesses with fewer competitors compared to those with more
competitors. Yelp ratings help mitigate these problems as Yelp ratings could potentially
supplement the existing information and provide additional knowledge about a business’
prospects. Consequently, I expect my results on the effectiveness of Yelp ratings in deter-
mining loan outcomes to be particularly pronounced for businesses in segments with fewer
competitors. Similarly, for businesses that are located farther away from the banks, banks
incur extra communication, transportation, and monitoring costs to obtain the information
they need to approve the loans and to oversee the loans (Degryse and Ongena, 2005). As a
result, Yelp ratings may play an important role in helping lenders obtain better knowledge
about borrowers located farther away.
I carry out the empirical tests following Equation (1.2) and focus on the full sample with
all cutoffs. I again use loan probability, loan spread, collateral, default, and write-off amount
as the measures for loan outcomes. The results are presented in Table 1.6. In Panel A, I
report results on the business environment competitiveness. More specifically, I define the
‘fewer competitors indicator’, which is a dummy variable that equals one if the Yelp business
is in a below the median number of competitors environment based on Yelp price range,
Yelp industry, and county of location, and equals zero otherwise. In Panel B, I examine the
distance between banks and borrowers. I calculate straight-line distances using businesses’
physical addresses. I create what I call the ‘far-from-lender’ indicator, which is a dummy
variable that equals one if the distance between the Yelp business and the lender is above the
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sample median, and equals zero otherwise. I also construct interaction terms between these
two indicator variables and the Yelp rating dummy, i.e., Iround up, to capture the effects of
competition and distance.
Using the RDD setting, my findings show that a one-half star increase in Yelp rating has
a stronger impact on businesses in sectors with fewer competitors as well as on the ones
located farther from banks. For businesses that are rounded a one-half star rating up, they
are more likely to get SBA loans, enjoy lower loan spread and collateral requirement, are less
likely to default, and write off a less amount when they have less competition in the same
segments and are located farther from the banks, compared to otherwise similar businesses
that are rounded down.22
For businesses in sectors with less competition, their business prospects are considerably
more difficult to obtain. Yelp ratings serve as good indicators of future revenue potential of
those types of businesses. Similarly, banks need to spend extra effort to obtain creditworthi-
ness about and monitor borrowers located farther from them. Yelp ratings help to alleviate
this problem since they are readily available to the lenders. In summary, Yelp ratings serve
the purpose well when banks are less informed about the businesses.
1.4.2. Repeated borrowers
In this subsection, I study small businesses that are repeat participants in the SBA loan
program. Banks already have credit history information for these businesses, not to mention
other borrower-specific information. Additionally, long-term borrowing relationships are
beneficial for all parties, which one can see in the loan terms (Boot and Thakor, 1994).
Consequently, I expect Yelp ratings to be less effective in this setting.
For the empirical analysis, I utilize the RDD environment and focus on loan terms as
suggested by Boot and Thakor (1994). More specifically, I analyze loan spread and collateral
and report the results in Table 1.7. In Columns (1) and (2), I use the same data as in Table
1.4. However, I create the second loan indicator variable as a dummy variable that equals one
if the underlying loan is the second loan between the business and the SBA, and it equals zero
otherwise. I interact this second loan indicator variable with the Yelp rating dummy, i.e.,
Iround up, effectively capturing the effect of subsequent borrowing. The results show positive
and significant coefficients on the interaction terms, suggesting that the lenders rely less on
Yelp ratings in subsequent lending decisions compared to the first borrowing encounters. In
Columns (3) and (4), I push the results further by studying only the businesses with more
22Note that the ‘distance-to-bank’ test requires that the businesses have already received loans. Otherwise,
it would be impossible to find the distances between the businesses and the banks. Consequently, the loan
probability test is infeasible here and intentionally left blank in the table.
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than one loan with the SBA, using the lending bank information. I define the same bank
indicator variable, which is a dummy variable that equals one if the second loan is taken out
with the same bank, and equals zero otherwise. I also include the interaction term of the same
bank indicator and Iround up to capture the effect of a same-bank lending relationship. The
coefficients on the interaction terms are, again, positive and significant. This indicates that
when the second loan is taken out with the same bank, Yelp ratings become less significant
because the banks have had direct interactions with the borrowers already. However, if we
examine the overall effects of Yelp ratings in the presence of existing banking relationships,
Yelp ratings are still good indicators of loan outcomes as the additional sources of information
do not counteract the Yelp effects entirely.
Taking the cross sectional analysis and the repeated loan transactions results together,
I am able to exploit situations where available information regarding the borrowers varies
greatly among the banks. I show that Yelp ratings become more effective when information
is scarce and remain effective when additional soft information is present.
1.5. Other Business Outcomes
In the previous sections, I have shown that Yelp ratings are effective determinants of SBA
loan outcomes and the effects of Yelp ratings in the cross section and in repeated loan
transactions. In this section, I examine the effects of Yelp ratings from both consumer and
business perspectives. I first study the changes in consumer demand due to Yelp ratings by
examining the probability of receiving more reviews. I then focus on the effects of Yelp ratings
on small businesses’ investment decision. More specifically, I study subsequent business
openings.
1.5.1. Changes in consumer demand
In this subsection, I study the effects of Yelp ratings from a consumer perspective. The
mechanism that Yelp ratings take effect through which is that customers learn from peer
feedbacks about the businesses and make their subsequent consumption choices accordingly.
Naturally, businesses with higher Yelp ratings will attract a larger number of customers.
I empirically test this here. In an ideal situation, I would like to observe the number of
customers who visit the businesses. However, such data is not available. To circumvent this
problem, I use the number of Yelp reviews for the businesses by assuming that the number
of reviews the businesses receive is proportional to the number of total customers. Using the
number of reviews the businesses receive each month, I am able to examine whether higher
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Yelp ratings lead to a higher probability of receiving more reviews, i.e., higher consumer
demand.
To perform the empirical test, I construct a business-month panel that is similar to the
one for the loan probability test. I calculate the number of reviews each business receives in a
given month. I create the change in consumer demand variable as an indicator variable that
equals one if a business receives a higher number of reviews in the next month compared to
the current month and equals zero otherwise. I follow a similar format as the main analysis
and report the results in Table 1.8.
In Column (1), I start by regressing the changes in consumer demand indicator on av-
erage actual Yelp ratings in the simple OLS estimation, where I also control for business
characteristics, firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, Yelp industry fixed effects, and county
fixed effects. I find a positive and significant relationship between receiving more reviews
and Yelp ratings, which suggests that higher Yelp ratings lead to a higher customer demand.
To make a causal claim, I again utilize the Yelp rating rounding thresholds RDD setting and
report the results in Columns (2) to (4). I add second-order polynomial controls and the
interaction terms between those polynomials and the Yelp rating dummy to address poten-
tial nonlinearity problems. I report a statistically and economically significant relationship
between consumer demand and Yelp ratings. Comparing businesses falling ‘just above’ the
cutoff to businesses falling ‘just below’ the cutoff, the former has a higher probability of
receiving more reviews than the latter, indicating a higher customer demand due to higher
Yelp ratings.23
1.5.2. Subsequent business opening
In this subsection, I turn my focus to the relationship between investment decisions by small
businesses and Yelp ratings. More specifically, I examine given a high Yelp rating, whether
the businesses open a second location. The purpose of this test is twofold. First, subse-
quent openings serve as an alternative way to test whether Yelp ratings could be effective
determinants and convey business prospects. Second, and more importantly, nobody knows
more about a particular business than the owner. They only open subsequent stores when
they believe their current operations are profitable and full of potential. Consequently, the
prediction of Yelp ratings will coincide with the businesses’ actual behavior, as measured by
opening subsequent stores.
To carry out the test, I follow a similar approach as the previous subsection and con-
23In robustness tests, I include a control for whether the businesses have received any SBA loans, cluster
the standard errors at the business-year level, and implement logit regressions. I also carry out the same
tests for the results presented in the next subsection.
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struct a business-year panel. I identify businesses’ subsequent locations if they share the
same business name, Yelp industry, and are located within the same county. I create the
subsequent business opening variable as an indicator variable that equals one if an existing
business opens another location and equals zero otherwise. I use the first review date of
those subsequent locations on Yelp as the subsequent opening date. I assign the subsequent
business opening indicator to its nearest past year end.
I follow a similar format as the main analysis and report the results in Table 1.9. In
Column (1), I estimate the regression specification in Equation (1.1). I regress the subsequent
business opening dummy on the actual Yelp rating and control for business characteristics,
firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, Yelp industry fixed effects, and county fixed effects. I
find a positive and significant relationship between Yelp ratings and subsequent business
openings, meaning higher Yelp ratings are associated with a higher likelihood of opening
another location.
In Columns (2) to (4), I carry out the RDD approach as depicted in Equation (1.2). I use
the full sample and include cutoff bin fixed effects in Column (2). I document that a one-half
star increase in Yelp rating leads to statistically significant higher probability of subsequent
business openings. This result is also economically significant. The average business falling
‘just above’ the rounding thresholds is 23% more likely to open a subsequent store compared
to the average business falling ‘just below’ the thresholds. In Columns (3) and (4), I again
focus on the two rounding cutoffs that matter the most, namely 3.75 and 4.25, respectively.
For businesses that are rounded up to 4 stars, they are close to 60% more likely to open a
new location compared to businesses that are rounded down to 3.5 stars. Though not as big
of an effect, comparing to businesses rounded down to 4 stars, businesses rounded up to 4.5
stars have a 30% higher probability to start another location.
Taking the changes in consumer demand and subsequent business opening results together,
I document that Yelp ratings are significant indicators in businesses’ future performance and
investment decisions. Furthermore, Yelp ratings matter non-trivially from both consumer
and business perspectives. In sum, though not perfect, the results provide further support
to my main argument.
1.6. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I investigate the role of customer satisfaction measured by Yelp ratings in the
small business lending process. Higher Yelp ratings are important indicators of businesses’
future revenue and cash flow streams due to consumers’ social learning behavior. Borrowers
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with higher ratings, shown by information aggregated on social media platforms, have more
financial resources to satisfy the loan commitments. Lenders, knowing the differences in
business prospects, approve SBA loans corresponding to borrowers’ Yelp ratings.
Using an RDD empirical setting that exploits the Yelp rating rounding thresholds, I show
that Yelp ratings are good indicators of loan outcomes and document that a one-half star
increase in Yelp rating leads to a 40% higher probability of receiving SBA loans, 12% reduc-
tions in collateral and loan pricing, and significantly better loan performance. In the cross
section, my findings show that a one-half star increase in Yelp rating has a more significant
impact on businesses with fewer competitors and those located farther from the banks. I
test situations in which Yelp ratings become less effective using repeated loan transactions
and show the overall effects of Yelp ratings remain powerful. I also document that higher
Yelp ratings lead to a higher probability of receiving more reviews and an increase in the
likelihood of opening new locations.
Overall, my results shed light on the importance of crowd-sourced information and cus-
tomer satisfaction in the determination of business outcomes. As technology advances
rapidly, such resources only become more critical, because it has never been easier to access
this type of knowledge about a business. Exceptional customer satisfaction can bring firms
a higher chance of financing and larger savings in financing costs. In practice, businesses
should emphasize the importance of the online presence in their customer satisfaction man-
agement. Future research could extend this analysis to other situations and incorporate
other useful contents generated by Internet users.
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1.7. Figures
Figure 1.1 Examples of Yelp rating
The figures show examples of Yelp ratings for two sample businesses. Yelp displays ratings
in the form of stars with half-star increments. The top business has a Yelp rating of 4 stars
and the bottom business has a Yelp rating of 4.5 stars.
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Figure 1.2 Yelp data collection
This figure shows a sample business listed on Yelp and the data collection process. For each
business, I collect the business name (i.e., Bacaro), Yelp business category (i.e., American,
Italian, Lounges), address (i.e., 113 N Walnut St., Champaign, IL 61820), price range (i.e.,
$$$ and $31-60), each reviewer rating and review date (i.e., for example, 5 stars, 1/2/2017),
along with other identifying information embedded in the source HTML code.
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Figure 1.3 Yelp data coverage
This map plots Yelp data coverage at the county level. Yelp data is available from 2004
to 2016. I count the number of businesses in each county. I require the businesses to have
more than five reviews to be included in the sample for the empirical analysis. Regions
range from darker (counties with higher numbers of businesses on Yelp) to lighter (counties
with lower numbers of businesses on Yelp).
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Figure 1.4 SBA loan data coverage
This map plots SBA loan data coverage at the county level. SBA loan data is available
from 2004 to 2016. I count the number of SBA 7(a) loans in each county. Regions range
from darker (counties with higher numbers of SBA loans) to lighter (counties with lower
numbers of SBA loans).
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Figure 1.5 Loan probability
The figures plot the probability of receiving an SBA loan as a function of Yelp ratings
around each cutoff. Yelp rounds the average ratings of the businesses up and down to the
nearest half point based on predetermined cutoffs. On a scale from 1 to 5, the ratings 1.25,
1.75, 2.25, 2.75, 3.25, 3.75, 4.25, and 4.75 are the cutoff points, and the graphs are displayed
accordingly. Businesses with average ratings above the cutoff points are assigned Yelp
ratings that are rounded up, and businesses with average ratings below the cutoff points
are assigned Yelp ratings that are rounded down to the nearest half points. Throughout
the analysis, I recenter Yelp ratings around their respective cutoffs to 0. For every Yelp
rating bin, the dots represent the probability of receiving an average SBA loan in that bin,
which is calculated as the number of businesses receiving a loan over the total number of
businesses within the bin. The lines are first- or second-order polynomials fitted through
the probabilities of receiving the loans on each side of the cutoff.
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Figure 1.6 Loan spread
The figures plot the SBA loan spread as a function of Yelp ratings around each cutoff. Yelp
rounds the average ratings of the businesses up and down to the nearest half point based on
predetermined cutoffs. On a scale from 1 to 5, the ratings 1.25, 1.75, 2.25, 2.75, 3.25, 3.75,
4.25, and 4.75 are the cutoff points, and the graphs are displayed accordingly. Businesses
with average ratings above the cutoff points are assigned Yelp ratings that are rounded
up, and businesses with average ratings below the cutoff points are assigned Yelp ratings
that are rounded down to the nearest half points. Throughout the analysis, I recenter Yelp
ratings around their respective cutoffs to 0. For every Yelp rating bin, the dots represent the
average SBA loan spread in that bin, which is calculated as the average loan spread across
all loans within the bin. The lines are first- or second-order polynomials fitted through the
loan spreads on each side of the cutoff.
27
Figure 1.7 Loan collateral
The figures plot the collateral required for SBA loans as a function of Yelp ratings around
each cutoff. Yelp rounds up and down the average ratings of the businesses up and down
to the nearest half point based on predetermined cutoffs. On a scale from 1 to 5, the
ratings 1.25, 1.75, 2.25, 2.75, 3.25, 3.75, 4.25, and 4.75 are the cutoff points, and the graphs
are displayed accordingly. Businesses with average ratings above the cutoff points are
assigned Yelp ratings that are rounded up, and businesses with average ratings below the
cutoff points are assigned Yelp ratings that are rounded down to the nearest half points.
Throughout the analysis, I recenter Yelp ratings around their respective cutoffs to 0. For
every Yelp rating bin, the dots represent the collateral required for an average SBA loan in
that bin, which is calculated as the collateral for each loan divided by the respective total
loan amount averaged across all loans within the bin. The lines are first- or second-order
polynomials fitted through the required loan collaterals on each side of the cutoff.
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Figure 1.8 Loan default probability
The figures plot default probability of SBA loans as a function of Yelp ratings around each
cutoff. Yelp rounds the average ratings of the businesses up and down to the nearest half
point based on predetermined cutoffs. On a scale from 1 to 5, the ratings 1.25, 1.75, 2.25,
2.75, 3.25, 3.75, 4.25, and 4.75 are the cutoff points, and the graphs are displayed accordingly.
Businesses with average ratings above the cutoff points are assigned Yelp ratings that are
rounded up, and businesses with average ratings below the cutoff points are assigned Yelp
ratings that are rounded down to the nearest half points. Throughout the analysis, I recenter
Yelp ratings around their respective cutoffs to 0. For every Yelp rating bin, the dots represent
the probability of default for an average SBA loan in that bin, which is calculated as the
number of loans default over the total number of loans within the bin. The lines are first- or
second-order polynomials fitted through the probabilities of default on each side of the cutoff.
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Figure 1.9 Loan charge-off amount
The figures plot the SBA loan write-off amount upon default as a function of Yelp ratings
around each cutoff. Yelp rounds the average ratings of the businesses up and down to the
nearest half point based on predetermined cutoffs. On a scale from 1 to 5, the ratings 1.25,
1.75, 2.25, 2.75, 3.25, 3.75, 4.25, and 4.75 are the cutoff points, and the graphs are displayed
accordingly. Businesses with average ratings above the cutoff points are assigned Yelp
ratings that are rounded up, and businesses with average ratings below the cutoff points
are assigned Yelp ratings that are rounded down to the nearest half points. Throughout the
analysis, I recenter Yelp ratings around their respective cutoffs to 0. For every Yelp rating
bin, the dots represent the write-off amount for an average SBA loan in that bin, which is
calculated as the write-off amount for each loan divided by the respective total loan amount
averaged across all loans within the bin. The lines are first- or second-order polynomials
fitted through the write-off amounts on each side of the cutoff.
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1.8. Tables
Table 1.1 Yelp data summary
This table presents a summary of the Yelp data collected. In Panel A, I show the number of
businesses, number of reviews, and the average number of reviews per business covered by
Yelp in each year. In Panel B, I breakdown the Yelp sample by 22 Yelp business categories.
I present the average rating, average number of reviews, and the category weight out of total
Yelp businesses for each category. Yelp data is available from 2004 to 2016. I require the busi-
nesses to have more than five reviews to be included in the sample for the empirical analysis.
Panel A: Yelp data by year
Number of Number of Number of reviews
Year businesses reviews per business
2004 577 879 1.52
2005 17,729 48,764 2.75
2006 56,861 232,144 4.08
2007 124,862 681,431 5.46
2008 207,286 1,329,585 6.41
2009 286,580 2,053,547 7.17
2010 410,747 3,191,291 7.77
2011 561,496 4,841,449 8.62
2012 684,470 5,719,592 8.36
2013 847,984 7,694,181 9.07
2014 1,032,939 11,376,074 11.01
2015 1,239,229 15,425,396 12.45
2016 1,395,928 17,994,708 12.89
Panel B: Yelp data by category
Average Average number Category
Yelp Category rating of reviews Weight
Restaurants 3.49 96.13 20.17 %
Shopping 3.77 15.91 10.30 %
Home Services 3.91 11.72 8.77 %
Food 3.76 55.00 8.19 %
Health & Medical 4.09 11.92 6.95 %
Beauty & Spas 4.12 25.03 6.45 %
Local Services 3.90 14.14 6.30 %
Automotive 3.72 19.12 5.78 %
Active Life 4.23 20.71 4.07 %
Event Planning & Services 4.18 26.96 3.63 %
Nightlife 3.60 119.61 3.48 %
Professional Services 4.15 8.26 2.93 %
Education 4.16 9.51 2.05 %
Hotels & Travel 3.39 33.67 2.01 %
Financial Services 3.54 6.65 1.99 %
Arts & Entertainment 4.10 37.28 1.83 %
Pets 4.18 22.13 1.68 %
Real Estate 3.63 8.42 1.59 %
Public Services & Government 3.53 19.01 0.77 %
Religious Organizations 4.49 4.98 0.65 %
Local Flavor 4.18 17.49 0.22 %
Mass Media 3.53 8.78 0.17 %
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Table 1.2 Summary statistics
This table presents summary statistics for the sample. Average rating is the unrounded aver-
age monthly Yelp rating. Iround up is an indicator variable that equals one if the Yelp rating is
rounded up and equals zero if rounded down. Number of reviews is the cumulative number of
reviews at the end of each month. Price ranges are dummy variables that based on the four
Yelp price range categories displayed in the business profile. For example, price range ($) is
a dummy variable that equals one if the business is in the $ price range category on Yelp and
equals zero otherwise. Loan probability is a dummy variable that equals one if the business
receives an SBA loan and equals zero otherwise. Collateral is the amount required as collat-
eral divided by total loan amount. Loan spread is the interest rate charged on the loan that is
determined by the lending institution minus the beginning of month prime rate. Default is a
dummy variable that equals one if the business defaults on the loan and equals zero otherwise.
Write-off amount is the amount that is written off by the lender divided by total loan amount.
Standard
Variable Mean deviation N
Actual rating 3.6577 0.8697 49,518,899
Iround up 0.4402 0.4964 49,518,899
Number of reviews 41.7856 84.0932 49,518,899
Price range ($) 0.3768 0.4846 49,518,899
Price range ($$) 0.5488 0.4976 49,518,899
Price range ($$$) 0.0641 0.2449 49,518,899
Price range ($$$$) 0.0104 0.1014 49,518,899
Loan probability 0.0003 0.0184 49,518,899
Collateral 0.3428 0.1516 16,058
Loan spread (%) 2.8960 1.3656 16,058
Default 0.0125 0.1112 16,058
Write-off amount 0.0101 0.0924 16,058
Loan amount (’000) 371.9049 641.4089 16,058
Maturity (months) 122.1028 78.5376 16,058
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Table 1.3 Loan probability
This table reports OLS regression results for SBA loan probability and Yelp ratings. The
dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the business receives an SBA loan
and equals zero otherwise. In Column (1), I show the results of a simple OLS regression
of loan probability and actual Yelp rating. In Columns (2) to (4), Iround up is an indicator
variable that equals one if the Yelp rating is rounded up and equals zero if rounded down.
I carry out the RDD analysis, introducing a polynomial in the Yelp rating of order two
on each side of the cutoff, interacted with Iround up. Column (2) utilizes the full sample
with all cutoffs. Column (3) examines cases where the cutoff equals 3.75, and Column (4)
examines cases where the cutoff equals 4.25. The cutoffs are defined in Figure 1.5. The
control variables are defined in Table 1.2. All the right-hand-side variables are scaled up by
a factor of 1,000. Robust standard errors clustered by Yelp businesses are in parentheses.
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Variables Simple OLS Full model Cutoff=3.75 Cutoff=4.25
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Actual rating 0.0681***
(0.0007)
Iround up 0.1393*** 0.1808*** 0.1388**
(0.0211) (0.0448) (0.0509)
Log(number of reviews) 0.0001 0.0005 0.0278 0.0255
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0234) (0.0174)
Higher order polynomial X X X
Cutoff fixed effects X
Firm fixed effects X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X
Yelp industry fixed effects X X X X
County fixed effects X X X X
Observations 49,518,616 49,518,616 10,662,939 11,909,948
R-squared 0.0067 0.0067 0.0087 0.0078
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Table 1.4 Loan terms
This table reports OLS regression results for SBA loan terms and Yelp ratings. In Panel A, the
dependent variable is the loan spread, calculated as the interest rate charged on the loan that is
determined by the lending institution minus the beginning of month prime rate. In Panel B, the
dependent variable is the amount required as collateral divided by total loan amount. In Column
(1), I show the results of simple OLS regressions of loan terms and actual Yelp rating. In Columns
(2) to (4), Iround up is an indicator variable that equals one if the Yelp rating is rounded up and
equals zero if rounded down. I carry out the RDD analysis, introducing a polynomial in the Yelp
rating of order two on each side of the cutoff, interacted with Iround up. Column (2) utilizes the
full sample with all cutoffs. Column (3) examines cases where the cutoff equals 3.75, and Column
(4) examines cases where the cutoff equals 4.25. The cutoffs are defined in Figures 1.6 and 1.7.
The control variables are defined in Table 1.2. Robust standard errors clustered by Yelp businesses
are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
Variables Simple OLS Full model Cutoff=3.75 Cutoff=4.25
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Loan spread
Actual rating -0.0454***
(0.0139)
Iround up -0.3580*** -0.3660*** -0.3893***
(0.0693) (0.1342) (0.1420)
Log(number of reviews) 0.0168* 0.0185* 0.0192 0.0292
(0.0093) (0.0109) (0.0243) (0.0220)
Price range ($) -0.0615 0.0634 0.0540 0.3072
(0.1016) (0.1083) (0.3305) (0.2404)
Price range ($$) -0.0407 0.0396 0.0625 0.1577
(0.0989) (0.1056) (0.3268) (0.2338)
Price range ($$$) -0.0581 0.0200 0.0716 0.1081
(0.1038) (0.1099) (0.3332) (0.2391)
Higher order polynomial X X X
Loan characteristics control X X X X
Cutoff fixed effects X
Year fixed effects X X X X
Yelp industry fixed effects X X X X
County fixed effects X X X X
Observations 15,777 15,777 3,652 4,001




Iround up -0.0418*** -0.0399*** -0.0373***
(0.0071) (0.0149) (0.0139)
Log(number of reviews) 0.0003 0.0018 0.0007 0.0012
(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0026) (0.0022)
Price range ($) -0.0079 -0.0106 0.0112 0.0336
(0.0094) (0.0104) (0.0275) (0.0235)
Price range ($$) -0.0088 -0.0119 0.0168 0.0202
(0.0091) (0.0102) (0.0269) (0.0229)
Price range ($$$) -0.0177* -0.0169 0.0067 0.0299
(0.0100) (0.0108) (0.0281) (0.0239)
Higher order polynomial X X X
Loan characteristics control X X X X
Cutoff fixed effects X
Year fixed effects X X X X
Yelp industry fixed effects X X X X
County fixed effects X X X X
Observations 15,777 15,777 3,652 4,001
R-squared 0.4670 0.3747 0.4287 0.4445
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Table 1.5 Loan performance
This table reports OLS regression results for SBA loan performance and Yelp ratings. In Panel A,
the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the business defaults on the loan and
equals zero otherwise. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the write-off amount by the lender
divided by total loan amount. In Column (1), I show the results of simple OLS regressions of
loan performance and actual Yelp rating. In Columns (2) to (4), Iround up is an indicator variable
that equals one if the Yelp rating is rounded up and equals zero if rounded down. I carry out
the RDD analysis, introducing a polynomial in the Yelp rating of order two on each side of the
cutoff, interacted with Iround up. Column (2) utilizes the full sample with all cutoffs. Column (3)
examines cases where the cutoff equals 3.75, and Column (4) examines cases where the cutoff equals
4.25. The cutoffs are defined in Figures 1.8 and 1.9. The control variables are defined in Table
1.2. Robust standard errors clustered by Yelp businesses are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Variables Simple OLS Full model Cutoff=3.75 Cutoff=4.25




Iround up -0.0259*** -0.0354** -0.0446**
(0.0091) (0.0167) (0.0225)
Log(number of reviews) 0.0005 0.0018 -0.0039 -0.0005
(0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0026) (0.0028)
Price range ($) -0.0013 -0.0215 -0.0080 -0.0838
(0.0101) (0.0153) (0.0239) (0.0549)
Price range ($$) -0.0021 -0.0253* -0.0109 -0.0931*
(0.0099) (0.0150) (0.0230) (0.0544)
Price range ($$$) -0.0023 -0.0280* -0.0137 -0.0792
(0.0105) (0.0151) (0.0247) (0.0533)
Higher order polynomial X X X
Loan characteristics control X X X X
Cutoff fixed effects X
Year fixed effects X X X X
Yelp industry fixed effects X X X X
County fixed effects X X X X
Observations 15,777 15,777 3,652 4,001
R-squared 0.0986 0.0835 0.1267 0.1545
Panel B: Write-off amount
Actual rating -0.0028**
(0.0013)
Iround up -0.0217*** -0.0291** -0.0322**
(0.0075) (0.0139) (0.0162)
Log(number of reviews) 0.0006 0.0017* -0.0035 -0.0001
(0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0022) (0.0022)
Price range ($) -0.0045 -0.0158 -0.0119 -0.0532
(0.0097) (0.0129) (0.0241) (0.0443)
Price range ($$) -0.0049 -0.0196 -0.0145 -0.0635
(0.0096) (0.0126) (0.0234) (0.0437)
Price range ($$$) -0.0050 -0.0209 -0.0151 -0.0502
(0.0099) (0.0127) (0.0249) (0.0422)
Higher order polynomial X X X
Loan characteristics control X X X X
Cutoff fixed effects X
Year fixed effects X X X X
Yelp industry fixed effects X X X X
County fixed effects X X X X
Observations 15,777 15,777 3,652 4,001
R-squared 0.0928 0.0826 0.1180 0.1592
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Table 1.6 Cross-sectional analysis
This table reports OLS regression results for SBA loan information and Yelp ratings in the cross-
section. Iround up is an indicator variable that equals one if the Yelp rating is rounded up and
equals zero if rounded down. In Panel A, I include the ‘non-competitive’ indicator, which is a
dummy variable that equals one if the Yelp business is in a below the median competitiveness
environment based on Yelp price range, Yelp industry, and county of location and equals zero
otherwise. I interact Iround up with this ‘non-competitive’ indicator variable. In Panel B, I include
the ‘far-from-lender’ indicator, which is a dummy variable that equals one if the distance between
the Yelp business and the lender is above the sample median and equals zero otherwise. I interact
Iround up with this ‘far-from-lender’ indicator variable. I introduce a polynomial in the Yelp rating
of order two on each side of the cutoff, interacted with Iround up, and uses the full sample. The
cutoffs are defined in Figure 1.5. The control variables are defined in Table 1.2. In Column (1), all
the right-hand-side variables are scaled up by a factor of 1,000. Robust standard errors clustered
by Yelp businesses are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level, respectively.
Loan Loan Write-off
Variables probability spread Collateral Default amount
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Competition
Iround up 0.0877*** -0.3204*** -0.0320*** -0.0208** -0.0172**
(0.0219) (0.0715) (0.0073) (0.0094) (0.0076)
Non-competitive indicator 0.0128 0.0520 0.0071* 0.0117** 0.0110**
(0.0193) (0.0390) (0.0041) (0.0054) (0.0045)
Iround up × 0.1110*** -0.0829* -0.0215*** -0.0112** -0.0099**
non-competitive indicator (0.0142) (0.0432) (0.0046) (0.0051) (0.0042)
Business characteristics control X X X X X
Higher order polynomial X X X X X
Loan characteristics control X X X X
Cutoff fixed effects X X X X X
Firm fixed effects X
Year fixed effects X X X X X
Yelp industry fixed effects X X X X X
County fixed effects X X X X X
Observations 49,518,616 15,777 15,777 15,777 15,777
R-squared 0.0067 0.3203 0.3758 0.0840 0.0832
Panel B: Distance to bank
Iround up -0.2322*** -0.0402*** -0.0220** -0.0175**
(0.0695) (0.0073) (0.0092) (0.0076)
Far from lender indicator 0.5240*** 0.0410*** 0.0026 0.0047
(0.0342) (0.0036) (0.0049) (0.0041)
Iround up × -0.3750*** -0.0122*** -0.0086* -0.0097**
far from lender indicator (0.0440) (0.0046) (0.0049) (0.0041)
Business characteristics control X X X X
Higher order polynomial X X X X
Loan characteristics control X X X X
Cutoff fixed effects X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X
Yelp industry fixed effects X X X X
County fixed effects X X X X
Observations 15,777 15,777 15,777 15,777
R-squared 0.3345 0.3836 0.0837 0.0829
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Table 1.7 Repeated borrowing
This table reports OLS regression results for repeated borrowing and Yelp ratings. Iround up
is an indicator variable that equals one if the Yelp rating is rounded up and equals zero
if rounded down. In Columns (1) and (2), I include the second loan indicator, which is a
dummy variable that equals one if the underlying loan is the second one through the SBA
loan program and equals zero otherwise. I interact Iround up with this second loan indicator
variable. In Columns (3) and (4), I restrict the sample to businesses with two loans and
include the same bank indicator, which is a dummy variable that equals one if the second
loan is taken out with the same bank and equals zero otherwise. I interact Iround up with
this same bank indicator variable. I introduce a polynomial in the Yelp rating of order two
on each side of the cutoff, interacted with Iround up, and uses the full sample. The cutoffs
are defined in Figure 1.5. The control variables are defined in Table 1.2. Robust standard
errors clustered by Yelp businesses are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Loan spread Collateral Loan spread Collateral
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Iround up -0.2009*** -0.0151* -0.2977** -0.0276**
(0.0778) (0.0077) (0.1454) (0.0139)
Second loan indicator -0.2057*** -0.0013
(0.0313) (0.0033)
Iround up × 0.0816* 0.0083*
second loan indicator (0.0458) (0.0049)
Same bank indicator -0.0488* -0.0029
(0.0275) (0.0031)
Iround up × 0.0907** 0.0094**
same bank indicator (0.0439) (0.0047)
Business characteristics control X X X X
Higher order polynomial X X X X
Loan characteristics control X X X X
Cutoff fixed effects X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X
Yelp industry fixed effects X X X X
County fixed effects X X X X
Observations 15,777 15,777 5,264 5,264
R-squared 0.4208 0.4683 0.4136 0.5310
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Table 1.8 Changes in consumer demand
This table reports OLS regression results for changes in consumer demand and Yelp ratings.
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if a business receives a higher
number of reviews in the next month compared to the current month and equal zero other-
wise. In Column (1), I show the results of a simple OLS regression of changes in consumer
demand and actual Yelp rating. In Columns (2) to (4), Iround up is an indicator variable that
equals one if the Yelp rating is rounded up and equals zero if rounded down. I carry out the
RDD analysis, introducing a polynomial in the Yelp rating of order two on each side of the
cutoff, interacted with Iround up. Column (2) utilizes the full sample with all cutoffs. Column
(3) examines cases where the cutoff equals 3.75, and Column (4) examines cases where the
cutoff equals 4.25. The cutoffs are defined in Figure 1.5. The control variables are defined
in Table 1.2. Robust standard errors clustered by Yelp businesses are in parentheses. ***,
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Variables Simple OLS Full model Cutoff=3.75 Cutoff=4.25
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Actual rating 0.0047***
(0.0002)
Iround up 0.0011** 0.0058*** 0.0048***
(0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0009)
Business characteristics control X X X X
Higher order polynomial X X X
Cutoff fixed effects X
Firm fixed effects X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X
Yelp industry fixed effects X X X X
County fixed effects X X X X
Observations 48,223,996 48,223,996 10,508,054 11,578,793
R-squared 0.0794 0.0796 0.0559 0.0848
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Table 1.9 Subsequent business opening
This table reports OLS regression results for subsequent business openings and Yelp ratings.
The dependent variable is is a dummy variable that equals one if an existing business on Yelp
opens another location under the same name in the same county and Yelp industry and equal
zero otherwise. In Column (1), I show the results of a simple OLS regression of subsequent
business opening and actual Yelp rating. In Columns (2) to (4), Iround up is an indicator vari-
able that equals one if the Yelp rating is rounded up and equals zero if rounded down. I carry
out the RDD analysis, introducing a polynomial in the Yelp rating of order two on each side
of the cutoff, interacted with Iround up. Column (2) utilizes the full sample with all cutoffs.
Column (3) examines cases where the cutoff equals 3.75, and Column (4) examines cases
where the cutoff equals 4.25. The cutoffs are defined in Figure 1.5. The control variables are
defined in Table 1.2. Robust standard errors clustered by Yelp businesses are in parentheses.
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Variables Simple OLS Full model Cutoff=3.75 Cutoff=4.25
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Actual rating 0.0149***
(0.0003)
Iround up 0.0087*** 0.0225*** 0.0130***
(0.0009) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Business characteristics control X X X X
Higher order polynomial X X X
Cutoff fixed effects X
Firm fixed effects X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X
Yelp industry fixed effects X X X X
County fixed effects X X X X
Observations 2,335,672 2,335,672 449,705 528,105
R-squared 0.1653 0.1663 0.1492 0.1842
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CHAPTER 2
ARE OPEN MARKET SHARE REPURCHASE
PROGRAMS REALLY FLEXIBLE?
2.1. Introduction
Share repurchase programs are playing an increasingly important role in firms’ payout po-
lices. In 1995, only 15% of publicly listed firms in the United States repurchased shares.
This number increased to 45% by 2012. Meanwhile, the dollar amount of total share re-
purchases among publicly listed U.S. firms increased from $90 billion of real 2012 dollars
in 1995 to $364 billion in 2012 (Farre-Mensa et al., 2014). Share repurchases have become
the dominant form of corporate payout (Skinner, 2008; Floyd et al., 2015). Open market
share repurchase programs represent more than 90% of all the share repurchase programs
announced (Stephens and Weisbach, 1998; Grullon and Michaely, 2004).
Brav et al. (2005) survey 384 managers about their payout decisions. The managers report
that they prefer open market share repurchases because share repurchase programs provide
managers with great flexibility in the amount and timing of stock buybacks. Specifically, the
managers can decide how many shares or the dollar amount to buyback at announcement.
Meanwhile, they have the option to time the market and only buyback when the market
conditions are favorable (Dittmar and Field, 2015). Additionally, the managers do not have
to repurchase all the shares or the dollar amount announced. They can let the repurchase
programs expire or retire them instead.
However, is this really the case in practice? Specifically, are the managers simply going
to stop buying back their shares when facing financing difficulties that prevent them from
doing so? Given the flexibility of share repurchase programs, do managers cut their share
repurchases to fund other firm activities? Or do the managers sacrifice firms’ real activities
to complete their share repurchase programs? I attempt to answer these questions in this
paper.
To unveil the true relation between firms’ completion of open market share repurchase pro-
grams and financial policies is difficult due to endogeneity concerns. During normal times,
the relation is predetermined and everything is anticipated. An ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression of real outcome variables on share repurchase completion is subject to omitted
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variable bias. In this paper, I consider open market share repurchase programs as contracts
that are announced well ahead of time. I exploit the predetermined variations in open market
share repurchase program ending dates surrounding the 2007 financial crisis to overcome the
empirical difficulties. When firms announce their open market share repurchase programs,
they also announce the ending dates of these programs. At announcement, it is difficult
for the firms to anticipate the upcoming financial crisis. As a result, they were not able to
strategically plan the optimum ending dates of their open market share repurchase programs
to protect themselves against the downturn. My identifying assumption is that having repur-
chase programs with ending dates after the recent financial crisis is uncorrelated with firms’
response to the crisis through channels other than share repurchases. I identify a sample
of firms who announced open market share repurchase programs before the recent financial
crisis with ending dates after the crisis as the treatment group. The control firms are those
with open market share repurchase programs announcement and ending dates before the
recent financial crisis.
Using a difference-in-difference approach, I find that firms sacrifice real activities to a
greater extent to fund their open market share repurchase programs. My difference-in-
difference point estimates show that treatment group firms cut 1.9 and 9 percentage points
more in capital investment and R&D expense, respectively, and layoff four more employees
per million dollars of capital stock than control firms. These results are economically large.
The cutbacks represent around 7% in capital investment, 6.9% in employment, and 15.4% in
R&D expense of the pre-crisis level. In addition, I find that the firms in the treatment group
complete their open market share repurchase programs at a very high rate, on average about
84%. The evidence confirms that the reductions from real activities are diverted to complete
share repurchases. In conclusion, these results indicate that open market share repurchase
programs are not as flexible as one might think. Once firms announce these programs, they
will complete them, even at a cost.
One alternative explanation of the results is that firms have already completed the major-
ity of their open market share repurchase programs before December 2007. If this is the case,
all the treatment group would only have a small portion of share repurchases left. As a re-
sult, the decrease in real activities is not a consequence of share repurchase programs, rather
some other factors affecting firms’ decisions. To mitigate this concern, I hand-collected the
share repurchase program status of all the treatment group around December 2007 from the
closest 10-K or 10-Q filings. I find that the treatment group on average repurchased less
than 35% of the predetermined amount, in terms of both dollar value and numbers of shares.
The above findings indicate that firms are on track with their share repurchases and it is not
trivial to finish buying the rest.
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Next, I carry out four subsample tests to take advantage of the rich cross sectional feature
of the data. First, I split the sample based on bank dependency. Some have argued that
bank dependent firms suffer a credit contraction hence reducing capital investments (Brun-
nermeier, 2009; Shleifer and Vishny, 2010). However, others have argued that no difference
can be found in capital expenditure regardless of bank dependency (Kahle and Stulz, 2013).
I find that treated firms who do not depend on the banks cut back twice as much as the
full sample in their real activities than the control firms. Second, I split the sample based
on whether the firms have long-term financial analyst forecast coverage. Analysts allocate
their efforts to firms with good future prospects (McNichols and O’Brien, 1997). Firms with
more analyst coverage get more attention from investors, hence realize lower capital costs
(Merton, 1987). My results show that firms without long-term analyst forecast coverage cut
back real activities significantly. They are better off using the funds to support their core
activities. However, I find that the funds are diverted to share repurchases. Third, I examine
firms with and without credit ratings. I find that the treated without credit ratings reduce
capital expenditure, employment, and R&D expense more than control firms. Credit ratings
signal the market participants’ perception of the firms (Almeida et al., 2004). Firms with
credit ratings are more likely to plan ahead. The ones without are not as prepared so they
have to sacrifice real activities. Lastly, I compare firms who issued new debt or equity with
the ones didn’t. With the additional financing available, the firms are better prepared to
embrace the crisis. I find that treated firms without new debt or equity issue cut back more
capital expenditure, employment, and R&D expense than control firms and no difference
between the treated and control when they have additional financing. Overall, the all the
results provide further support that share repurchases are not flexible, even the firms in most
need of resources are diverting funds to complete share repurchases.1
To get a more complete picture about share repurchase flexibility, I examine whether the
cutback on real activities spillover to operating activities. I look at the profit margin and
sales growth to get an idea of operating performance changes between the treatment and
control groups. I find that the treatment group experiences 1 percentage point lower profit
margin than the control group. That’s equivalent to a 6% decrease in pre-crisis level profit
margin. I also find the treatment group had a 2.8 percentage point lower sales growth rate
than the control firms.
The most common concern with a difference-in-difference study is that the pre-treatment
1I also examine a subsample of share repurchase programs announced in 2006 and 2007. As these firms
announce their repurchases so close to the recent financial crisis, they may have believed they were more
resistant to financial downturns (Ouimet and Simintzi, 2016). I find these firms faced more severe cuts to
real activities in magnitude as compared to the full sample, which includes all three years before the recent
financial crisis.
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parallel trends between the treatment and control groups need to be satisfied. Having open
market share repurchase programs ending after the recent financial crisis must be the only
factor driving the reductions in real activities for my arguments to be valid. Further, I
want to make sure that treatment and control firms have similar share repurchase program
durations. For example, if one firm always announces repurchase programs with six-month
durations and another firm always announces repurchase programs lasting two years, they
might be fundamentally different. Another concern is that there might be a latent macro-
level variable that is driving the sharp treatment-control contrast in the post-treatment
period.
I address these concerns in several ways. First, I match a firm in the treatment group
with a firm in the control group that has a similar duration. Second, I show that the out-
come variables for the treatment and control groups have no difference in pre-exsiting trends.
Meanwhile, I control for a battery of firm characteristics along with firm fixed effects, year
fixed effects, and industry times year fixed effects. Third, I conduct placebo tests by assum-
ing that a financial crisis takes place in December 2004, December 2005, and December 2006.
If the results are due to an omitted variable bias, then I should observe similar effects of open
market share repurchase programs on firms’ real activities during those placebo periods as
well. However, the tests show no statistically significant differences between the treatment
and control groups during the placebo periods. Fourth, I use the 2001 dotcom period as a
further robustness check; in 2001, there is a recession but no credit supply shock. The goal
is to differentiate the credit supply channel of the recent financial crisis. I do not find any
differences in real activities between the treatment and control groups around 2001. Fifth,
I implement a difference-in-difference matching estimator approach, developed by Abadie
and Imbens (2006), by matching on firm size, Q, leverage, cash flow, cash holdings, duration
of repurchase program, and industry. The results are qualitatively similar to my regression
approach. Lastly, I utilize my full sample of repurchasing firms by adding controls for share
repurchase duration. Specifically, instead of matching on duration, I add controls for share
repurchase duration up to the 4th order polynomial to address the linearity assumption and
interact all the control variables with the treated dummy to eliminate all possible differences
between the treatment and control groups. I find qualitatively similar results.
This paper contributes to the literature on share repurchases that focus on their (in)flexibility
and completion. Many papers document the reasons why firms buyback their stocks, such
as stock price undervaluation (Ikenberry et al., 1995; Brockman and Chung, 2001; Peyer
and Vermaelen, 2009), to mitigate agency problems by returning excess cash to investors
(Dittmar, 2000), employee stock option exercise anti-dilution (Kahle, 2002), and managers
think share repurchase programs are the best investments as compared to other investment
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opportunities (Grullon and Michaely, 2004).2 However, fewer researchers examine the com-
pletion of open market share repurchase programs. Papers mainly focus on the reasons why
firms complete their share repurchases. For example, Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find
that firms increase their share repurchases when the degree of perceived undervaluation is
lower. Oded (2009) models the free cash flow and adverse selection problems in share repur-
chase decisions and finds that the wider the bid-ask spread, the lower the share repurchase
completion rate. Chemmanur and Li (2016) finds that institutional trading immediately
after an open market repurchase announcement has significant predictive power for the ac-
tual purchases by the firm. Bonaimé (2012) documents that a firm’s reputation from prior
repurchase activities is a determinant of the current repurchase completion rate. Firms have
higher announcement returns of new share repurchase programs given they completed their
prior programs. In this paper, I examine the real and operational consequences of completing
share repurchase programs as this has yet to be reported in the literature.
To the best of my knowledge, I am the first to document the (in)flexibility of open market
share repurchase programs and through the lens of real activities. Almeida et al. (2016) also
looks at the real consequences of share repurchase programs and finds that share repurchases
are associated with reductions in employment and investment. However, these authors fo-
cus only on earnings per share (EPS) motivated repurchases, which could be fundamentally
different from other repurchases.
2.2. Empirical Design
I start this section with institutional background on open market share repurchase programs
and discuss the identification strategy. I then describe the data and the construction of the
variables. I also present the summary statistics.
2.2.1. Open Market Share Repurchase Programs
Open market share repurchase programs are becoming increasingly popular among U.S.
firms. By 2013, over 40% of U.S. publicly traded firms had initiated open market share
repurchase programs, more than threefold the 1995 figure (Skinner, 2008).
After the board of directors’ approval, firms usually make public announcements about
their open market share repurchase programs. In the announcements, firms disclose the
total dollar amount and/or total number of shares to repurchase. Those two numbers are
2The list here is not exhaustive. See Farre-Mensa et al. (2014) for a review of the literature.
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generally fixed values instead of ranges. Firms on average have open market share repurchase
programs as large as 7% of their total number of shares outstanding (Stephens and Weisbach,
1998). In the announcements, firms also inform investors about the time frame of their open
market share repurchase programs, usually with specific ending dates. Some firms choose the
announcement day as the starting date while others announce a specific future date as the
inception date.3 The announcements often have disclaimers stating that the managers have
the flexibility to decide when and how much to buyback given market conditions throughout
the programs. When the managers decide to buyback, they hire a broker-dealer to repurchase
shares on their behalf on the open market. The time period between the ending of one
program to the starting of the next is usually about two years (Skinner, 2008). The following
two paragraphs are excerpts from General Motors Co. and Apple Inc.’s announcements of
open market share repurchase programs, respectively.
“General Motors Co. (NYSE: GM) today announced a comprehensive capital allocation
framework, as improving business performance and strong capital discipline enable increased
returns to shareholders. GM said a foundational element of its approach will be to return all
available free cash flow to shareholders while it maintains an investment-grade balance sheet
underpinned by a target cash balance of $20 billion ... GM also announced that its Board of
Directors authorized the initial repurchase of $5 billion in GM shares to begin immediately
and conclude before the end of 2016...”4
“Apple today announced plans to initiate a dividend and share repurchase program com-
mencing later this year ... Additionally, the Company’s Board of Directors has authorized a
$10 billion share repurchase program commencing in the Company’s fiscal 2013, which begins
on September 30, 2012. The repurchase program is expected to be executed over three years,
with the primary objective of neutralizing the impact of dilution from future employee equity
grants and employee stock purchase programs...”5
2.2.2. The 2007 financial crisis
The recent financial crisis is widely regarded as a supply shock in the academic literature.
During this period, firms had a hard time accessing external financing. Almeida et al. (2012)
document a dramatic credit spread increase for both short- and long-term credit instruments.
3On the announcement day, investors usually observe a 2%-4% abnormal stock return (Lie, 2005) as a
positive signal from the market.
4Retrieved at http://media.gm.com/media/us/en/gm/news.detail.html/content/Pages/news/us/e
n/2015/mar/0309-allocation-framework.html on April 24th, 2015.
5Retrieved at https://www.apple.com/pr/library/2012/03/19Apple-Announces-Plans-to-Initia
te-Dividend-and-Share-Repurchase-Program.html on April 24th, 2015.
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Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) find that bank lending falls in all types of loans. Gorton
(2009) theoretically models that banks are flying to quality, which leads to the increased
cost of all forms of external capital (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008). During this crisis,
the firms in my sample experienced the same credit contractions in the capital markets and
needed additional resources to maintain operations and payout. This environment provides
me with a natural setting in which the external financing channel to fund share repurchases
is shut down.6 Firms were forced to use their internal funds.
I choose December 2007 as the cutoff date for the identification strategy. The National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) determines this date to be the beginning point of
a recession.7 NBER finds that the economy reached the peak of its previous expansion in
December 2007 using a host of economy-wide measures of economic activity. Consequently,
the firms in my sample would start to experience the recession as the economy entered a
trough.
2.2.3. Identification Strategy
In the spirit of Almeida et al. (2012) and Ouimet and Simintzi (2016), I treat share repur-
chase programs as contracts that are negotiated and signed ahead of time. Similar to firms’
debt maturities that are predetermined with a specific due date as in Almeida et al. (2012)
and the labor contracts that are signed at random times but require renewal at a specific
future date as in Ouimet and Simintzi (2016), open market share repurchase programs are
announced ahead of time with predetermined program ending dates. At the announcements,
it was difficult for the managers to correctly predict that the economy will peak in December
2007 and then begin to decline. Therefore, the managers were not able to strategically set
the ending dates of their open market share repurchase programs ex ante. I assume that
repurchase programs that end after the crisis are uncorrelated with firms’ response to the
crisis through channels other than share repurchases.
I assign firms into the treatment and control groups based on the announcement and
ending dates of their open market share repurchase programs. I require all firms to have
announced open market share repurchase programs before December 2007. Firms with open
market share repurchase programs ending after December 2007 are assigned to the treatment
group, while firms with repurchase programs ending before December 2007 are assigned to
6Farre-Mensa et al. (2016) find that about half the firms engage in payout activities and raise external
capital to fund for those payouts simultaneously. The popular press also has numerous articles about firms
issuing debt to fund share repurchases. For example, please see a recent article on Johnson & Johnson in
The Wall Street Journal (”A $10 Billion Buyback Doesn’t Kill Johnson & Johnson’s Deal Hopes”, retrieved
at http://on.wsj.com/1Pu6AtZonOctober15,2015).
7For more details, please see http://www.nber.org/dec2008.pdf.
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the control group.
During normal times, the relation between share repurchase decisions and firm policies are
predetermined and all firm activities are anticipated. Hence I need to utilize the predeter-
mined variations in the repurchase program ending dates around the 2007 financial crisis
as an experiment to examine whether firms will take advantage of the flexibility features of
open market share repurchase programs. However, there are four potential concerns I would
like to address in some detail.
First, I want to make sure that treatment and control firms have similar share repurchase
program durations. For example, if one firm always announces repurchase programs with
six-month durations and another firm always announces repurchase programs lasting two
years, they might be fundamentally different. To mitigate this concern, I match firms in the
treatment group with firms in the control group that have close or the same share repurchase
program durations. The matched firms might differ in program starting and ending dates;
however, they have almost the same program length. One potential drawback is that this
matching process reduces the sample size. To fully utilize my control sample and to address
some concerns about matching on duration, I use the full control group in the robustness
test.8 Specifically, I include durations up to the fourth order polynomials, as well as interact
all the control variables with the treated dummy as controls. I find qualitatively similar
results.
Second, one might argue that since open market share repurchases are so flexible, the
managers have the power to not repurchase or to change the ending dates after they realize
the financial crisis is imminent. This will possibly contaminate the identification strategy
because the ending dates become endogenously determined. However, Bargeron et al. (2015)
hand-collected firms’ announcements about changing or altering their open market share re-
purchase programs from news resources for the 1980-2010 period. They find that only 2% of
firms make such changes. It is unlikely that the results are driven by this small set of firms.
Third, one might argue that around the cut-off date, the treatment group might have
already finished the majority of their share buyback targets. The identification strategy will
not unveil the true situation of the treated firms. To address this issue, I hand-collected
the treatment group’s share repurchase program status around December 2007 from their
closest 10-K or 10-Q reports. I find that the treatment group on average only repurchased
about 35% of the predetermined amounts of shares as well as dollars. As of that point in
time, the treatment group had not yet completed the majority of their goals.9 This exercise
8I present this result in Table 2.14.
9I find that as of December 2007, on average 355 days had elapsed for the repurchase programs of the
treated firms. These programs had an average duration of 1,300 days, so roughly speaking, the firms were
about a quarter way through the share repurchase programs as of December 2007. Meanwhile approximately
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mitigates the concerns that the firms try to accelerate their share repurchases before the
financial crisis and had only a small fraction of repurchases not yet completed, supporting
that the identification strategy is able to deliver the true effects of the open market share
repurchase programs.
Lastly, the control group could be somewhat special since they just happen to finish their
repurchases before December 2007. Their managers might have some superior skills to predict
the financial crisis. Skinner (2008) finds that firms announce new share repurchase programs
every other year; the announcement gap in my sample is around 2.4 years. Since firms do not
have share repurchase programs one immediately after another, the control group must just
have completed their previous repurchase programs and are in the gap period. The managers
might have anticipated the financial crisis. So they decided to not announce new programs.
I argue that this happens naturally as it is part of the characteristics of open market share
repurchase programs. For the treatment group, the predetermined ending dates had not yet
arrived in December 2007.
2.2.4. Sample Selection
The data used in this paper come from two main sources. I use the Securities Data Company
(SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions database for open market share repurchase deals, including
announcement date, completion date, number of shares (dollar value) authorized, number
of shares (dollar value) repurchased, etc. I complement the SDC data with Compustat data
for firm characteristics.
For the SDC data, I require the share repurchase programs to be open market share
repurchase programs only. I only keep deals with non-missing ending dates. I drop deals
where the ending dates are earlier than the announcement dates. Lastly, I require that the
deals have matching data from Compustat. I merge the two datasets based on CUSIP and
construct treatment and control groups following the procedure described above. I follow
Almeida et al. (2012) to apply common filters to the data. I define the pre-crisis period
as from 2005 to 2007 and the post-crisis period as from 2009 to 2011. In the 2008 annual
reports, firms with fiscal year ending in the early half of the year include a substantial portion
of their activities from calendar year 2007. This accounting issue will bias the results in an
unclear direction. Thus, I decide to exclude 2008 as a transition year following Ouimet and
Simintzi (2016).
As mentioned earlier, it is crucial that the treatment and control groups have similar
share repurchase program durations. For the firms that satisfy the treatment group criteria,
two-thirds of the shares (dollar amount) remained unrepurchased. The evidence above shows that the
treatment group was on track with their share repurchases instead of being anomalies in the market.
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I find a control firm that has the closest program duration. I present the mean, median, and
distributional tests of the matching on duration in Table 2.1, Panel A.
2.2.5. Construction of Variables and Summary Statistics
The main outcome variables are capital investment, employment, and R&D expense. Capital
investment is defined as capital expenditures scaled by lagged total capital stock (capx/ppent).10
Employment is defined as the number of employees per million dollars of lagged capital stock
(emp×1000/ppent). R&D expense is defined as the total research and development expense
scaled by lagged total capital stock (xrd/ppent). Following Almeida et al. (2004) and Rauh
(2006), I include size, Tobin’s Q, leverage, cash holdings, and cash flow as control variables.
Size is the natural logarithm of total assets (log(at)). Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market
value of assets to the book value of assets. Leverage is the sum of short-term debt (dlc)
and long-term debt (dltt). Cash is cash and short-term investments (che). Cash flow is the
sum of income before extraordinary items (ib) and depreciation and amortization (dp). To
alleviate endogeneity concerns, I measure all of the control variables prior to the treatment
period. All the variables are deflated and scaled accordingly. I winsorize all the variables at
the 1% level to reduce the effect of outliers.
Panels B and C in Table 2.1 present the summary statistics for 2007, which is the pre-
event year. Panel B shows the mean, standard deviation, 25th percentile, 50th percentile,
and 75th percentile values of the entire sample. On average, capital investment and R&D
expense are around 27% and 58% of firm’s capital stock, respectively; each firm has about
58 employees per each million dollars of capital stock. Panel C shows the mean, standard
deviation, 25th percentile, 50th percentile, and 75th percentile values of the treatment and
control groups separately.
2.3. Are Repurchases Really Flexible
In my analysis, I use a difference-in-difference estimation approach. Specifically, I estimate
regressions of the following form:
yit = β1 · postit × treatedit + δ ·Xit + λi + τt + αj × τt + εit. (2.1)
10I present the Compustat variable names in parentheses.
49
In equation (1), i, j, and t index firm, industry, and year. postit = 1 if firm i is in years
2009-2011. treatedit = 1 if firm i is in the periods when treatment occurs. Xit is a set of
time-varying firm-level control variables discussed above. λi is firm fixed effects, τt is year
fixed effects, αj × τt is industry times year fixed effects, and εit is the error term. β1, the
coefficient of the interaction term, is the focus of the analysis.
To properly implement a difference-in-difference estimation, I have to make sure that the
outcome variables of the treatment and control groups follow parallel trends during the
periods leading up to the 2007 financial crisis. In Table 2.2, I present the results. As one
can see, the treatment and control groups are statistically similar.
Table 2.3 reports the main findings. I regress capital investment, employment, and R&D
expense on the interaction term, along with firm and year fixed effects to control for unobserv-
able firm heterogeneity and changing economic conditions, respectively. I find a negative and
significant coefficient on the interaction term (columns 1, 4, and 7). The results show that
firms are cutting their real activities to fund their open market share repurchase programs.
I add firm-level controls and report the results in columns 2, 5, and 8 for capital investment,
employment, and R&D expense, respectively, to rule out the common factors driving cor-
porate policies. The results remain qualitatively the same as the baseline results. I then
add industry times year fixed effects to control for industry-specific environment changes
(columns 3, 6, and 9). I find that firms with repurchase programs ending after December
2007 on average cut their investment-to-capital ratio by 1.9 percentage points more than
similar firms with share repurchase programs ending before December 2007. Similarly, the
treatment group on average terminates four more employees per million dollars of capital
stock than the control group while the treatment group on average decreases their R&D
expense-to-capital ratio by 9 percentage points more than the control group. In economic
terms, these results convey that the 1.9 percentage point decrease in capital investments rep-
resents a 7% drop in pre-crisis capital investment levels, the reduction of four employees per
million dollars of capital stock represents a drop of 6.9% in pre-crisis employment levels, and
the 9 percentage point decrease in R&D expense represents a drop of 15.4% in pre-crisis R&D
expense levels. In summary, I show that firms with open market share repurchase programs
ending after December 2007 face a substantial reduction in their real activities compared to
firms with programs ending before December 2007. The findings are statistically significant
and economically large.
So far, I have shown a decrease in investment activities if the firms have open market
share repurchase programs ending after the crisis. However, one might ask whether those
with freed-up liquidity indeed go on to fund the share repurchases. In Table 2.4, I present
the post-event repurchase completion rate of the treatment group. I report the percentage of
50
shares repurchased in column (1) and the percentage of dollar value repurchased in column
(2). I find that half of the firms complete their open market share repurchase programs
within three years after announcement in terms of both the percentage of shares and dollar
value. On average, the treatment group buys back 84% of the per-determined amount an-
nounced. The completion rates are fairly stable across different repurchase time horizons.
This finding is consistent with the repurchase schedule reported in Stephens and Weisbach
(1998). This table shows that the firms that cut back on real activities actually did spend
the money on open market share repurchase programs instead of diverting the funds to other
activities.
For comparison purposes, Stephens and Weisbach (1998) back out share repurchase com-
pletion rates from dollars spent on repurchases divided by average share price. They find
that firms buyback around 82% of the announced shares. Oded (2009) and Bonaimé (2012)
use the same SDC data as I do but examine difference sample periods. They find firms
complete 92% and 73% of the announced programs, respectively. In a more recent study,
Chemmanur and Li (2016) hand-collected actual share repurchase completion data from 10-
K and 10-Q. They report an 86% completion rate. My treatment sample has a completion
rate of around 84%. This result is in line with the aforementioned literature. I can conclude
that the liquidity diverted from firms’ investments are used to fund the open market share
repurchase programs to historical level. These evidence shows that open market share repur-
chase programs are not as flexible as one might think. Once firms announce these programs,
they will complete them even if they need to sacrifice their real activities. Additionally,
Bonaimé (2012) reports a 20% increase in announcement return given completion of prior
share repurchase programs. Her findings provide partial explanatory power for why firms
are trying to complete the share repurchase programs, as firms care about their reputations
and the market expects them to complete their repurchase programs.
However, I do not claim that open market share repurchase programs are at all inflex-
ible. From the data, I observe a 62% decrease in open market share repurchase program
announcements in 2009.11 This finding is consistent with Almeida et al. (2012) and Floyd
et al. (2015), in which they both report a reduction in share repurchase announcements
during the recent financial crisis. The popular press has also widely reported the decrease
in share repurchase initiations, with a historical low in 2009.12 In summary, I show that
open market share repurchase programs are not as flexible as they appear. Firms still have
11In the SDC data, open market share repurchase announcements have decreased from 397 in 2008 to 152
in 2009.
12For example, see The Wall Street Journal article ”Companies’ Stock Buybacks Help Buoy the Market”
published on September 15, 2014 at http://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-stock-buybacks-help
-buoy-the-market-1410823441.
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the ability to not announce them. However, once they announce such programs, they will
conclude them even if they need to take reductions in real activities.
2.4. Additional Results
In this section, I examine split samples based on bank dependency measures, long-term
analyst forecast coverages, credit ratings, and debt and equity issuances. I then examine the
longer term consequences of open market share repurchase programs on firms’ real activities.
I also examine repurchase programs announced in the near term only (i.e. 2006 and 2007).
And lastly I consider two operating outcome variables.
2.4.1. Bank Dependency
On the one hand, bank lending channel would be a potential explanation for the main results.
For example, Brunnermeier (2009) and Shleifer and Vishny (2010) have argued that banks
suffer big losses from their sub-prime assets hence reduce the loans to their corporate clients.
As a result, the credit contraction leads to a reduction in capital expenditures. On the
other hand, Kahle and Stulz (2013) find that capital expenditures do not fall more for bank
dependent firms compared to matched firms. I would like to see whether bank dependency
plays a role here. I try to show whether bank dependent firms scale back real activities to
fund share repurchases. Or the firms who do not have prior banking relationships the ones
with more urgent needs of additional financial slack to fund share repurchase programs.
Following Kahle and Stulz (2013), I construct two measures for bank dependency.13 The
first measure is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has two or more credit facilities
with the same bank in the five years prior to the end of the second quarter of 2006. The sec-
ond measure is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is in the top quintile of leverage
at the end of the second quarter of 2006 and has credit facility with a bank at the end of
2005 and at the end of 2006. The credit facilities data come from Thomson Reuters LPC-
Dealscan. I use the link table provided by Chava and Roberts (2008) to merge Dealscan with
Compustat following Acharya et al. (2013). I report the results in Table 2.5. I implement the
same regression specification as in equation (1). I report the bank loan measure results in
columns (1) - (6) and the high leverage firms with credit facilities measure results in columns
(7) - (12). I find that firms without bank relationships cut back capital investment, employ-
ment, and R&D expense whereas bank dependent firms don’t. The results are statistically
13Kahle and Stulz (2013) utilized three measures in their paper. Unfortunately, the third measure do not
yield enough observations for the bank dependent group to carry out any statistical tests.
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significant. The magnitudes are about twice as large as the full sample I reported in Table
2.3. Firms that are not bank dependent really struggle to come up with resources to fulfill
their share repurchase programs compared to their bank dependent counterparts.
Additionally, I tab the data to see if there are any differences in share repurchase com-
pletion rates between firms depend on banks and the ones do not. In unreported results, I
find that the completion rates between the two groups are qualitatively similar.14 And the
completion rates are in line with the full sample and the literature. This evidence shows
that the firms without long-term coverage diverted the funds from real activities to share
repurchases. In summary, the results in general support my hypothesis that open market
share repurchases are not as flexible as construed.
2.4.2. Long-Term Analyst Coverage
McNichols and O’Brien (1997) show that analysts allocate their efforts to firms with good
future prospects. Merton (1987) documents that firms with more analyst coverage gets more
attention from investors and leads to a lower cost of capital. Jung et al. (2015) find that
changes in analyst interest is positively associated with future changes in the fundamentals.
One can infer that firms without long-term analyst coverage need more resources at the
current stage to maintain normal activities. Since open market share repurchase programs
appear to have flexibility, one would not expect to see the firms without long-term analyst
coverage to cut real activities to fund the share repurchases. If such firms indeed cut capital
investment, employment, and R&D expense to buyback shares, then share repurchases are
not really flexible.
I split the sample based on firms’ long-term analyst forecast coverage. I obtain financial
analyst forecast coverage data from I/B/E/S. I define long-term forecast as forecasting firms’
EPS more than three years ahead. I use analyst four-year and five-year forecasts in my test.
I code a firm as having long-term coverage if at least one analyst is reporting future EPS on
the firm. I report the results in Table 2.6. I implement the same regression specification as
in equation (1). I report the four-year coverage sample results in columns (1) - (6) and the
five-year coverage sample results in columns (7) - (12). I find that firms without long-term
analyst coverage cut back capital investment, employment, and R&D expense. The results
are statistically significant. The magnitudes are higher than the full sample I reported in
Table 2.3 which means the firms in this subsample are cutting back more.
14The results are available upon request. I perform this test for all subsample analysis.
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2.4.3. Credit Ratings
Firms with credit ratings are perceived by the market as firms of better credit quality
(Almeida et al., 2004). Consequently, they should be the ones better at capital budgeting
and planning because they value the importance of their credit. In terms of share repur-
chases, they are the ones who really planned ahead to ensure their repurchase programs will
move forward as expected. Unfortunately, firms without credit ratings might not have the
luxury to do so. Naturally, one would expect those firms to be affected more severely by the
unforeseen financial crisis. Hence we should observe a reduction in real activities.
In terms of credit ratings, I focus on two measures used in the literature. The first is
commercial paper rating and the second is bond rating. I split the sample based on whether
the firms have commercial paper or bond rating. I use the credit rating information from
Compustat. I report the results in Table 2.7. I implement the same regression specification
as in equation (1). I report the commercial paper rating sample results in columns (1) - (6)
and the bond rating sample results in columns (7) - (12). I find that treated firms with-
out credit ratings significantly cut back capital investment, employment, and R&D expense
than control firms. Firms with credit ratings do not act differently between the treated and
control groups. I again obtain point estimates with higher magnitudes than the full sample
I reported in Table 2.3.
2.4.4. New Debt and Equity Issuance
Farre-Mensa et al. (2016) documents the fact that many firms finance their payout activities
by issuing new debt or equity as oppose to the conventional wisdom of paying out residual
cash only. For firms that have had debt or equity issuance around their share repurchase
announcements, they are likely to have enough capital raised to fund the share repurchase
programs. However, firms that did not have new issuance of debt or equity might not have
enough resources to repurchase shares. Hence they should be the ones that scale back on
the real activities.
I use SDC Global New Issue database to test this hypothesis. I create a debt issuance
dummy that equals one if the firm has issued debt around a three-year window of the share
repurchase announcement date and zero otherwise. I implement the same procedure for
equity issuance. I split the sample based on whether the firms have issued debt or equity. I
report the results in Table 2.8. I implement the same regression specification as in equation
(1). I report the debt issuance sample results in columns (1) - (6) and the debt issuance
sample results in columns (7) - (12). I do not observe any statistically significant differences
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between the treated and control firms in the issuance group. However, for firms that did
not issue debt or equity, the treated group reduce their capital investment, employment, and
R&D expense, both statistically and economically significantly, more than the control group.
2.4.5. Longer-Term Real Consequences
So far, I have shown the effects of open market share repurchase programs on firms’ real
activities during a three-year window since the onset of the financial crisis. My empirical
strategy requires a narrow window. Naturally one might ask whether those open market
share repurchase programs induce longer-term consequence to firms’ investment strategies.
It would also be interesting to see how firms adjust their financial policies when the overall
economic condition improves. I am not trying to provide a thorough analysis of long-term
effects of share repurchases. I simply extend the treatment window to 2013 (i.e. 2009-2013),
which is the last year with a reasonable amount of data.
I define laterPost = 1 if firm i is in 2012 and 2013 and interact it with the treatment
dummy. I extend the main specifications in Table 2.3 by adding this interaction term to
equation (1).15 I present the results in Table 2.9. The coefficients of the main interaction
term treat×post are of similar magnitude with the main results and statistically significant.
However, the coefficients of the second interaction term laterPost× treated are all positive,
which means share repurchases do not impose negative long-term consequences. Firms esca-
late investment activities after the financial crisis. The coefficients are statistically significant
for capital investment but not for employment and R&D expense.
One possible explanation is that firms delayed their investments to after the financial crisis
when there were better investment opportunities. Another possible explanation is that the
wedge in investment between the treatment and control groups became smaller. Recall that
the later period is year 2012 and 2013, so this might be due to the fact that the treatment
group got better access to external financing when the economy began to recover.
2.4.6. Recently Announced Repurchase Programs
In this subsection, I restrict the sample to firms with open market share repurchase programs
announced in 2006 and 2007 only. Both the treatment and control groups announced share
repurchases during this narrower time window. By restricting the announcement period,
I can rule out some time series or macroeconomic conditions that might drive the results.
15Specifically, I estimate yit = β1 ·postit×treatedit+β2 ·laterPostit×treatedit+δ ·Xit+λi+τt+αj×τt+εit.
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And in the same vein of Ouimet and Simintzi (2016), I can mitigate the concerns about
firms intentionally choose to announce share repurchases before a financial crisis because
they think they can better manage potential downturns.
I present the findings in Table 2.10. I conduct regressions using the same specifications
as for Table 2.3. I report capital investment as the outcome variable in columns (1) - (3),
employment as the outcome variable in columns (4) - (6), and R&D expense as the outcome
variable in columns (7) - (9). I find similar results to Table 2.3. However, the magnitudes of
the difference-in-difference point estimates are higher for this sample under all three outcome
variables. Specifically, the effects on capital investment, employment, and R&D expense are
27%, 50%, and 20% larger than the full sample, respectively. Firms that announce repur-
chase programs in 2006 and 2007 took much deeper cuts to their real activities, meaning
that the firms cannot really time financial crises. This result indirectly shows that the recent
financial crisis is a surprise to the firms because the firms announced their programs so close
to the crisis realized bigger scale-backs on average.
2.4.7. Operating Outcomes
The discussion above focuses on firms’ real activities. It is natural to ask whether firms
with open market share repurchase programs ending after December 2007 have better or
worse operating performance than similar firms with programs ending before. I examine two
measures of operating outcome: profit margin and sales growth. Since anything related to
firms’ assets and equity is contaminated in the setting, I focus on sales-related variables.
I define profit margin as operating income divided by lagged sales. I calculate sales growth
as the ratio of the difference between firms’ sales in year t and year t − 1 to firms’ sales in
year t− 1. I implement a similar regression specification as in equation (1).
The results are reported in Table 2.11. Columns (1) - (3) report the profit margin re-
sults. Firms with repurchase programs ending after December 2007 on average experience
a 1 percentage point lower profit margin than otherwise similar firms with share repurchase
programs ending before December 2007. This decrease in profit margin is statistically signif-
icant and economically large. It represents a 6% drop in pre-crisis profit margin. Columns
(4) - (6) show the results using sales growth as the outcome variable. The treatment group
has a 2.8 percentage point slower sales growth rate than the control group. In summary,
I can see that firms with open market share repurchase programs ending after the recent
financial crisis not only have to sacrifice their real activities to finish their share repurchase




In this section, I present several robustness checks. I first check the main results using the
Abadie and Imbens (2006) matching estimator approach. I then perform the placebo tests
for my difference-in-difference regression. I also use the dotcom recession as an additional
placebo period. And lastly I utilize my full control group with higher order controls.
2.5.1. Matching Estimator
There may be other subtle firm heterogeneities producing the results. I alleviate this concern
using a difference-in-difference matching estimator approach (Abadie and Imbens, 2006) by
following Almeida et al. (2012), Kahle and Stulz (2013) and Bliss et al. (2015). This approach
accounts for both observable firm characteristics and unobservables. Specifically, I require
firms in the treatment and control groups to be similar in firm size, Tobin’s Q, leverage,
cash flow, cash holdings, duration of repurchase programs, and industry. Tests between the
matched treatment and control groups reveal no statistical difference between them.
I report the results in Table 2.12. Panel A shows the summary statistics of the matching
procedure. The p-value of the t-test statistic between the treatment and control groups
reveals no significant difference between them on any of the dimensions I matched upon.
This finding confirms that the matching was successful. I show the matching estimator
coefficients, along with the regression results from Table 2.3 in Panel B. The results are
qualitatively the same.
2.5.2. Placebo and Dotcom Recession Tests
The identification strategy relies on the assumption that the treatment and control groups
follow parallel trends in the period leading up to December 2007. Even though I have shown
that the treatment and control groups have no statistical difference in terms of the outcome
variables and I control for a battery of firm characteristics, I cannot completely rule out
the possibility that a latent variable may be driving both the choices of open market share
repurchase programs’ ending time and firms’ real activities.
In order to strengthen the results, I conduct the same experiment I did for the 2007
crisis period in Table 2.3 around three placebo periods. Specifically, I perform the same
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tests around December 2004, December 2005, and December 2006. Following my empirical
strategy, I sort firms into placebo treatment and control groups based on the ending dates of
their open market share repurchase programs. Using the December 2004 test as an example,
I assign firms with open market share repurchase programs ending after December 2004 to
the treatment group and firms with open market share repurchase programs ending before
December 2004 io the control group. If there is an unobservable factor driving the results,
open market share repurchase programs should have effects on firms’ financial outcomes
during the three placebo periods as well.
The results from the three placebo periods are shown in Table 2.13. Columns (1)-(3)
present results from the December 2006 placebo crisis, columns (4)-(6) present results from
the December 2005 placebo crisis, and columns (7)-(9) present results from the December
2004 placebo crisis. For brevity, I only report the results from the fully fledged model and
the coefficients of the key interaction term treat×post. Notably, I do not observe any statis-
tically or economically significant relation between the treatment and control groups during
the placebo periods. In conclusion, these findings are consistent with the argument that the
results I observe are driven by having open market repurchase programs ending after the
recent financial crisis.
So far I have shown a consistent relation between having open market repurchase programs
ending after December 2007 and a reduction in investments. However, it is possible that
such effects are due to a demand shock or ”macro effect” (Almeida et al., 2012), that is firms
might be more likely to cut investments during a recession and this likelihood is higher for
firms with open market repurchase programs going into the recession. In order to exam-
ine this, I use a period that did not experience a credit supply shock but was a recession.
Specifically, I use the 1999-2003 period, known as the dotcom period, during which firms
experienced a recession as defined by NBER without external financing shortage.
This test is similar to the placebo tests. Firms with open market share repurchase pro-
grams ending after February 2001 are assigned to the treatment group and firms with open
market share repurchase programs ending before February 2001 are assigned into the control
group.16 If my main findings are due to a recession, I should also see similar effects during
the dotcom era.
Table 2.13 Columns (10)-(12) shows that coefficients of the interaction term treat× post
are not statistically significant. There are no observable differences between the treatment
and control groups. In short, the results are not likely due to the dotcom recession or demand
shocks.
16I choose February 28, 2001 as the cutoff for this exercise because NBER defines March 2001 as the peak
of the dotcom period.
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2.5.3. Full Sample Test
The main tests were conducted on a sample matched on share repurchase durations. I do
so to mitigate the issue that firms of different program durations might be fundamentally
different. This approach addresses the endogeneity concern but leaves a large portion of
available data unused. In this subsection, I utilize the full sample by controlling for share
repurchase durations. Specifically, I use the same basic set up as in equation (1). However,
I add controls for share repurchase duration and interaction terms. In the regression, I
control for duration by including up to the fourth order polynomial terms. I also interact
all the control variables with the treatment dummy to capture the differences between the
treatment and control groups. These additional controls help to deal with issues associated
with the difference in time span of the repurchase programs and the different starting and
ending dates.
I report the results in Table 2.14. In the regressions for the results in columns (3), (7),
and (11), I include interactions between the treatment dummy and all other control variables
except for duration. In the regressions for the results in columns (4), (8), and (12), I include
all the interactions, as well as higher order duration controls. I find qualitatively similar
results to those reported in Table 2.3.
2.6. Concluding Remarks
Open market share repurchase programs are widely regarded as flexible tools in firms’ pay-
out policy. The firms can decide not only the timing but also the amount of buybacks. In
this paper, I challenge this traditional view and ask whether open market share repurchase
programs are really flexible. I use the onset of the 2007 financial crisis as the experimental
setting and utilize the predetermined variations in open market share repurchase program
ending dates to overcome empirical difficulties in the literature to address the question.
I find evidence that open market share repurchase programs are not as flexible as one might
expect. Although the firms still have the freedom to decide whether or not to announce re-
purchase programs, once such programs are in place, they will sacrifice real activities to
complete the programs. I find that firms with open market share repurchase programs end-
ing after December 2007 cut 1.9 percentage point more of capital investment, four employees
more per million dollars of capital stock, and 9 percentage points more of R&D expense to
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fund the share repurchases than otherwise similar firms with such programs ending before
December 2007. The reductions are economically large. They represent 7%-15% decreases
in pre-crisis levels. I show that the freed-up capital indeed goes toward the share repur-
chase programs - firms buyback on average 84% of the predetermined amount of shares.
In additional tests, I find that firms do not depend on banks, without long-term analyst
coverage, without credit ratings, and with no new debt or equity issuance cut back more
real activities to divert to share repurchases. These results further suggest that repurchases
are not flexible since these firms are the ones need capital the most. I also report that open
market share repurchase programs do not impose negative consequences on treatment group
firms’ longer-term real activities, which might due to firms delaying investments or better
overall financing conditions. Treatment group firms also suffer some degree of operational
loss, which might be a result of an investment cut. The results are robust to the placebo
tests, as well as a battery of other robustness tests.
My paper provides policy implications to firms. Managers have the choice of whether or
not to announce share repurchase programs. However, if they ever decide to initiate such
programs, they should make sure that they can complete them before doing so (i.e., they
have enough resources to complete them or have emergency plans for unexpected events).
Otherwise, if there are negative shocks to the firms or the overall economy, the managers
cannot easily complete the programs without taking on costly cutbacks.
For future research, it would be helpful to obtain interim data on the exact amount of
shares repurchased from the 10-Q and 10-K filings. With the additional data, one can better
understand the subtle changes in the relation between firms’ financial decisions and share
repurchase decisions, hence obtaining deeper knowledge of the issue.
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2.7. Tables
Table 2.1 Summary statistics
This table reports summary statistics. Panel A reports the matching results on share repurchase program
duration. Panel B reports the summary statistics of the entire sample. Panel C reports the summary statis-
tics of the treatment and control groups. All of the control variables are measured in 2007 (the year prior to
crisis). The treatment group is defined as firms who have open market share repurchase programs in place
and completed before December 2007. The control group includes firms that have open market share repur-
chase programs announced before December 2007 with predetermined ending dates after December 2007.
Panel A: Matching for the Duration Variable (days)
Mean SD P25 p50 p75
Treatment 1,351 1,159 473 950 1,921
Control 1,338 1,117 470 952 1,921
Mean Median Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
p-value p-value p-value
0.83 0.98 0.99
Panel B: The Entire Sample
Mean SD P25 p50 p75
Capital investment 0.27 0.19 0.14 0.22 0.32
Employment 57.69 80.34 17.41 37.78 65.49
R&D expense 0.58 1.19 0.02 0.13 0.62
Size 7.18 1.92 5.85 7.10 8.42
Q 1.92 1.08 1.18 1.75 2.42
Leverage 0.19 0.19 0.02 0.18 0.29
Cash holdings 0.16 0.16 0.04 0.096 0.23
Cash flow 0.85 1.30 0.28 0.58 1.02
Panel C: Treatment and Control Groups
Mean SD P25 p50 p75 Mean SD P25 p50 p75
Treatment Group Control Group
Capital investment 0.29 0.21 0.16 0.23 0.35 0.23 0.15 0.13 0.20 0.28
Employment 63.01 92.16 17.10 38.03 67.52 48.84 53.73 17.60 36.58 57.56
R&D expense 0.66 1.31 0.02 0.15 0.69 0.44 0.93 0.02 0.12 0.48
Size 7.26 1.88 5.93 7.29 8.49 7.01 1.99 5.70 6.86 8.15
Q 2.02 1.12 1.22 1.81 2.49 1.74 0.97 1.02 1.60 2.19
Leverage 0.18 0.17 0.01 0.17 0.27 0.20 0.17 0.03 0.18 0.31
Cash holdings 0.16 0.15 0.04 0.10 0.25 0.15 0.17 0.03 0.09 0.21
Cash flow 0.96 1.39 0.33 0.63 1.10 0.67 1.11 0.24 0.51 0.94
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Table 2.2 Pre-existing trends in capital investment, employment, and R&D expense
This table presents the differences of the change in average capital investment, employment, and
R&D expense to capital stock ratio between the treatment and control groups. The base year, year
t, is 2008. For example, the first row reports the change from year t − 2 to t − 1. This is the
change in the outcome variables from year 2006 to 2007. Column (1) reports the change in cap-
ital investment. Column (2) reports the change in employment. Column (3) reports the change
in R&D expense. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parenthe-
ses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Outcome Change Capital Investment Employment R&D Expense
(1) (2) (3)
t− 2 to t− 1 -0.01 -0.45 -0.01
(0.01) (2.00) (0.05)
t− 3 to t− 2 -0.00 -1.92 -0.01
(0.01) (1.75) (0.05)
t− 4 to t− 3 -0.00 2.64 0.03
(0.01) (-1.89) (0.05)
t− 3 to t− 1 0.00 -2.36 0.02
(0.02) (2.28) (0.06)



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.11 Operating outcomes
This table reports the effects of having open market share repurchase programs ending after December
2007 on firms’ operating outcomes. Profit margin is defined as operating income divided by lagged sales.
Sales growth is the ratio of the difference between firms’ sales in year t and year t-1 to firms’ sales in
year t-1. The sample is from 2005 to 2011. Year 2008 is omitted as a transition year. In columns (1)
- (3), I use profit margin as the outcome variable and in columns (4) - (6), I use sales growth as the
outcome variable. The control variables are defined as in Almeida et al. (2004) and Rauh (2006). All
the variables are winsorized at the 1% level. The regressions are at the firm-year level. I control for year
and firm fixed effects throughout. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Variables Profit Margin Sales Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat×post -0.006 -0.010** -0.009** -0.018** -0.029*** -0.028***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Size 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.075*** 0.070***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.018)
Q 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.061*** 0.062***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.012)
Leverage 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.304*** 0.313***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.093) (0.091)
Cash holdings 0.004 0.011 -0.160* -0.150*
(0.035) (0.035) (0.082) (0.080)
Cash flow 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.010 0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.010)
Year FE Y Y Subsumed Y Y Subsumed
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry × Year FE N N Y N N Y
N 3,434 2,935 2,935 3,434 2,935 2,935
R2 0.816 0.843 0.858 0.424 0.449 0.494
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Table 2.12 Matching estimator
This table reports the results using Abadie and Imbens (2006) matching estimator approach. I
match firms in the treatment and control groups in terms of firm size, Q, leverage, cash flow, cash
holdings, duration of repurchase programs, and industry. Panel A reports the differences between
the treatment and control group after matching. Panel B column (1) presents the matching esti-
mator coefficients and column (2) shows the regression results from Table 2.3. All the variables are
winsorized at the 1% level. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Summary Statistics for Treatment and Control
Variables Treatment Control Mean p-value
(1) (2) (3)
Investment -0.070 -0.078 0.581
Employment -4.093 -2.830 0.730
R&D Expense -0.049 0.001 0.457
Size 7.220 7.271 0.781
Q 2.110 2.080 0.756
Leverage 0.171 0.167 0.836
Cash holdings 0.179 0.176 0.846
Cash flow 0.953 0.952 0.996
Repurchase duration 1,648.300 1,649.400 0.994
Panel B: Matching Estimator
Abadie and Imbens Regression Result















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































“TRADING” POLITICAL FAVORS: EVIDENCE
FROM THE IMPACT OF THE STOCK ACT
3.1. Introduction
Politicians and firms are closely and intricately linked through various connections, and these
links can provide mutual benefits. A stream of recent research has documented the value
of political connections from the firms’ perspective, but in contrast, much less attention
has been devoted to studying the benefits that accrue to politicians. In this paper, we
focus on stock ownership as the link that aligns the financial incentives of politicians with
firm performance. We show that politicians use private information and political favors for
financial gains from stock investments in their personal portfolios, and that these favors have
a real impact on the value and economic outcomes of the firms in which they invest.
Although politicians cannot legally trade their power for personal benefits through demon-
strable quid pro quo arrangements such as outright bribery and influence peddling, they may
exploit their public office to advance their personal interest in an insidious manner that falls
in the gray area of the law. In particular, with respect to stock trading, politicians’ positions
afford them unique advantages through two distinct but related channels.
First, politicians have access to material, nonpublic information derived from their of-
ficial positions or gained from performing their official responsibilities. Such information
may be used to time the market in their personal stock trades, allowing the politicians to
generate significant gains or avoid significant losses before the information becomes public.
For example, a few months (in some cases weeks) prior to the passage of the Affordable
Care Act, Senator John Kerry, Senator Jim Webb, Congressman Vern Buchanan, and many
other politicians on Capitol Hill purchased healthcare stocks, and their estimated gains were
between 15% and 50% in a short six-month period.1 The private information available to
1As another example, in September 2008 amid the financial crisis, Senator Dick Durbin, Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government of the Senate Appropriation Committee, sold
investments worth more than $115,000 in the few days after a closed-door meeting with then-Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, with the majority of the selling happening
on the day after the meeting. The stock market fell 22% in the following month. Schweizer (2011) discusses
these instances in detail, along with many other examples of alleged congressional corruption.
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politicians can be broad-based and relevant for an entire industry or even the entire stock
market but can also be firm-specific, e.g., the decision to award a substantial government
contract to a particular company. Access to such information does not require that the
politicians intentionally and actively seeking it. They may obtain access while performing
routine official responsibility.
By comparison, the second channel through which politicians can obtain an advantage in
stock trading involves them playing an active role and taking actions on behalf of the firms
in their stock portfolios: politicians can favor certain groups of firms or individual firms in
decisions that have significant economic impact on firm performance, such as the passage
of legislations and regulations, the awarding of government contracts, and the selection into
government programs. An example can be found in Congressman Tom Petri’s dealings with
the Oshkosh Corporation, a manufacturer of specialty trucks and military vehicles.2 In
2009, Representative Petri helped Oshkosh secure a $3 billion contract from the U.S. Army,
after the award was challenged by a competitor and then under review by the Government
Accountability Office, by sending letters and memos to colleagues and officials on the Hill and
at the Pentagon including the Defense Secretary, the Chairman of the House Armed Services
Committee, and the Secretary of the Army. Meanwhile, Petri owned a substantial amount of
Oshkosh stock, valued at between $250,000 and $500,000, and purchased additional shares
as he was making contacts on behalf of the company to resolve the dispute. Oshkosh’s
stock price rose from $8 per share in early 2009 to $38 per share in February 2010, when its
contract with the Army was finalized.
Favoritism towards firms held in politicians’ stockholdings can be achieved either directly
through politicians’ own decision rights or indirectly by influencing the relevant parties in
charge, and the benefits ensuing from the favors can help boost the stock prices of the favored
firms and increase the likelihood of superior investment performance. Moreover, these acts of
favor may afford politicians opportunities to obtain privileged information that can enhance
their trading performance from the firms themselves, either through learning about the firms’
businesses in the normal course of offering help or as a returned favor by firms engaging in
a tacit quid pro quo exchange.
In this paper, we examine whether politicians exploit such private information and political
favors in trading stocks, how well their investments perform as a result, and what impact
their actions have on the value and economic outcomes of the firms they hold in their
portfolios. To do so, we assemble the stock ownership and trading data for all members of
2See Slack (2014), a news report in USA Today, for a detailed coverage of the Tom Petri example. The
news report prompted a review conducted by the Office of Congressional Ethics to investigate whether
Representative Petri improperly performed official acts on behalf of companies in which he had financial
interests.
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the U.S. Congress from 2010 to 2013 as well as firm-level data on procurement contracts and
government grants awarded and trade mission participation. We then use the passage of the
Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act in 2012 as an experiment. The
STOCK Act is a bill designed to combat congressional insider trading.3 The Act prohibits
members and employees of Congress from using any nonpublic information for personal
benefit and requires them to publicly disclose financial transactions (including stock, bonds,
and commodities) exceeding $1,000 within 45 days of the transactions. In effect, by explicitly
declaring that members of Congress are not exempt from the insider trading prohibitions
arising under the security laws, the STOCK Act represents a shock to politicians’ incentives
to engage in trading on private information. To the extent that the Act heightens monitoring
and transparency of congressional activity, it can also have a deterrent effect on politicians’
use of political favors for financial gains in their own stock investments. The shock thus
offers a relatively clean setting to study the effect of private information and political favors
on the trading performance of politicians and the impact of politicians’ actions on firms.
Exploiting this shock, our empirical strategy examines the changes in politicians’ trading
performance as well as in firm value and outcomes around the passage of the Act.
We start by assessing the profitability of politicians’ trades, both before and after the
STOCK Act, using the calendar-time portfolio approach. We find that politicians earn sig-
nificant abnormal returns on their stock trades prior to the passage of the Act but exhibit
no outperformance after the Act. The buy-minus-sell portfolio for politicians’ trades earns a
statistically significant Carhart alpha of 9.5% per year before the Act but has only a statis-
tically insignificant alpha of 0.9% per year afterwards. Therefore, the abnormal performance
of politicians’ stock trades is unlikely to be attributable to any superior skills in stock picking
or trading. Rather, this evidence is consistent with politicians having an advantage in stock
trading by exploiting private information and political favors prior to the STOCK Act and
the Act being effective in deterring such exploitation.
We then explore the politicians’ information advantage further by linking changes in their
stockholdings to firm performance and activities in an attempt to identify the sources of
politicians’ superior stock trading performance. Specifically, we examine whether politicians’
stock market transactions have predictive power for the mergers and acquisitions activities
as well as the revenue and earnings surprises of the firms held in their stock portfolios,
again contrasting the pre-Act period with the post-Act period. We find that an increase in
politicians’ holdings of a firm’s stock positively and significantly predicts the firm’s likelihood
of being acquired and its revenue and earnings surprises prior to the Act. An increase
in politicians’ ownership in a firm in this quarter increases the firm’s likelihood of being
3We discuss the institutional details of the STOCK Act in Section 3.2.1
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acquired in the next quarter by 180% and increases its amount of surprise revenue and
surprise earnings in the next quarter by over 100%. After the passage of the STOCK Act,
the predictive power of politicians’ holdings increase disappears for both revenue/earnings
surprises and merger activities. We interpret these results as evidence that politicians have
access to nonpublic information related to the firms in which they invest prior to the Act.
While some of this information (e.g., information related to revenue or earnings) may be
obtained from outside sources when politicians perform their official acts (e.g., knowing the
imminent approval of a government contract), it is plausible to believe that some of the
privileged information (e.g., information related to mergers) may be from the companies
themselves, suggesting a reciprocal exchange of favors between politicians and firms.
Next, we focus on firm-level analysis to assess the value implication and real impact of being
politician-owned from the firms’ perspective. We first examine the stock market reaction to
the passage of the STOCK Act, distinguishing between firms with and without politician
ownership. We find that firms that are held in politicians’ stock portfolios at the time
of announcement on average lose a statistically significant 1.4% in value during the three-
day window around the Act’s passage, while firms not owned by politicians experience no
abnormal returns. It is interesting to note that for the set of firms owned by politicians, the
market reacts negatively to the news of an Act that curbs insider trading by the politicians.
A reasonable inference is that the market understands that in pursuing personal benefit,
politicians give preferential treatment toward the firms held in their stock portfolios. These
favors are valuable to firms and are taken into consideration in the market valuation. By
reducing politicians’ incentives to engage in trading on private information and political
favors, the STOCK Act makes it less likely that these politician-owned firms continue to
enjoy preferential treatment, hence the drop in value upon announcement.
Accordingly, we investigate the changes in firm outcomes around the Act, focusing on
measures that are likely to be subject to influence and preferential treatment by politicians.
We examine the changes in procurement contracts, government grants, and participation rate
in high-profile government trade missions for firms with and without politician ownership
around the Act, using a difference-in-differences approach. We find that compared to firms
without politician ownership, firms owned by politicians experience a substantial decrease in
the contract and grant awards from the government and become significantly less likely to
be selected by the government into high-profile trade missions. These results are consistent
with the market reaction upon announcement of the passage of the Act and indicate that
once politicians refrain from exploiting their public office for personal gains in stock trading,
the political favors towards the firms in their stock portfolio also diminish, directly affecting
the value and outcomes of these companies.
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Last, we use cross-sectional comparisons to understand the factors that enhance the ben-
efits that accrue to politicians and the firms held in their stock portfolios. Specifically, we
focus on politicians’ committee assignments to identify powerful versus non-powerful politi-
cians and on corporate campaign contributions and lobbying activities to identify politically
active versus non-active firms. Our findings show that the mutual benefits are particularly
pronounced for politicians who are powerful and firms that are politically active. For exam-
ple, the outperformance in politicians’ stock trading prior to the STOCK Act is concentrated
among powerful politicians (with a Carhart alpha of 13.5% per year) and among trades in
stocks of politically active firms (with a Carhart alpha of 10.7% to 11.9% per year). Simi-
larly, the value loss upon the announcement of the passage of the Act is most striking for
firms that are owned by powerful politicians and politician-owned firms that make political
donations or spend money lobbying.
Taken together, our results shed light on the tacit benefits that accrue to both politicians
and the firms to which they are connected through stock ownership. These findings relate
to several strands of literature. First, we contribute to a growing literature that examines
the value of political connections (e.g., Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006).4 Most of this research,
however, studies such value from the firms’ perspective. Benefits accrued to politicians
are relatively difficult to observe and quantify and thus have received much less attention,
typically restricted to during election events (e.g., job creation by firms to help politicians’
election efforts). Our paper demonstrates the personal, financial benefits that politicians
are able to reap through the use of private information and political favors in stock trading.
Politicians’ stock ownership aligns their financial incentives with firm performance, and in
the pursuit of personal gains, their actions have a significant real impact on firm value and
outcomes. Our findings therefore provide suggestive evidence of a reciprocal relationship
between politicians and firms, in spirit in line with the argument developed in Shleifer and
Vishny (1994) of favors being traded between firms and politicians.
Our paper is also related to the studies that examine the abnormal returns earned by cor-
porate insiders (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Jeng et al., 2003) or by following legislators’
votes (Cohen et al., 2013). With respect to politicians’ trading performance, however, there
is no consensus whether politicians can outperform the market.5 Furthermore, it is difficult
to distinguish, without a clear setting or methodology, whether the trading performance of
4See also Faccio et al. (2006), Bertrand et al. (2007), Claessens et al. (2008), Goldman et al. (2008),
Faccio and Parsley (2009), Cooper et al. (2010), Duchin and Sosyura (2012), Goldman et al. (2013), Tahoun
(2014), Akey (2015), and Acemoglu et al. (2016), among others.
5For example, Ziobrowski et al. (2004) suggest that U.S. senators earn abnormal returns from their stock
investments whereas C. Eggers and Hainmueller (2013) argue that there is little evidence of outperformance
in politicians’ stockholdings and that they are better off investing in passive index funds.
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politicians is attributable to their actions and information advantages tied to their posts or
is simply due to their trading skills, so no attempt has been made in the existing literature
in this regard. Our paper uses a relatively clear setting that allows us to examine politi-
cians’ trading performance as well as the link between changes in their stockholdings and
firm performance both before and after the STOCK Act. The comparison between the two
periods yields reasonably convincing evidence that is consistent with politicians having an
advantage in stock trading by exploiting private information and political favors prior to the
Act.
In addition, our paper adds to the literature that debates the effectiveness of the STOCK
Act in curtailing congressional insider trading. Critics of the law argue that the Act is merely
a public relations stunt by the government and that it would continue to be difficult to reduce
congressional insider trading (e.g., Schroeder, 2014), while the more optimistic scholars view
the Act as a step towards the right direction in addressing the issue (e.g., Lekahal, 2012).
Empirical studies, therefore, are much needed to assess whether the STOCK Act serves as
an effective remedy to the problem (e.g., Brick, 2013; Verret, 2015). Our paper represents a
first study to examine changes in politicians’ trading performance and activities around the
passage of the Act and presents evidence that demonstrates the effectiveness of the STOCK
Act from the perspectives of both politicians and firms.
3.2. Data and variables
3.2.1. The STOCK Act
To combat politician insider trading, the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK)
Act prohibits the members and employees of the legislative branch, the executive branch,
and the judiciary branch of the government from using “any nonpublic information derived
from the individual’s position... or gained from performance of the individual’s duties” for
personal benefit.6
Politicians have always been subject to the same insider trading laws such as the Security
and Exchange Act of 1934 as everyone else. However, it’s unclear to whom politicians owe
“fiduciary duties”, and it’s hard to define “non-public, material” information in a political
context, whereas both are clear for corporations. It is, therefore, difficult to hold politi-
cians liable for insider trading under the traditional “classical theory” or “misappropriations
6The full Act can be accessed here: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-112publ105/pdf/PLAW-1
12publ105.pdf (last retrieved: March 15, 2017).
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theory”, which are the two common methods determining insider trading for corporate em-
ployees (Bainbridge, 2010).
Additionally, no regulations exist on barring politicians from owning shares in companies
that are regulated by their committees. Rule 37(4) of the Senate Ethics Manual prohibits
politicians from knowingly using their official positions to further their personal financial
interests. However, this provision acknowledges that “[l]egislation may have a significant fi-
nancial effect on a senator because his holdings are involved,” and states that the prohibitions
would not apply as long as “the legislation has a broad, general impact on his state or the
nation.” Similarly, the House Ethics Manual Rule 23(3) states that “[m]embers and employ-
ees need not divest themselves of assets upon assuming their positions, nor must members
disqualify themselves from voting on issues that affect their personal financial interests.” In-
stead, this provision states that “public financial disclosure provides a means of monitoring
and deterring conflicts,” which is immediately followed by “[n]o federal statute, regulation,
or rule of the House absolutely prohibits a member or House employee from holding assets
that might conflict with or influence the performance of official duties” (Nagy, 2013).
Last but not least, the Congress funds the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
which makes it harder to open investigations against politicians. The then-Director of En-
forcement at the SEC, Robert Khuzami, testified in Congressional hearings that insider
trading laws had not been applied to the Congress. Khuzami stated that “[t]here does not
appear to be any case law that addresses the duty of a member [of Congress] with respect
to trading on the basis of information the member learns in an official capacity”.
Members of the Congress have been trying to introduce legislations to address the gray
area of congressional insider trading. The STOCK Act was first introduced in 2006 by
two representatives in the 109th Congress. It was then reintroduced in 2007 in the 110th
Congress and again in 2009 in the 111th Congress. Each time it received little attention or
support from the politicians and died in committee with a small number of cosponsors.
In March 2011, the Act was introduced yet again in the 112th Congress. Just like in
previous years, it had a limited number of cosponsors and was referred to various committees.
In November 2011, the CBS program 60 Minutes reported several cases of alleged insider
trading by members of Congress, which immediately went viral. During the five days after
the show, the STOCK Act gained an additional 84 cosponsors from the House. In his State
of the Union Address on January 24, 2012, President Barack Obama remarked, ”Send me
a bill that bans insider trading by members of Congress; I will sign it tomorrow”.7 The
revised version of the Act was introduced in the Senate on January 26, 2012. It passed in
7The full 2012 State of the Union Address can be accessed here: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-p
ress-office/2012/01/24/remarks-president-state-union-address (last retrieved: March 15, 2017).
81
the Senate by a vote of 96-3 on February 2, 2012 and passed in the House by a vote of 417-2
a week later. The STOCK Act was signed into law on April 4, 2012. In our analysis, we
use February 2, 2012, the date when the STOCK Act passed in the Senate, as the event
date. Although the Act had more solid support than in previous years, there was still policy
uncertainty regarding its fate prior to the Senate vote results: the draft bill still had a chance
of being thrown out just like in the series of past defeats. By the time it passed in the Senate
with wide support, the uncertainty was largely, if not entirely, resolved. The Act was sure
to be on its way to become the law, and indeed it passed in the House swiftly and almost
unanimously.
In summary, the STOCK Act prohibits politicians from profiting from nonpublic, material
information obtained at work. The Act requires politicians to file and disclose publicly any
financial transactions of stocks, bonds, commodities futures, and other securities that exceed
$1,000 within 45 days. By making explicit that members of Congress are not exempt from the
insider trading prohibitions arising under the security laws, the STOCK Act aims to curtail
congressional insider trading and enhance transparency and monitoring of congressional
activity. For the purpose of our study, it represents a shock to politicians’ incentives to
engage in trading on private information and can also have a deterrent effect on politicians’
use of political favors for financial gains in their own stock investments.
3.2.2. Politicians’ stock ownership
Politicians’ stock ownership information, including both holdings and transactions, is vital to
our analysis. The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 requires a mandatory annual public dis-
closure of financial records by government officials, including earned and unearned incomes,
assets (e.g., stocks, retirement funds, and real estate), liabilities, gifts received, reimbursed
traveling costs, etc. In particular, any assets with a balance greater than $1,000 in value
or producing more than $200 in income must be reported. Furthermore, any transactions
involving more than $1,000 in value must be reported together with the transaction dates.
The Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) collects the financial disclosure reports from
the Senate Office of Public Records for the U.S. Senate and the Office of the Clerk of the
House for the U.S. House of Representatives. We obtain from the CRP financial disclosure
reports for all Senate and House members in the four years around the STOCK Act, i.e.,
from 2010 to 2013. We then manually classify and extract all equity transactions. For
each politician, we collect year-end stock ownership value as well as equity transaction data
including whether the transaction is a buy or sell, the transaction date, and the transaction
value. Politicians are not required to report the exact dollar amount of their holdings and
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transactions. Instead, they must check a box representing a range.8 The CRP undertakes
additional research efforts to find the exact value when possible. If the exact amount is
not available, we use the midpoint value of the reported bracket in the analysis.9 We then
hand-match each equity transaction to CRSP to get stock prices. In total, we have 14,791
equity transactions made by politicians in the sample years, with an average transaction
value of $18,899
We also construct politicians’ stock ownership information as of February 2nd, 2012, our
event date. To do so, we start with the 2011 year-end stock ownership balances from the 2011
financial disclosure reports. We then update the information using transactions reported
in the 2012 year-end reports taking into consideration the stocks bought and sold by all
politicians from January 1st, 2012 to February 2nd, 2012. On average, 11% of the firms in
our sample are owned by at least one politician as of February 2nd, 2012.
3.2.3. Firm-level data
3.2.3.1. Procurement contracts and government grants
We collect company-level procurement contract data from the Federal Procurement Data
System Next Generation (FPDS-NG). FPDS-NG reports federal awards of various types of
procurement contracts from different government agencies with contract value of $3,000 or
more. Data on government grants are obtained from the Award Submission Portal, which
is managed by the Department of the Treasury’s Bureau of the Fiscal Service and reports
all grant and financial assistance awards of more than $25,000. We gather data covering
2010 to 2014, which spans two years before and after our event date. More than one million
contracts and grants were awarded during this period. We first aggregate the contract
amount and grant amount by recipient and year and then hand-match the recipient firms to
the Compustat and CRSP databases using company names.
3.2.3.2. Trade mission
The U.S. Department of Commerce organizes trade missions. Planned missions are an-
nounced on export.gov and other related outlets, with information on the mission goal,
destination, industries involved, costs, and application procedures, and the Department of
Commerce chooses the mission participants from the applicants. We made a request to the
8Ownership and transaction values are reported in the financial disclosure reports in the following brackets:
$1 to $1,000, $1,001 to $15,000, $15,001 to $50,000, $50,001 to $100,000, $100,001 to $250,000, $250,001
to $500,000, $500,001 to $1,000,000, $1,000,001 to $5,000,000, $5,000,001 to $25,000,000, $25,000,001 to
$50,000,000, and over $50,000,000.
9Our results are robust to using the lower bound of each range instead of the midpoint.
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Department of Commerce to obtain a list of high-profile trade missions in the four years
(2010-2014) centering on our event date. The Department of Commerce defines high-profile
trade missions as missions led by high-rank officials (with ranks of deputy secretary of the
Department or higher). In fact, many of such missions are led by the Secretary of the Depart-
ment of Commerce, the Vice President, or the President. These high-profile trade missions
are the top-level trade missions that afford participating firms opportunities to interact with
key government officials and have high potentials of bringing participants significant amount
of businesses.
The list of trade missions received from the Department of Commerce contains mission
names, dates, and destinations of 63 trade missions, with no participants’ information pro-
vided.10 We then followed up with the contact persons listed on the mission announcements
to request the participant lists for these missions. Through our inquiries, we learned that for
some missions, participants’ information is considered classified and cannot be made pub-
licly available. In the end, we were able to obtain the names of the participants for 39 trade
missions that took place in the four years centering on our event date. We then hand-match
the participants’ names to Compustat using company name as the identifier.
3.2.3.3. Firm financials
Firm financial data and stock return data are obtained from the Compustat and CRSP
databases, respectively. We use I/B/E/S for data on quarterly earnings and analyst earnings
forecasts and the Securities Data Company (SDC) U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions Database
for data on mergers and acquisitions. We exclude firms in the financial industry and the
regulated utilities industry but otherwise examine all firms that are listed on the NYSE,
NASDAQ, and Amex stock exchanges.
The set of firm-level variables we use to control for firm characteristics include firm size,
Q, leverage, asset tangibility, cash holdings, and cash flow. We use the natural logarithm of
the total book value of assets as a proxy for firm size. Q is defined as the book value of assets
plus the market value of equity minus the sum of the book value of equity and deferred taxes
all over assets. Leverage is defined as the sum of short-term debt and long-term debt scaled
by total assets. Asset tangibility is measured as property, plant, and equipment scaled by
total assets. Cash holding is defined as cash and short-term investments divided by total
assets. Cash flow is the sum of net income before extraordinary items and depreciation and
amortization expenses divided by total assets. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and
99th percentiles to reduce the effect of outliers. Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics
10Educational trade missions (in which the participants are mainly public universities) and publicly avail-
able trade missions (which the firms can simply sign up on their own) are excluded from the list.
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for our sample.
3.3. Politicians’ stock trading performance
In this section, we examine politicians’ stock trading performance, comparing the periods
before and after the passage of the STOCK Act. We present evidence that prior to the
STOCK Act, politicians have an advantage in their stock market transactions that cannot
be attributed to skills in stock-picking or trading. We first use the calendar-time portfolio
approach to mimic politicians’ trades and demonstrate that politicians earn significant ab-
normal returns in their stock transactions. We then show that an increase in politicians’
holdings of a firm’s stock has strong predictive power for the firm’s likelihood of being ac-
quired as well as its revenue and earnings surprises. We show that all these advantages
disappear in the post-Act period.
3.3.1. Calendar-time portfolio approach
To assess the performance of politicians’ stock trades, we use the calendar-time portfolio
methodology (Fama, 1998; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). If politicians can obtain valuable
private information and provide political favors through the positions they hold and the
actions they take on behalf of firms, then a portfolio consisting of stocks purchased by
politicians should outperform a portfolio of stocks sold by politicians. We therefore construct
buy and sell portfolios that mimic the buy and sell decisions made by politicians and estimate
the abnormal returns (or “Alpha”) for the buy-minus-sell portfolio. Since the average holding
period for politicians in our sample is approximately six months, we examine portfolios that
hold stocks for six months following a buy or sell transaction.11
Specifically, we follow Seasholes and Zhu (2010) and form transactions-based calendar-time
portfolios as follows. Stocks purchased (sold) on day t are added to the buy (sell) portfolio at
the end of the day t+1 and held for 6 months. We examine both equal-weighted and value-
weighted portfolios. In the equal-weighted portfolio, the initial value of each position in the
portfolio is equal to $1. In the value-weighted portfolio, the initial value of each position
is equal to the dollar value of the transaction actually conducted by the politicians in our
data set. Both the equal-weighted and value-weighted calendar-time portfolios calculate the
weighted average return of stocks in the portfolio each day, and the relative weight of each
position in the portfolio changes as stock prices change. We calculate monthly buy and
sell portfolio returns separately and construct the buy-minus-sell portfolio by taking a long
11All results are robust to using an alternative holding period of 12 months.
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position in the buy portfolio and a short position in the sell portfolio. We then calculate
Alpha, which measures the average monthly abnormal return, from calendar-time regressions
of the buy-minus-sell portfolio returns using the CAPM, the Fama-French three-factor model,
and the Fama-French-Carhart four factor model, respectively.
Table 3.2 presents the transactions-based calendar-time portfolio results for politicians’
stock trades both before and after the passage of the STOCK Act.12 The results in Columns
1 and 2 show that prior to the STOCK Act, the buy-minus-sell portfolio has a statisti-
cally significant monthly abnormal return of 42 to 92 basis points. This abnormal return
is also economically meaningful. For example, the value-weighted Carhart alpha using the
four-factor model translates to an abnormal return of 9.5% per year. This means that politi-
cians’ stock trades perform significantly better than those by managers of actively managed
mutual funds, which on average generate zero or negative alphas Fama and French (2010).
Politicians’ superior performance in stock trading, however, no longer exists in the post-Act
period. The results in Columns 3 (equal-weighted) and Column 4 (value-weighted) show that
the abnormal returns decrease drastically after the passage of the STOCK Act and are nei-
ther statistically nor economically significant. The four-factor alpha in the post-Act period,
for example, is only 0.9% per year and not statistically different from zero. The superior
performance of politicians’ trades before the STOCK Act and its disappearance thereafter
indicate that the abnormal returns are unlikely to be attributable to stock-picking or trad-
ing skills. Instead, the evidence is consistent with politicians having an unfair advantage in
trading stocks before the STOCK Act and the Act being effective in deterring politicians
from exploiting such advantage for personal financial gains from stock investments.
3.3.2. Linking changes in politicians’ stockholdings to firm activities
In this subsection, we explore politicians’ information advantage further by linking changes
in their stockholdings to firm activities and performance. We conduct tests that attempt to
identify the sources of politicians’ superior stock trading performance by focusing on settings
that are documented in the insider trading literature to be major information-based sources
of insider profits. Specifically, we examine whether changes in politicians’ stockholdings
have predictive power for the mergers and acquisitions activities as well as the revenue and
earnings surprises of the firms held in their stock portfolios, again contrasting the periods
before and after the passage of the STOCK Act.
12The six months of transactions leading up to the Act are excluded to ensure that the holding periods for
all transactions in the pre-Act sample end before the passage of the Act. All results are robust to including
these six months of transactions in the pre-Act sample.
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3.3.2.1. Firms’ probability of being targeted in mergers and acquisitions
Numerous studies on mergers and acquisitions have shown that target firms experience sub-
stantial increases in stock price upon acquisition announcement. Learning about an impend-
ing merger in advance of its planned announcement and trading on this knowledge, there-
fore, is a prime way for insiders possessing this nonpublic information to generate significant
abnormal returns (e.g., Keown and Pinkerton, 1981). We investigate whether politicians
exploit the same mechanism in their stock trading by examining the timing of politicians’
stockholding increase and firms’ merger and acquisitions activities.
To do so, we construct an indicator variable, Increase in stockholdings in the previous
three months, which equals one if any politician increases his or her holdings in a firm’s
stock in the past three months (months t-2, t-1, and t) and equals zero otherwise. We also
construct three dummy variables, indicating whether the firm becomes a merger target in
the upcoming month (month t+1), the second month (month t+2), and the third month
(month t+3) after the stockholding change, respectively. We then regress the merger target
dummy variables on the indicator variable for politicians’ stockholding increase along with
a host of firm-level controls and fixed effects.
We present the results in Table 3.3. In Panel A, we show the results from before the
STOCK Act. In Columns 1 through 3, we examine whether an increase in politicians’
stockholdings in the previous three months could predict firms’ likelihood of being targeted
in mergers in the next month. We control for industry and year fixed effects in Column 1,
replace industry fixed effects with firm fixed effects in Column 2, and further add industry
times year fixed effects in Column 3. We find that, consistent across all specifications, an
increase in politicians’ stockholdings has significant predictive power for the probability of
firms’ becoming merger targets. The magnitude of this effect is also economically meaningful.
The unconditional mean likelihood of being targeted in month t+1 is 0.005. After politicians
increase their holdings in a firm’s stock in the past three months, this likelihood increases
by 120%-180% in the next month relative to the sample mean. We find similar results in the
second month and third month after politicians’ stockholding increase, reported in Columns
4 to 6 and Columns 7 to 9 of Table 3.3, respectively: an increase in politicians’ holdings
of a firm’s stock positively and significantly predicts the firm’s likelihood of being acquired
in both months.13 In panel B, we perform the same tests for the period after the passage
of the STOCK Act. In contrast, we find no predictive power from politicians’ stockholding
13We observe that the magnitude of our point estimate is smaller for month t+3 as compared to month
t+1. The statistical significance also deteriorates a bit, albeit still significant at the 10% level. In unreported
results, we find politicians’ stockholding increases also have a positive relationship with firms becoming
merger targets in the upcoming fourth, fifth, and sixth months, although the estimates are not statistically
significant and have monotonically decreasing magnitudes.
87
increase in any specification.
Together, these results indicate that politicians have private information that enables them
to time merger announcements in their stock trades prior to the Act. Politicians increase
their stockholdings in target companies shortly prior to acquisition announcements in a
consistent manner before the STOCK Act, whereas during the post-Act period, an increase
in politicians’ stockholdings can no longer predict future merger activities. Since acquisition
announcements are typically unexpected events, only informed parties have the ability to
time mergers in such a systematic way. Although some mergers appear at Congressional
hearings, most of them are likely not known to politicians through their official positions.14
We therefore interpret these results as evidence that it is plausible that some of the nonpublic
information may have come to the politicians from the companies themselves, which implies
the existence of a reciprocal exchange of favors between politicians and firms.
3.3.2.2. Revenue and earnings surprises
Another major mechanism that is identified in the literature to be responsible for insider
profits is trading based on future earnings information (e.g., Beneish and Vargus, 2002;
Aboody et al., 2005). In this subsection, we examine the timing of politicians’ stockholding
increase and firms’ revenue and earnings surprises to see whether politicians exhibit an
informational advantage in trading ahead of firms’ revenue or earnings surprises.
We follow a similar approach as before and use the same key independent variable, In-
crease in stockholdings in the previous three months, which equals one if any politician
increases his or her stockholdings in the underlying company in the previous three months
and zero otherwise. We then calculate the measure for revenue surprise following Jegadeesh
and Livnat (2006). Specifically, this methodology assumes that quarterly revenue follows
a seasonal random walk with drift to calculate the revenue expectation using data from
the past four to twelve quarters. The revenue surprise is proxied by the difference between
the current quarter revenue and the expected revenue, scaled by the standard deviation of
revenue growth. We also calculate the earnings surprise measure following DellaVigna and
Pollet (2009). Earnings surprise is defined as the difference between actual quarterly earn-
ings and the median analyst forecast, both reported by I/B/E/S, scaled by the stock price
five days prior to the earnings announcement. We present the regression results for firms’
revenue and earnings surprises in Table 3.4.
The dependent variables in Panels A and B are revenue and earnings surprises in the next
14Only certain mergers require premerger reviews by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The ones that
need Congressional hearings are extremely high-stake and happen rarely (see https://www.ftc.gov/enfo
rcement/merger-review, last retrieved: March 15, 2017).
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quarter, respectively. In Columns 1, 2, and 3, we focus on the period before the STOCK Act.
We examine whether an increase in politicians’ stockholdings in the previous three months
can predict revenue and earnings surprises in the next quarter. Across all specifications, we
find that an increase in politicians’ holdings in a firm’s stock in the last quarter is positively
and significantly related to the firm’s revenue and earnings surprises in the next quarter.
Given that the unconditional means of revenue surprise and earnings surprise are 0.414 and
0.018, respectively, we document an increase of 77% to well over 100% over the mean in
both revenue and earnings surprises after politicians increase their holdings of the firm’s
stock. In Columns 4 to 6, we focus on the period after the STOCK Act performing the
same tests. However, similar to our findings on merger likelihood, in the post-Act period,
politicians no longer seem to have the ability to time their trades to consistently increase
their stockholdings ahead of firm revenue or earnings surprises.
Taken together, the results from our analysis on politicians’ trading performance as well
as their stockholding changes suggest that politicians have an informational advantage over
the average trader and, as a result, are able to profit significantly in their stock market
transactions before the passage of the STOCK Act. Subsequent to the Act, such advantage
disappears, along with politicians’ superior stock trading performance. The evidence is
consistent with a deterrent effect of the STOCK Act in limiting politicians’ abilities and
incentives to use private information for financial gains in their personal investments.
3.4. Firm value and outcomes
So far, our focus has been on politicians. In this section, we carry out firm-level analysis
to examine the value impact and real effects of being owned by politicians from the firms’
perspective. First, we examine the stock market reactions around the passage of the STOCK
Act, distinguishing between firms with and without politician ownership. Then we use a
difference-in-differences approach to investigate changes in firm outcomes around the Act,
focusing on measures that are likely to be subject to influence and preferential treatment by
politicians, including procurement contracts, government grants, and participation rate in
high-profile government trade missions.
3.4.1. Stock market reaction around the passage of the STOCK Act
To gauge the market’s reaction, we calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)
around the passage of the Act following the standard event study methodology (Brown
and Warner, 1985). We estimate the market model abnormal returns over the [-205, -6]
89
day interval and calculate CARs for the three-day event window ([-1, +1]), the five-day
event window ([-2, +2]), and the seven-day event window ([-3, +3]) around the passage of
the Act. We report the univariate CAR results in Table 3.5, separately for firm with and
without politician ownership. Firms that are held in politicians’ stock portfolios at the time
of announcement on average experience a 1.4% drop in value during the three-day window
around the passage of the Act. This effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. For
the five-day and seven-day window around the Act’s passage, the value loss is 1.7% and
2.7%, respectively, both statistically significant at the 1% level. In contrast, firms without
politician ownership on average show no significant CARs around the passage of the STOCK
Act in any of the three event windows. The difference in CAR between the two groups of
firms is statistically significant across all event windows.
We next examine the relationship between politicians’ stock ownership and the stock
market reaction to the passage of the STOCK Act using multivariate ordinary least squares
(OLS) regressions. Specifically, we regress the three-day CAR on politician stock ownership
and a set of firm-level controls including firm size, Q, leverage, asset tangibility, cash holding,
and cash flow.15
We report the results in Table 3.6. In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.6, the key independent
variable is the politician stock ownership dummy, which equals one if at least one politician
owns stock in the underlying company and zero if the company’s stock is not owned by any
politicians. In Column 1, we include firm-level controls while Column 2 adds industry fixed
effects. We find that, everything else equal, the average three-day abnormal return for firms
with politician ownership is 1.3% lower than for firms without politician ownership, and this
difference is significant at the 1% level. In Columns 3 and 4, we use the politician stock
ownership amount as the key independent variable, which is a continuous measure defined
as the natural logarithm of the aggregated dollar amount of stock owned by all politicians
in the underlying company. We include firm-level controls in Column 3 and further add
industry fixed effects in Column 4. We find similar results in both specifications. A one-
standard-deviation increase in log politician stock ownership amount decreases the three-day
CAR by 1.56 percentage points. The effect is significant both economically and statistically.
The event study gives us a first glance into the effects of the STOCK Act on firm value.
Compared to firms not owned by politicians, firms in politicians’ stockholdings lose more
than 1% in value upon announcement of the Act’s passage. In other words, for the set of
firms owned by politicians, the market reacts negatively to the news of an Act that curbs
Congressional insider trading. A plausible interpretation is that the market understands that
politicians give preferential treatment to firms held in their stock portfolios while pursuing
15Our results are robust to using the five-day or seven-day CAR as the dependent variable.
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personal financial gains. These favors are valuable to firms and reflected in the market
valuation. The market also recognizes that politicians are less likely to continue to engage in
trading on private information and political favors when the Act becomes law. Consequently,
these firms will be less likely to continue enjoying such treatment after the Act, hence the
drop in value upon announcement.
3.4.2. The potential channels
To gain further insights into the channels through which the Act impacts the value of
politician-owned firms, we examine the changes in firm outcomes around the Act. We focus
on three measures that are likely to be subject to influence and preferential treatment by
politicians. Our first measure is procurement contracts. When government agencies need
goods or services, they post Request for Proposals on the Federal Business Opportunities
website. Companies submit their offers and proposals for agency evaluation. The system is
designed such that government contracts are granted based on the merits of the proposals.
However, people with inside knowledge argue that “relationships have become infinitely more
important than a contractor being able to show that they are the best person for the job...“16
As a result, procurement contracts are commonly used as an important outcome measure
for firms’ political activities (e.g., Goldman et al., 2013; Brogaard et al., 2015). The second
measure is government grants. Government grants are basically “free” money to firms and
have a direct impact on firm value. Unlike procurement contracts, the grant recipients are
not required to render any services to the government. Our third outcome variable measures
firms’ participation in high-profile trade missions. These trade missions are top-level govern-
mental interactions with other sovereign governments. Generally, the missions are organized
in order to introduce a new industry or service to the destination countries, and the partic-
ipating firms would normally be the first ones conducting such business in those countries.
As a result, participating firms enjoy tremendous first-mover advantages and monopolistic
market power for an extended period (Spence, 1981). In addition, these missions allow firm
executives to develop strong personal relationships among themselves as well as with key
government officials leading each mission. The relationship building, both at the business
level and at the personal level, is beneficial for firms’ conducting business in the future.
We use the difference-in-differences approach to investigate changes in these measures sur-
rounding the Act for firms with and without politician ownership. Specifically, we examine
the natural logarithm of the dollar amount received in procurement contracts, the natural
logarithm of the dollar amount received in government grants, and an indicator variable for
16For more details, see http://www.govexec.com/magazine/features/2005/12/schmooze-or-lose/2
0778/ (last retrieved: March 15, 2017).
91
trade mission participation as the dependent variables. We define the two years succeeding
the passage of the Act as the after period (captured by the dummy variable After) and the
two years preceding the Act as the before period. We regress the dependent variables, respec-
tively, on politician stock ownership, the After dummy, and the interaction term between
the two, along with a set of control variables and fixed effects.
We report the results in Table 3.7. In Columns 1 to 3, politician stock ownership is a
dummy variable. The natural logarithm of dollar amount awarded in procurement contracts
is the dependent variable in Column 1, the natural logarithm of dollar amount received in
government grants is the dependent variable in Column 2, and an indicator variable for trade
mission participation serves as the dependent variable in Column 3. We find that prior to the
passage of the STOCK Act, firms owned by politicians receive significantly higher amounts
of procurement contracts and government grants and are much more likely to be selected
by the government into high-profile trade missions than firms without politician ownership.
In the post-Act period, however, these politician-owned firms experience drastic decreases
in government contracts and grants, both in absolute terms and relative to firms not owned
by politicians. Compared to firms without politician ownership, the decline is 2.6 times as
large in contracts and 7.6 times as large in grants for firms with politician ownership after
the passage of the Act. Similarly, politician-owned firms also become significantly less likely
to participate in high-profile trade missions after the Act. In Columns 4 to 6, we use the
natural logarithm of politicians’ stock ownership amount as the key independent variable
and find qualitatively similar results.
Overall, these results are consistent with the market reaction upon the passage of the
STOCK Act and indicate that the political favors towards the firms held in politicians’ stock
portfolios diminish once politicians refrain from exploiting their public office for personal
gains in stock trading. The value and economic outcomes of these firms are directly affected
as a result.
3.5. Cross-sectional analysis
To better understand the interplay between political favoritism and private information as
well as their effects on politicians’ stock trading performance and firm outcomes, we inves-
tigate characteristics of politicians and firms that could amplify our results. Specifically, we
focus on politicians’ committee assignments to identify powerful versus non-powerful politi-
cians and on corporate campaign contributions and lobbying activities to identify politically
active versus non-active firms.
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Politicians on important Congressional committees have more power than the others be-
cause they have access to a wider range of government resources (Cohen et al., 2011). In
turn, powerful politicians are more likely to gain material, nonpublic information while per-
forming their Congressional duties. These politicians also have abundant favors at their
disposal for the firms of their choice. Consequently, we expect our results on politicians’
trading performance prior to the Act to be particularly strong for powerful politicians. Sim-
ilarly, the value loss after the passage of the Act should be particularly pronounced for firms
owned by powerful politicians. We classify powerful Congressional committees as the top five
committees in each chamber defined by Stewart III (2012). For the Senate, these committees
include Finance, Veterans Affairs, Appropriations, Rules and Administration, and Armed
Services. For the House, these committees are Ways and Means, Appropriations, Energy
and Commerce, Rules, and Foreign Affairs.
We also identify politically active versus non-active firms. Firms that are politically active
enjoy better outcomes than peers not politically active (Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998).
We examine two types of political activity. The first concerns campaign contributions.
Campaign contributions are becoming an increasingly important form of corporate political
capital Mian et al. (2010). Companies must voluntarily set up political action committees
(PACs) to donate to the politicians they support. Since firms with PACs spend the effort
to advocate for certain politicians and to raise campaign funds for them, those firms are
more likely to be politically active. The other measure we study is lobbying activities. The
lobbying industry is a multi-billion-dollar business that connects corporations to politicians
(Bertrand et al., 2014). It is another important and effective way for firms to be actively
involved in the policy-making process. We regard firms that make campaign contributions
and firms that spend money lobbying as politically active firms. Politicians may be able to
obtain more private information from and be willing to direct more political favors to these
firms. As a result, these firms may be central to politicians’ superior trading performance
prior to the STOCK Act and experience greater value loss after the passage of the Act.
In the next two subsections, we re-examine politicians’ trading performance and firm value
loss upon announcement using cross-sectional comparisons along these two dimensions.
3.5.1. Politicians’ trading performance
We carry out calendar-time portfolio approaches as in Subsection 3.3.1 by following the
same test methodology. We first study powerful politicians’ stock trading. We categorize
politicians’ stock market transactions into two groups: trades made by powerful politicians
and trades made by politicians who are not powerful. We report the results in Panel A of
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Table 3.8. We find that the superior performance in politicians’ stock trading prior to the
STOCK Act is concentrated among powerful politicians. For example, the Carhart alpha for
powerful politicians amounts to 13.5% per year, much higher than for the full sample. The
outperformance no longer exists after the Act. In contrast, trades made by non-powerful
politicians do not earn significant abnormal returns, either before or after the Act.
In Panels B and C, we turn to politically active versus non-active firms. We split our
sample into firms that donate to political campaigns and firms that do not make political
contributions in Panel B and firms that lobby and firms that do not lobby in Panel C. We
construct hedging portfolios based on politicians’ stock trades for firms in each category.
Our results show that politicians’ investments in firms that donate to political campaigns
and firms that lobby yield positive and statistically significant abnormal returns before the
passage of the STOCK Act. Hedging portfolios investing in firms that are not politically
active, however, in general yield positive but insignificant returns before the Act. In the
period after the Act, none of the portfolios outperforms the market.
3.5.2. Firm value
To explore the effects of politicians’ power and firms’ political participation on firm value loss
after the passage of the STOCK Act, we reexamine the three-day CARs upon announcement
using OLS regressions, distinguishing between powerful and non-powerful politicians and
between politically active and non-active firms. We present the results in Table 3.9.
In Column 1 of Table 3.9, we examine the effect of stock ownership by powerful politicians.
We define Powerful politician stock ownership as a dummy variable that equals one if at least
one politician owning the stock serves on a powerful Congressional committee and zero oth-
erwise. We add the Powerful politician stock ownership dummy to the CAR regression along
with the politician stock ownership dummy. The Powerful politician stock ownership dummy,
therefore, measures the difference in CAR between firms owned by powerful politicians and
firms owned by non-powerful politicians. We find a negative and statistically significant
coefficient on the Powerful politician stock ownership dummy. The total impact of stock
ownership by powerful politicians on firm value is a whopping -1.6% during the three-day
window around the passage of the Act, more than doubling the impact of non-powerful
politician ownership (-0.7%).
In Columns 2 and 3, we include the Political contribution dummy and the Lobby dummy,
along with their interactions with the After dummy, respectively. We find that politician-
owned firms that make political donations or spend money lobbying lose significantly more
in value compared to politician-owned firms that are not politically active. Consistent with
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the cross-sectional results on politicians’ trading performance, the value loss upon the an-
nouncement of the passage of the Act is most striking for firms that are owned by powerful
politicians and politician-owned firms that are politically active.
3.6. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the linkage between politicians and firms through stock owner-
ship using the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act as an experiment.
Politicians may give preferential treatment to the firms held in their stockholdings directly
via politicians’ own decision rights or indirectly by influencing the relevant parties in charge.
These political favors help boost the economic outcomes of the favored firms and thus in-
crease the likelihood of politicians’ superior investment performance. Moreover, politicians
have opportunities to obtain privileged information from their official duties and from the
firms themselves that can enhance their trading performance. These advantages can lead to
superior trading performance by politicians, and their actions in turn have real impact on
firm performance and outcomes.
We find that prior to the STOCK Act, members of the Congress earn significant abnormal
returns on their stock trades. We also show that an increase in politicians’ stockholdings
of a firm’s stock positively predicts the firm’s likelihood of being acquired as well as its
revenue and earnings surprises. After the passage of the Act, politicians exhibit no such
informational advantage in trading or outperformance. On the firms’ side, we show that
companies with politician ownership on average lose 1.4% in value during the three-day win-
dow around the Act’s passage, while firms not owned by politicians experience no abnormal
returns. Correspondingly, after the Act’s passage, these politician-owned firms receive re-
duced amounts of procurement contracts and government grants and become less likely to
be selected by the government into high-profile trade missions compared to the period before
the Act. We document that these mutual benefits are particularly pronounced for politicians
who sit on powerful Congressional committees, firms that actively donate to political action
committees, and firms that lobby.
Overall, our results shed light on the tacit benefits that accrue to both politicians and the
firms to which they are connected through stock ownership. In addition, the evidence from
our study suggests that the STOCK Act is effective in deterring politicians from exploiting
their official positions for personal financial gains.
95
3.7. Tables
Table 3.1 Summary statistics
This table presents summary statistics for our sample. Stock transactions include politician
buy and sell transactions from 2010 to 2013. Total assets are the book value of assets. Q is
defined as the book value of assets plus the market value of equity minus the sum of the book
value of equity and deferred taxes all over assets. Leverage is defined as the sum of long-
term debt and debt in current liabilities scaled by total assets. Asset tangibility is defined
as property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets. Cash holding is defined as cash
and short-term investments scaled by total assets. Cash flow is the sum of net income be-
fore extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization expenses scaled by total assets.
Politician stock ownership dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if at least one politi-
cian owns stock in the underlying company and zero otherwise. Politician stock ownership
amount aggregates the amount owned by all politicians in the underlying company. Procure-
ment contracts and government grants are the dollar amount of government contracts and
grants awarded, respectively. Trade mission participation is a dummy variable that equals
one if the firm takes part in a government high-profile trade mission and zero otherwise.
Variable Name Mean Std. Dev. N
Stock transactions (in thousand $) 18.899 36.932 14,791
Total assets (in million $) 5.655 17.187 3,499
Q 1.776 1.444 3,499
Leverage 0.206 0.209 3,499
Tangibility 0.280 0.259 3,499
Cash holdings 0.215 0.232 3,499
Cash flow 0.060 0.231 3,499
Politician stock ownership dummy 0.111 0.314 3,499
Politician stock ownership amount (in thousand $) 12.407 81.328 3,499
Procurement contract (in million $) 3.338 18.000 12,960
Government grant (in thousand $) 2.052 20.098 12,960
Trade mission participation 0.009 0.097 12,960
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Table 3.2 Politicians’ stock trading performance: buy-minus-sell calendar-time portfolios
This table reports abnormal returns of buy-minus-sell calendar-time portfolios. Equal- and
value-weighted buy and sell portfolios are formed based on politicians’ stock market trans-
actions. The buy-minus-sell portfolio is constructed by taking a long position in the buy
portfolio and a short position in the sell portfolio. Stocks are held in the portfolios for six
months. Monthly abnormal returns (Alphas) are calculated from calendar-time regressions of
the buy-minus-sell portfolio returns using the CAPM, the Fama-French three-factor model,
and the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model, respectively. Newey-West standard errors
with five lags and robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation are in parentheses. Sta-
tistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Before the STOCK Act After the STOCK Act
Equal-weighted Value-weighted Equal-weighted Value-weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Raw return 0.283 0.879*** -0.106 -0.189
(0.344) (0.261) (0.182) (0.151)
CAPM Alpha 0.420* 0.921*** 0.143 -0.078
(0.211) (0.303) (0.206) (0.109)
3-factor Alpha 0.556** 0.901*** 0.156 -0.071
(0.254) (0.310) (0.222) (0.123)
4-factor Alpha 0.234 0.794** -0.006 0.073




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.4 Politicians’ stockholding changes and firms’ revenue and earnings surprises
This table reports OLS regression results for firms’ revenue and earnings surprises. The
key independent variable, Increase in stockholdings in the previous three months, is an
indicator variable that equals one if any politician increases his or her holdings in a firm’s
stock in the past three month (months t-2, t-1, and t) and zero otherwise. The dependent
variable in Panel A is the revenue surprise in the next quarter. Revenue surprise is the
unexpected change in revenue scaled by the standard deviation of revenue changes following
Jegadeesh and Livnat (2006). The dependent variable in Panel B is the earnings surprise
in the next quarter. Earnings surprise is defined as the difference between actual earnings
and the median analyst forecast, scaled by the stock price five days prior to the earnings
announcement. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. Statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Revenue and earnings surprises in the next quarter
Before the STOCK Act After the STOCK Act
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Revenue surprise
Increase in stockholdings in 0.438*** 0.321* 0.320* -0.242 -0.070 -0.018
previous three months? (0.164) (0.184) (0.181) (0.219) (0.243) (0.241)
Size 0.021 -0.366 -0.473** -0.187*** -1.332*** -1.309***
(0.017) (0.225) (0.224) (0.024) (0.305) (0.304)
Q 0.236*** 0.316*** 0.298*** 0.269*** 0.100 0.108*
(0.025) (0.055) (0.054) (0.030) (0.066) (0.065)
Leverage 1.215*** 3.959*** 3.933*** 1.877*** 5.630*** 5.702***
(0.179) (0.548) (0.540) (0.239) (0.639) (0.631)
Asset tangibility 0.351* 3.807*** 3.724*** 0.192 0.809 0.683
(0.191) (0.710) (0.711) (0.251) (0.931) (0.917)
Cash holding -0.591*** -1.066** -1.152*** 0.323 -2.404*** -2.544***
(0.192) (0.417) (0.417) (0.240) (0.454) (0.456)
Cash flow 1.827*** 0.842 0.793 -1.200 -3.527*** -3.670***
(0.621) (1.078) (1.070) (0.811) (1.233) (1.240)
Firm FE X X X X
Industry FE X X
Year FE X X X X
Industry x Year FE X X
Observations 25,188 25,089 25,079 18,827 18,675 18,675
R-squared 0.043 0.302 0.322 0.053 0.422 0.433
(Continued on the next page)
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Table 3.4 Politicians’ stockholding changes and firms’ revenue and earnings surprises
(Continued)
Revenue and earnings surprises in the next quarter
Before the STOCK Act After the STOCK Act
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel B: Earnings surprise
Increase in stockholdings in 0.020** 0.023* 0.022* -0.023** -0.019** -0.018*
previous three months? (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Size 0.006*** -0.016 -0.018 0.008*** -0.043** -0.039*
(0.001) (0.016) (0.016) (0.001) (0.022) (0.022)
Q -0.004** -0.015*** -0.014*** 0.001 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006)
Leverage -0.013 0.017 0.017 -0.030 0.019 0.024
(0.016) (0.029) (0.029) (0.019) (0.044) (0.045)
Asset tangibility -0.025* 0.029 0.027 -0.022 0.018 0.029
(0.015) (0.052) (0.052) (0.016) (0.057) (0.056)
Cash holding 0.064*** -0.029 -0.035 0.067*** -0.045 -0.048
(0.016) (0.031) (0.032) (0.019) (0.040) (0.041)
Cash flow 0.253*** -0.110 -0.119 0.285*** -0.323*** -0.338***
(0.058) (0.119) (0.120) (0.064) (0.114) (0.115)
Firm FE X X X X
Industry FE X X
Year FE X X X X
Industry x Year FE X X
Observations 25,188 25,089 25,079 18,827 18,675 18,675
R-squared 0.015 0.238 0.241 0.018 0.319 0.322
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Table 3.5 The STOCK Act announcement returns: univariate results
This table reports the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the passage of the
STOCK Act. We report CARs over the three-day event window [-1, +1], the five-day
event window [-2, +2], and the seven-day event window [-3, +3], separately for firms with
politician ownership (Columns 1 and 2) and firms without politician ownership (Columns
3 and 4). Column 5 reports the p-values of the differences between the two groups of firms.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Firms with Firms without p-value of
politician ownership politician ownership difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CAR [-1, +1] N=388 -0.014*** N=3,111 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.001)
CAR [-2, +2] N=388 -0.017*** N=3,111 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.001)
CAR [-3, +3] N=388 -0.027*** N=3,111 0.002 0.000
(0.004) (0.002)
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Table 3.6 The STOCK Act announcement returns: multivariate results
This table reports OLS regression results for firms’ cumulative abnormal returns (CAR)
around the passage of the STOCK Act. The dependent variable is the CAR over the
three-day event window [-1, +1]. In Columns 1 and 2, politician stock ownership is a dummy
variable that equals one if at least one politician owns stock in the underlying company
and zero if the stock is not owned by any politicians. In Columns 3 and 4, politician stock
ownership is the politician stock ownership amount, which is the natural logarithm of the
aggregated dollar amount of stock owned by all politicians in the underlying company.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
CAR [-1, +1]
Ownership dummy Ownership amount
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Politician stock ownership -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
Size 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Q -0.002** -0.001 -0.002** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Leverage 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Asset tangibility -0.023*** 0.005 -0.023*** 0.004
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
Cash holding 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Cash flow -0.005 -0.008 -0.005 -0.008
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Industry FE X X
Observations 3,499 3,499 3,499 3,499
R-squared 0.022 0.106 0.022 0.106
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Table 3.7 Procurement contracts, government grants, and trade mission participation
This table reports OLS regression results for government contracts and grants awarded to
firms as well as firms’ likelihood of participating in trade missions. The dependent variable
is the natural logarithm of the amount of procurement contracts the firm receives (contract
amount; Columns 1 and 4), the natural logarithm of the amount of government grants the
firm receives (grant amount; Columns 2 and 5), and an indicator variable of whether the
firm has participated in government-organized high-profile trade missions (participate in
trade mission; Columns 3 and 6). In Columns 1 to 3, politician stock ownership is a dummy
variable that equals one if at least one politician owns stock in the underlying company
and zero if the stock is not owned by any politicians. In Columns 4 to 6, politician stock
ownership is the politician stock ownership amount, which is the natural logarithm of the
aggregated dollar amount of stock owned by all politicians in the underlying company.
After is a dummy variable that equals one for the period after the passage of the STOCK
Act and zero for the period before. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Contract Grant Participate in Contract Grant Participate in
amount amount trade mission amount amount trade mission
Ownership dummy Ownership amount
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Politician stock 2.319*** 0.703*** 0.098*** 0.248*** 0.076*** 0.010***
ownership (own) (0.387) (0.147) (0.015) (0.039) (0.016) (0.002)
After -0.840** -0.069*** -0.002 -0.844** -0.070*** -0.001
(0.400) (0.024) (0.002) (0.400) (0.024) (0.002)
Own x after -1.312*** -0.458*** -0.079*** -0.137*** -0.043*** -0.009***
(0.287) (0.128) (0.016) (0.029) (0.013) (0.002)
Size 0.440*** 0.051*** 0.001 0.425*** 0.044*** 0.001
(0.055) (0.014) (0.001) (0.055) (0.013) (0.001)
Q 0.115** -0.005 -0.001 0.110** -0.007 -0.001
(0.056) (0.011) (0.001) (0.055) (0.011) (0.001)
Leverage -0.229 -0.119 0.004 -0.206 -0.107 0.004
(0.449) (0.075) (0.005) (0.449) (0.075) (0.005)
Tangibility -1.889*** -0.090 -0.011* -1.839*** -0.074 -0.010
(0.520) (0.081) (0.006) (0.519) (0.081) (0.007)
Cash holdings -2.410*** -0.051 0.006 -2.361*** -0.035 0.008
(0.471) (0.076) (0.006) (0.471) (0.076) (0.007)
Cash flow 0.370 -0.224*** -0.005 0.399 -0.210*** -0.005
(0.366) (0.074) (0.004) (0.366) (0.073) (0.004)
Industry FE X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
Observations 12,960 12,960 12,960 12,960 12,960 12,960
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Table 3.8 Calendar-time portfolios: powerful politicians and politically active firms
This table reports abnormal returns of buy-minus-sell calendar-time portfolios, both before
and after the Act, distinguishing between powerful and non-powerful politicians and between
politically active and non-active firms. Monthly abnormal returns (Alphas) are calculated
from calendar-time regressions of the value-weighted buy-minus-sell portfolio returns using
the CAPM, the Fama-French three-factor model, and the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor
model, respectively. Panel A focuses on stock trades of powerful politicians (defined as those
sitting on the top five congressional committees) versus stock trades of non-powerful politi-
cians. Panel B focuses on politicians’ stock trades for firms that donate to political campaigns
versus firms that do not donate to political campaigns. Panel C focuses on politicians’ stock
trades for firms that lobby versus firms that do not lobby. Newey-West standard errors with
five lags and robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation are in parentheses. Statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Before the STOCK Act After the STOCK Act
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Politicians’ power
Powerful Non-powerful Powerful Non-powerful
Raw return 1.275* 0.026 -0.273 -0.176
(0.419) (0.212) (0.191) (0.249)
CAPM alpha 1.346 *** 0.089 -0.094 -0.309
(0.427) (0.178) (0.132) (0.192)
3-factor alpha 1.339 ** 0.111 -0.112 -0.314*
(0.511) (0.214) (0.149) (0.168)
4-factor alpha 1.123 ** 0.008 -0.172 0.066
(0.504) (0.235) (0.180) (0.178)
Panel B: Firms’ political contributions
Contributing Not contributing Contributing Not contributing
Raw return 1.007 *** 0.100 -0.024 -0.816
(0.274) (0.174) (0.177) (0.499)
CAPM alpha 1.082 *** 0.071 0.005 -0.442
(0.340) (0.087) (0.200) (0.349)
3-factor alpha 1.012 *** -0.001 -0.005 -0.529
(0.340) (0.106) (0.196) (0.399)
4-factor alpha 0.990*** 0. 157 0.055 -0.549
(0.338) (0. 078) (0.290) (0.548)
Panel C: Firms’ lobbying activities
Lobbying No lobbying Lobbying No lobbying
Raw return 0.973*** 0.117 -0.182 -0.512
(0.267) (0.190) (0.199) (0.343)
CAPM alpha 1.001 *** 0.089 -0.156 -0.221
(0.314) (0.101) (0.220) (0.177)
3-factor alpha 0.974 *** 0.009 -0.157 -0.292
(0.320) (0.105) (0.231) (0.206)
4-factor alpha 0.889*** 0.190* -0.080 -0.345
(0.305) (0.092) (0.315) (0.322)
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Table 3.9 Value loss upon announcement: powerful politicians and politically active firms
This table reports OLS regression results for STOCK Act announcement returns, focusing
on the effects and stock ownership by powerful politicians and politically active firms. The
dependent variable is the CAR over the three-day event window [-1, +1]. Politician stock
ownership is a dummy variable that equals one if at least one politician owns stock in the
underlying company and zero if the stock is not owned by any politicians. Powerful politician
stock ownership is defined as a dummy variable that equals one if at least one politician
owning the stock serves on a powerful Congressional committee and zero otherwise. Political
contribution is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm donates to any political cam-
paign and zero otherwise. Lobby is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm incurs any
lobbying expense and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
CAR[-1, +1]
Independent variable (1) (2) (3)
Powerful politician stock ownership -0.009**
(0.004)
Political contribution dummy (PC) 0.000
(0.003)




Lobby x politician stock ownership -0.009*
(0.001)
Politician stock ownership -0.007** -0.006* -0.007*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Size 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Q -0.001 -0.002** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Leverage 0.003 0.006 0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Asset tangibility 0.005 -0.010** -0.010**
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Cash holding 0.005 0.006 0.006
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Cash flow -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Industry FE X X X
Observations 3,499 3,499 3,499
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Bonaimé, A. A., 2012. Repurchases, reputation, and returns. Journal of Financial and Quan-
titative Analysis 47, 469–491.
Bongaerts, D., Cremers, K., Goetzmann, W. N., 2012. Tiebreaker: Certification and multiple
credit ratings. The Journal of Finance 67, 113–152.
Boot, A. W., Thakor, A. V., 1994. Moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated
credit market game. International Economic Review 35, 899–920.
Brav, A., Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., Michaely, R., 2005. Payout policy in the 21st
century. Journal of Financial Economics 77, 483 – 527.
Brick, J. M., 2013. The stock act: Is it necessary and if so is it a sufficient solution. Duq.
Bus. LJ 15, 179.
Brockman, P., Chung, D. Y., 2001. Managerial timing and corporate liquidity: evidence
from actual share repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics 61, 417–448.
Brogaard, J., Denes, M., Duchin, R., 2015. Political connections, incentives and innovation:
Evidence from contract-level data. Unpublished working paper .
Brown, J. D., Earle, J. S., 2017. Finance and growth at the firm level: Evidence from sba
loans. The Journal of Finance 72, 1039–1080.
Brown, S. J., Warner, J. B., 1985. Using daily stock returns: The case of event studies.
Journal of financial economics 14, 3–31.
Brunnermeier, M. K., 2009. Deciphering the liquidity and credit crunch 2007–2008. Journal
of Economic Perspectives 23, 77–100.
C. Eggers, A., Hainmueller, J., 2013. Capitol losses: The mediocre performance of congres-
sional stock portfolios. The Journal of Politics 75, 535–551.
Caballero, R. J., Krishnamurthy, A., 2008. Collective risk management in a flight to quality
episode. Journal of Finance 63, 2195–2230.
Cai, H., Chen, Y., Fang, H., 2009. Observational learning: Evidence from a randomized
natural field experiment. American Economic Review 99, 864–882.
108
Chava, S., Roberts, M. R., 2008. How does financing impact investment? the role of debt
covenants. Journal of Finance 63, 2085–2121.
Chemmanur, T. J., Li, Y., 2016. The role of institutional investors in open-market share
repurchase programs. Available at SSRN 2543397 .
Chernenko, S., Sunderam, A., 2011. The real consequences of market segmentation. The
Review of Financial Studies 25, 2041–2069.
Chevalier, J. A., Mayzlin, D., 2006. The effect of word of mouth on sales: Online book
reviews. Journal of Marketing Research 43, 345–354.
Claessens, S., Feijen, E., Laeven, L., 2008. Political connections and preferential access to
finance: The role of campaign contributions. Journal of financial economics 88, 554–580.
Cohen, L., Coval, J., Malloy, C., 2011. Do powerful politicians cause corporate downsizing?
Journal of Political Economy 119, 1015–1060.
Cohen, L., Diether, K., Malloy, C., 2013. Legislating stock prices. Journal of Financial
Economics 110, 574–595.
Cooper, M. J., Gulen, H., Ovtchinnikov, A. V., 2010. Corporate political contributions and
stock returns. The Journal of Finance 65, 687–724.
Craig, B. R., Jackson, W. E., Thomson, J. B., 2005. Sba-loan guarantees and local economic
growth. FRB of Cleveland Working Paper No. 0503 Available at SSRN 712622.
Da, Z., Engelberg, J., Gao, P., 2011. In search of attention. The Journal of Finance 66,
1461–1499.
Degryse, H., Ongena, S., 2005. Distance, lending relationships, and competition. The Journal
of Finance 60, 231–266.
DellaVigna, S., Pollet, J. M., 2009. Investor inattention and friday earnings announcements.
The Journal of Finance 64, 709–749.
Diamond, D. W., 1991. Monitoring and reputation: The choice between bank loans and
directly placed debt. Journal of Political Economy 99, 689–721.
Diamond, D. W., Verrecchia, R. E., 1981. Information aggregation in a noisy rational ex-
pectations economy. Journal of Financial Economics 9, 221–235.
Dittmar, A. K., 2000. Why do firms repurchase stock. Journal of Business 73, 331–355.
Dittmar, A. K., Field, L. C., 2015. Can managers time the market? Evidence using repur-
chase price data. Journal of Financial Economics 115, 261 – 282.
Duchin, R., Sosyura, D., 2012. The politics of government investment. Journal of Financial
Economics 106, 24–48.
109
Edmans, A., 2011. Does the stock market fully value intangibles? employee satisfaction and
equity prices. Journal of Financial economics 101, 621–640.
Elder, R. S., Schlosser, A. E., Poor, M., Xu, L., 2017. So close i can almost sense it: The inter-
play between sensory imagery and psychological distance. Journal of Consumer Research
forthcoming.
Ellison, G., Fudenberg, D., 1995. Word-of-mouth communication and social learning. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 93–125.
Faccio, M., 2006. Politically connected firms. American economic review 96, 369–386.
Faccio, M., Masulis, R. W., McConnell, J. J., 2006. Political connections and corporate
bailouts. The Journal of Finance 61, 2597–2635.
Faccio, M., Parsley, D. C., 2009. Sudden deaths: Taking stock of geographic ties. Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 44, 683–718.
Fama, E. F., 1998. Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral finance. Journal of
financial economics 49, 283–306.
Fama, E. F., French, K. R., 2010. Luck versus skill in the cross-section of mutual fund
returns. The journal of finance 65, 1915–1947.
Farre-Mensa, J., Michaely, R., Schmalz, M. C., 2014. Payout policy. Annu. Rev. Financ.
Econ. 6, 75–134.
Farre-Mensa, J., Michaely, R., Schmalz, M. C., 2016. Financing payouts. Available at SSRN
2535675 .
Fisman, R., 2001. Estimating the value of political connections. American economic review
91, 1095–1102.
Floyd, E., Li, N., Skinner, D. J., 2015. Payout policy through the financial crisis: The
growth of repurchases and the resilience of dividends. Journal of Financial Economics 118,
299–316.
Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., So, J., 2008. Do politically connected boards affect firm value?
The Review of Financial Studies 22, 2331–2360.
Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., So, J., 2013. Politically connected boards of directors and the
allocation of procurement contracts. Review of Finance 17, 1617–1648.
Gorton, G., 2009. Information, liquidity, and the (ongoing) panic of 2007. American Eco-
nomic Review 99, 567–72.
Grullon, G., Michaely, R., 2004. The information content of share repurchase programs.
Journal of Finance 59, 651–680.
110
Hackney, J. P., 2016. Financial crises, financial constraints, and government guarantees.
University of South Carolina Working Paper Available at SSRN 2876653.
Hahn, J., Todd, P., Van der Klaauw, W., 1999. Evaluating the effect of an antidiscrimina-
tion law using a regression-discontinuity design. National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper No.w7131.
Hahn, J., Todd, P., Van der Klaauw, W., 2001. Identification and estimation of treatment
effects with a regression-discontinuity design. Econometrica 69, 201–209.
Huang, J., 2017. The customer knows best: The investment value of consumer opinions.
Journal of Financial Economics forthcoming.
Ikenberry, D., Lakonishok, J., Vermaelen, T., 1995. Market underreaction to open market
share repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics 39, 181–208.
Ivashina, V., 2009. Asymmetric information effects on loan spreads. Journal of Financial
Economics 92, 300–319.
Ivashina, V., Scharfstein, D., 2010. Bank lending during the financial crisis of 2008. Journal
of Financial Economics 97, 319–338.
Jegadeesh, N., Livnat, J., 2006. Revenue surprises and stock returns. Journal of Accounting
and Economics 41, 147–171.
Jeng, L. A., Metrick, A., Zeckhauser, R., 2003. Estimating the returns to insider trading: A
performance-evaluation perspective. Review of Economics and Statistics 85, 453–471.
Jung, M. J., Wong, M. H. F., Zhang, X. F., 2015. Analyst interest as an early indicator of
firm fundamental changes and stock returns. Accounting Review 90, 1049–1078.
Kahle, K. M., 2002. When a buyback is not a buyback: Open market repurchases and
employee options. Journal of Financial Economics 63, 235–261.
Kahle, K. M., Stulz, R. M., 2013. Access to capital, investment, and the financial crisis.
Journal of Financial Economics 110, 280–299.
Keown, A. J., Pinkerton, J. M., 1981. Merger announcements and insider trading activity:
An empirical investigation. The journal of finance 36, 855–869.
Kroszner, R. S., Stratmann, T., 1998. Interest-group competition and the organization of
congress: theory and evidence from financial services’ political action committees. Amer-
ican Economic Review pp. 1163–1187.
Lakonishok, J., Lee, I., 2001. Are insider trades informative? The Review of Financial
Studies 14, 79–111.
Lee, D. S., Lemieux, T., 2010. Regression discontinuity designs in economics. Journal of
Economic Literature 48, 281–355.
111
Lekahal, C. K., 2012. The stock act-dispelling a legal perception. Unpublished working paper.
University of Colorado at Boulder .
Lie, E., 2005. Operating performance following open market share repurchase announce-
ments. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39, 411–436.
Lin, C., Ma, Y., Malatesta, P., Xuan, Y., 2012. Corporate ownership structure and bank
loan syndicate structure. Journal of Financial Economics 104, 1–22.
Luca, M., 2016. Reviews, reputation, and revenue: The case of yelp.com. HBS working paper
12-016 .
McCrary, J., 2008. Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity
design: A density test. Journal of Econometrics 142, 698–714.
McNichols, M., O’Brien, P. C., 1997. Self-selection and analyst coverage. Journal of Account-
ing Research 35, 167–199.
Merton, R. C., 1987. A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete infor-
mation. Journal of Finance 42, 483–510.
Mian, A., Sufi, A., Trebbi, F., 2010. The political economy of the us mortgage default crisis.
American Economic Review 100, 1967–98.
Mitchell, M. L., Stafford, E., 2000. Managerial decisions and long-term stock price perfor-
mance. The Journal of Business 73, 287–329.
Moretti, E., 2011. Social learning and peer effects in consumption: Evidence from movie
sales. Review of Economic Studies 78, 356–393.
Nagy, D. M., 2013. Owning stock while making law: an agency problem and a fiduciary
solution. Wake Forest L. Rev. 48, 567.
Oded, J., 2009. Optimal execution of open-market stock repurchase programs. Journal of
Financial Markets 12, 832–869.
Ouimet, P. P., Simintzi, E., 2016. Wages and firm performance: Evidence from the 2008
financial crisis. Available at SSRN 2409496 .
Petersen, M. A., Rajan, R. G., 1994. The benefits of lending relationships: Evidence from
small business data. The Journal of finance 49, 3–37.
Peyer, U., Vermaelen, T., 2009. The nature and persistence of buyback anomalies. Review
of Financial Studies 22, 1693–1745.
Rauh, J. D., 2006. Investment and financing constraints: Evidence from the funding of
corporate pension plans. Journal of Finance 61, 33–71.
Rothschild, M., Stiglitz, J., 1976. Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: An essay on
the economics of imperfect information. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 90, 629–649.
112
Schroeder, J. L., 2014. Taking stock: Insider and outsider trading by congress. Wm. & Mary
Bus. L. Rev. 5, 159.
Schweizer, P., 2011. Throw them all out: How politicians and their friends get rich off insider
stock tips, land deals, and cronyism that would send the rest of us to prison. Houghton
Mifflin Harcourt.
Seasholes, M. S., Zhu, N., 2010. Individual investors and local bias. The Journal of Finance
65, 1987–2010.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. W., 1994. Politicians and firms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics
109, 995–1025.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. W., 2010. Unstable banking. Journal of Financial Economics 97,
306–318.
Skinner, D. J., 2008. The evolving relation between earnings, dividends, and stock repur-
chases. Journal of Financial Economics 87, 582 – 609.
Slack, D., 2014. Lawmaker holds stock in defense contractor he champions. USA Today .
Stephens, C. P., Weisbach, M. S., 1998. Actual share reacquisitions in openmarket repurchase
programs. The Journal of Finance 53, 313–333.
Stewart III, C., 2012. The value of committee assignments in congress since 1994. Midwest
Political Science Association .
Stiglitz, J. E., Weiss, A., 1981. Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information.
American Economic Review 71, 393–410.
Sufi, A., 2007. Information asymmetry and financing arrangements: Evidence from syndi-
cated loans. The Journal of Finance 62, 629–668.
Tahoun, A., 2014. The role of stock ownership by us members of congress on the market for
political favors. Journal of Financial Economics 111, 86–110.
Verrecchia, R. E., 1982. Information acquisition in a noisy rational expectations economy.
Econometrica 50, 1415–1430.
Verret, J., 2015. Applying insider trading law to congressmen, government officials, and the
political intelligence industry .
Ziobrowski, A. J., Cheng, P., Boyd, J. W., Ziobrowski, B. J., 2004. Abnormal returns from




SUPPLEMENTAL RESULTS FOR CHAPTER 1
A.1. Examples of Yelp Ratings Shown in Google Search
The figures present the corresponding Google search results of Yelp ratings for the two sample businesses
shown in Figure 1.1. Yelp displays ratings in the form of stars with half-star increments. The top business
has a Yelp rating of 4 stars and the bottom business has a Yelp rating of 4.5 starts. Google displays the
same Yelp ratings as shown on the businesses’ Yelp page.
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A.2. Control Variables around the Cutoffs
The figures plot the control variables as a function of Yelp ratings around the cutoffs. Yelp rounds up and
down the average ratings of the businesses to the nearest half point based on predetermined cutoffs. On a scale
from 1 to 5, 1.25, 1.75, 2.25, 2.75, 3.25, 3.75, 4.25, and 4.75 are the cutoff points. Businesses with average rat-
ings above the cutoff points are assigned Yelp ratings that are rounded up, and businesses with average ratings
below the cutoff points are assigned Yelp ratings that are rounded down to the nearest half points. Through-
out the analysis, I re-center Yelp ratings around their respective cutoffs to 0. The top figure plots the number
of reviews and for every Yelp rating bin, the dots represent the average number of reviews in that bin. The
bottom figure plots the price range and for every Yelp rating bin, the dots represent the average price range
in that bin. The lines are second-order polynomials fitted through the averages on each side of the cutoff.
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A.3. Yelp Manipulation Test
To formally rule out the possibility that business owners manipulate their Yelp ratings, I
carry out a test in the spirit of McCrary (2008). The concern is that business owners may
post fake ratings to boost their overall Yelp ratings to the next one-half star level because
they are aware of the rounding thresholds. If this is the case in practice, one should observe
ratings clustering just above the rounding thresholds. I start with all the raw Yelp ratings
and their corresponding dates at each business. I calculate a moving average of the Yelp
ratings for each business. I then assign those averages to bins and test whether clustering
exists in the bins right above the rounding thresholds.
In the table below, I present the results. In Column (1), I assign average ratings into bins
in the increment of 0.01 point. The dependent variable is the weight of each bin related to
the total number of reviews. I define the independent variable, potential manipulation, as
an indicator variable that equals one if the bin is right above the rounding thresholds and
equals zero otherwise. I find that the regression coefficient is not statistically different from
zero and the magnitude is close to zero. The evidence suggests that business owners do not
manipulate Yelp ratings on average. Similarly, in Column (2), I conduct the same test using
a wider bin, i.e., in the increment of 0.05 point. I find qualitatively similar result.
Rating bin weight
[0.01 bin] [0.05 bin]
(1) (2)






This table reports OLS regression results for SBA loan probability and Yelp ratings. The dependent
variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the business receives an SBA loan and equals zero otherwise.
Iround up is an indicator variable that equals one if the Yelp rating is rounded up and equals zero if rounded
down. Columns (1), (2), and (3) restricts the sample to observations with Yelp ratings within 0.05, 0.10,
and 0.15 points of the cutoffs, respectively. The cutoffs are defined in Figure 1.5. The control variables are
defined in Table 1.2. All the right-hand-side variables are scaled up by a factor of 1,000. Robust standard
errors clustered by Yelp businesses are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Variables [-0.05, +0.05] [-0.10, +0.10] [-0.15, +0.15]
(1) (2) (3)
Iround up 0.1332*** 0.1341*** 0.1284***
(0.0158) (0.0112) (0.0092)
Log(number of reviews) 0.0547*** 0.0653*** 0.0612***
(0.0090) (0.0063) (0.0053)
Price range ($) -0.0132 -0.0425 -0.0579
(0.0892) (0.0652) (0.0538)
Price range ($$) -0.0111 -0.0302 -0.0448
(0.0879) (0.0639) (0.0527)
Price range ($$$) -0.0257 -0.0447 -0.0802
(0.0925) (0.0663) (0.0548)
Cutoff fixed effects X X X
Year fixed effects X X X
Yelp industry fixed effects X X X
County fixed effects X X X
Observations 8,173,728 16,339,376 23,717,292
R-squared 0.0005 0.0003 0.0003
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A.5. Loan Terms
This table reports OLS regression results for SBA loan terms and Yelp ratings. In Panel A, the dependent
variable is the loan spread, calculated as the interest rate charged on the loan that is determined by the
lending institution minus the beginning of month prime rate. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the
amount required as collateral divided by total loan amount. Iround up is an indicator variable that equals
one if the Yelp rating is rounded up and equals zero if rounded down. Columns (1), (2), and (3) restricts the
sample to observations with Yelp ratings within 0.05, 0.10, and 0.15 points of the cutoffs, respectively. The
cutoffs are defined in Figures 1.6 and 1.7. The control variables are defined in Table 1.2. Robust standard
errors clustered by Yelp businesses are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Variables [-0.05, +0.05] [-0.10, +0.10] [-0.15, +0.15]
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Loan spread
Iround up -0.4581*** -0.4786*** -0.5067***
(0.0670) (0.0447) (0.0363)
Log(number of reviews) 0.0214 -0.0289 -0.0160
(0.0316) (0.0213) (0.0179)
Price range ($) 0.0286 0.1457 0.2146
(0.3665) (0.2268) (0.1760)
Price range ($$) 0.0908 0.1388 0.2057
(0.3627) (0.2232) (0.1716)
Price range ($$$) 0.0134 0.0860 0.1591
(0.3626) (0.2272) (0.1776)
Loan characteristics control X X X
Cutoff fixed effects X X X
Year fixed effects X X X
Yelp industry fixed effects X X X
County fixed effects X X X
Observations 2,588 5,159 7,720
R-squared 0.2474 0.1979 0.1589
Panel B: Collateral
Iround up -0.0524*** -0.0500*** -0.0538***
(0.0069) (0.0047) (0.0038)
Log(number of reviews) -0.0031 -0.0013 -0.0012
(0.0032) (0.0022) (0.0019)
Price range ($) 0.0069 -0.0224 -0.0339*
(0.0388) (0.0258) (0.0202)
Price range ($$) 0.0046 -0.0242 -0.0355*
(0.0381) (0.0254) (0.0198)
Price range ($$$) -0.0173 -0.0500* -0.0475**
(0.0390) (0.0262) (0.0206)
Loan characteristics control X X X
Cutoff fixed effects X X X
Year fixed effects X X X
Yelp industry fixed effects X X X
County fixed effects X X X
Observations 2,588 5,159 7,720
R-squared 0.2897 0.2601 0.2291
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A.6. Loan Performance
This table reports OLS regression results for SBA loan performance and Yelp ratings. In Panel A, the
dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the business defaults on the loan and equals zero
otherwise. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the write-off amount by the lender divided by total loan
amount. Iround up is an indicator variable that equals one if the Yelp rating is rounded up and equals zero if
rounded down. Columns (1), (2), and (3) restricts the sample to observations with Yelp ratings within 0.05,
0.10, and 0.15 points of the cutoffs, respectively. The cutoffs are defined in Figures 1.8 and 1.9. The control
variables are defined in Table 1.2. Robust standard errors clustered by Yelp businesses are in parentheses.
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Variables [-0.05, +0.05] [-0.10, +0.10] [-0.15, +0.15]
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Default
Iround up -0.0281*** -0.0281*** -0.0311***
(0.0067) (0.0043) (0.0037)
Log(number of reviews) 0.0065** 0.0029 0.0006
(0.0031) (0.0021) (0.0017)
Price range ($) 0.0183 -0.0063 -0.0061
(0.0240) (0.0234) (0.0200)
Price range ($$) 0.0258 -0.0067 -0.0077
(0.0241) (0.0233) (0.0197)
Price range ($$$) 0.0491* 0.0019 -0.0106
(0.0264) (0.0255) (0.0208)
Loan characteristics control X X X
Cutoff fixed effects X X X
Year fixed effects X X X
Yelp industry fixed effects X X X
County fixed effects X X X
Observations 2,588 5,159 7,720
R-squared 0.2126 0.1344 0.1001
Panel B: Write-off amount
Iround up -0.0226*** -0.0233*** -0.0253***
(0.0056) (0.0036) (0.0031)
Log(number of reviews) 0.0058** 0.0028 0.0005
(0.0025) (0.0017) (0.0014)
Price range ($) 0.0131 -0.0105 -0.0070
(0.0212) (0.0246) (0.0174)
Price range ($$) 0.0184 -0.0114 -0.0080
(0.0214) (0.0246) (0.0172)
Price range ($$$) 0.0385* -0.0053 -0.0109
(0.0232) (0.0263) (0.0183)
Loan characteristics control X X X
Cutoff fixed effects X X X
Year fixed effects X X X
Yelp industry fixed effects X X X
County fixed effects X X X
Observations 2,588 5,159 7,720
R-squared 0.2044 0.1342 0.1000
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A.7. Additional Control Variables
This table reports OLS regression results for SBA loan terms and Yelp ratings. The dependent variables are
the loan terms used in the main analysis. Iround up is an indicator variable that equals one if the Yelp rating
is rounded up and equals zero if rounded down. I carry out the RDD analysis, introducing a polynomial in
the Yelp rating of order two on each side of the cutoff, interacted with Iround up. The cutoffs are defined in
Figure 1.5. The control variables are defined in Table 1.2. This table includes additional control variables of
log number of employees, credit score, and the portion of loan guarantee in all columns and loan spread and
collateral in Columns (3) and (4). Robust standard errors clustered by Yelp businesses are in parentheses.
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Loan Write-off
Variables spread Collateral Default amount
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Iround up -0.2000** -0.0285*** -0.0423*** -0.0342***
(0.0955) (0.0057) (0.0156) (0.0128)
Log(number of reviews) 0.0253 0.0010 -0.0019 -0.0014
(0.0156) (0.0009) (0.0018) (0.0015)
Price range ($) 0.0211 -0.0062 -0.0072 -0.0023
(0.1424) (0.0071) (0.0212) (0.0172)
Price range ($$) -0.0305 -0.0049 -0.0072 -0.0028
(0.1400) (0.0069) (0.0208) (0.0169)
Price range ($$$) -0.1015 -0.0080 -0.0133 -0.0068
(0.1462) (0.0074) (0.0213) (0.0176)
Log(number of employees) 0.0072 -0.0001 0.0037 0.0029
(0.0195) (0.0013) (0.0028) (0.0024)
Credit score control -0.1098 -0.0050 0.0068 0.0042
(0.1553) (0.0097) (0.0185) (0.0157)
Higher order polynomial X X X X
Loan characteristics control X X X X
Cutoff fixed effects X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X
Yelp industry fixed effects X X X X
County fixed effects X X X X
Observations 7,800 7,800 7,800 7,800
R-squared 0.3687 0.4254 0.1579 0.1447
120
